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Employing the social and political ontology of Iris Marion Young, this paper evaluates the claim as to 
whether or not fat people are subject to oppression on the basis of their weight. It establishes clear 
criteria for what constitutes oppression (exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism, and violence), as well as a compelling epistemological argument for the need to 
conceptualize structural social relations at the level of social groups. It provides a psychoanalytic 
account of embodied subjectivity, and considers the implications of a fat-hating culture on subjectivity 
in light of this ontology. Further, it documents the way these fatphobic cultural norms have impacted 
women, with particular emphasis on the history of anorexia. Lastly, it interrogates the medical literature 
surrounding obesity qua disease, as well as how the 'obesity epidemic' is both produced by, and co- 
constitutive of, the process of biomedicalization in late capitalism. 
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I. Introduction: Whetting the Appetite
FAT PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, UNITE! YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE.
 The Fat Liberation Manifesto, 1973
In  January  2012,  Toronto  mayor  Rob  Ford  announced  that  he  and  his  brother,  city 
councillor Doug Ford, would both be publicly dieting together in order to kick off a city-
wide weight loss challenge. The mayor, by his own admission, weighed well over 300 
pounds, and his brother clocked in somewhere in the ballpark of 275. Both pledged to 
drop 50 pounds each by the middle of June, with periodic public weigh-ins to mark their  
progress towards this goal. Ostensibly, both were motivated by health concerns; Doug 
explained to a radio show at the outset of the diet that:
Rob has two young kids and I have four girls. We want to be around to watch them get  
married and be grandparents. If you're carrying this extra weight... it's not healthy. And we 
know that. (Bolen, 2012)
But  while  concerns  about  their  health  were  no  doubt  a  motivating  factor,  there  was 
definitely something else behind the two brothers' decision to make a public spectacle out 
of their weight loss: it was as much a political act as a personal one. 
Since  becoming  mayor,  Rob  Ford  has  received  a  lot  of  criticism  from  the 
Canadian Left. But beneath many of the partisan disagreements over municipal policy, it 
was never hard to discern a deeper and more damning denunciation: Rob Ford is a bad 
mayor (and a bad person) because he is fat. Obviously Doug Ford and his brother could 
more readily locate nearby Tim Horton's outlets than local public libraries; their priorities 
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(donuts) are painfully clear. Their fat, bloated bodies are physical manifestations of the 
conservative, corporatist political agenda they represent; the irony of a fat man like Rob 
Ford talking about 'halting the gravy train' of municipal spending is about as thick as the 
plaque inevitably clogging his arteries. Of course Rob Ford hates cyclists and pedestrians; 
he  clearly hates  all  forms  of  exercise  (Horel,  2011).  In  one  of  the  more  scathing 
indictments of Rob Ford's fat body, Toronto writer Ben Johnson declared “I believe that 
the fact that our mayor is fat is actually relevant to the debate about his competency to do 
his duties (...) [and] I think it speaks to a level of personal irresponsibility and short-
sightedness” (Johnson, 2011).
Presumably, Mr. Johnson and his colleagues have felt their opinions vindicated 
now that Ford's highly public diet has concluded; a few weeks before he was due to weigh 
in for the final time on June 18th, Ford openly conceded on a radio program that he had 
quit his diet (a month earlier, he had been caught on camera entering a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken).  In  the end, Ford only lost  about  17 pounds over the six-month period;  his 
brother  Doug  managed  to  lose  35  pounds  after  reportedly  dropping  a  3-litre-a-day 
chocolate  milk habit.  Predictably,  Ford's  failed diet  has  again served as  proof for  his 
critics that he is incompetent both personally and politically, and that this incompetency 
has visibly manifested itself on his body1. How can Rob Ford take care of Toronto, one 
wonders, if he cannot even take care of himself?
The obscene fascination that many self-identified “progressives” have with the 
1 Despite the fact that up to 95% of all diets fail and that even successful weight-loss programs only 
produce, on average, a sustained (i.e. lasting more than five years) reduction of less than 3% of body  
weight (Anderson et al., 2001).
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size of Rob Ford's abdomen highlights an interesting phenomenon. I would wager that 
very few of  the  people  who regularly use  Ford's  weight  as  a  reason  to  question  his 
competency  as  mayor  would  point  to,  say,  former  Alaskan  governor  Sarah  Palin's 
personal (and political) ignorance as a symptom of her gender. Nor would they, I imagine, 
attempt  to  argue  that  Ottawa  MP John  Baird's  abrasive  performances  in  the  federal 
cabinet are reducible (or even related) to his sexual orientation, or that any of Labrador 
MP Peter Penashue's political gaffes have occurred because he is Aboriginal. That many 
individuals who would otherwise not hesitate to denounce sexism, racism, classism, and 
homophobia have no problem explicitly and unabashedly claiming that Rob Ford is a bad 
person because he is a fat person speaks to just how powerful and pervasive the societal 
prejudices  against  fat  people  really  are  in  the  early  21st century.  So  powerful  and 
pervasive,  in  fact,  that  they  constitute  nothing  less  than  one  of  the  many  forms  of 
oppression that fat people, collectively, experience in contemporary Western society.
'Fat people are oppressed' – that is the central argument of this treatise. There is a 
general  consensus  that  fat  people  can  sometimes  be  treated  poorly  or  otherwise 
stigmatized because of their size, but there is a hesitation to label them oppressed. Public 
health officials have been warning us for over a decade that obesity is a deadly disease; 
media  commentators  remind  us  regularly  that  rising  global  obesity  rates  will  take  a 
terrible economic cost on our nation; popular culture buttresses both by portraying the fat 
body as repulsive and absurd (if they even portray it at all).  The global obesity crisis  
mandates that although we might love the fat person, we must hate the fat. 
Against this received wisdom, I submit that the contemporary moral panic about 
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obesity is the outgrowth of very old prejudices in Western thought against the 'horrors' of 
the flesh itself, translated now into the post-modern discourses of consumer capitalism 
and  the  biomedicalization  of  our  society.  It  is  also  serves  as  the  implicit  intellectual 
legitimation  for  much  of  the  exploitation,  marginalization,  powerlessness,  cultural 
denigration, and violence to which fat people – in particular, fat women and minorities – 
are regularly subjected.
These are radical claims for a fat-hating society, but – as I will argue – they are 
legitimate.  Fat people,  as a  group, are  regularly subjected to social,  institutional,  and 
cultural structures and power relations which adversely impact their quality of life and 
personal development. Fat children are, on the whole, subjected to more bullying than 
their thinner peers, and many are even ridiculed by their gym teachers (Rimm and Rimm, 
2004);  average-weight  children  who  fear  becoming  fat  may  eat  too  little,  become 
malnourished, and delay the onset of puberty (Pugliese et al., 1983). Fat teenagers are 
more  likely to  face  humiliating  and shaming experiences  that  can  lead  to  depression 
(Sjöberg et al., 2005), teens who think they're not the “right” weight are more likely to 
contemplate  or attempt suicide (Eaton et  al.,  2005),  and disordered relationships with 
food are distressingly common among young women (Polivy and Herman, 1987). When 
it  comes to  higher education,  high school counsellors are less likely to encourage fat 
students  to  apply  for  colleges,  colleges  are  less  likely  to  admit  equally qualified  fat 
applicants, and parents are less likely to pay a fat daughter's college tuition (Crandall, 
1995).
Fat people do not fare any better in the workplace. In one survey, 93% of human 
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resources professionals admitted they would hire a “normal weight” applicant over an 
equally qualified fat applicant, 15% said they would not promote a fat employee, and one 
in ten claimed it  was acceptable to fire an employee for being fat  (Wann, 2009).  Fat 
women earn up to one-fourth less than their thinner co-workers (Cawley, 2000), and fat 
employees are regularly denied health insurance benefits and are pressured to resign or 
are fired for being fat (Rothblum et al., 1990). Perhaps most insidiously of all, anti-fat 
attitudes are often most deeply internalized (and most intensely expressed) by fat people 
themselves; in one psychological study of weight bias, fat people expressed significantly 
harsher judgements upon viewing an image of a thin man with a fat woman than average-
weight people did (Gallagher et al., 2003). These are just a few of the concrete instances 
of fat oppression commonplace in Western society.
The social ontology of Iris Marion Young broadly encapsulates the systemic and 
structural  processes  which  characterize  fat  oppression.  Young's  conceptualization  of 
oppression  –  a  multifaceted  phenomenon  comprised  of  a  complex  set  of  historically 
situated,  systematically  reproduced  social,  economic,  cultural  and  institutional  power 
relationships – is innovative; straightforward, expansive, and nuanced. Oppression occurs 
when  relationships  between  social  groups  are  characterized  by  exploitation, 
marginalization,  powerlessness,  cultural  imperialism,  and  violence   These  are  clear 
criteria  for  determining  whether  individuals  and  groups  are  oppressed;  any claim of 
oppression  can  be  assessed  through  “observable  behaviour,  status  relationships, 
[economic]  distributions,  (…) and other  cultural  artifacts”  (Young,  1990:  64).  In  this 
sense, they are 'objective' criteria and measurements of social oppression and injustice. 
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The breadth of Young's  theory makes it  possible  to  evaluate  the situations of various 
social groups, and allows us to compare different group oppressions without reducing 
them to a common essence, or claiming that one form of oppression is more 'fundamental' 
than another.
The presence  of  any of  these  five  conditions  is  sufficient  for  calling  a  group 
oppressed.  Different  groups  are  subject  to  different  combinations  of  these  forms  of 
oppression, as are various individuals within the groups themselves. And while these are 
general categories of oppression, causal explanations of a group's oppressions will always 
be  particular  and  historical;  “an  explanatory  account  of  why  a  particular  group  is 
oppressed in the ways that it is must trace the history and current structure of particular 
social relations” (ibid.:  65). Young's theory works because it builds on the insights of 
several important theoretical traditions in the study of oppression and ontology; namely, 
feminism,  Marxism,  psychoanalysis,  critical  race  studies,  queer  theory,  and  post-
structuralism. The first  chapter of this work will delineate the contours and import of 
Young's theory; specifically, how it explains the formation and dynamics of social groups, 
why  oppression  is  best  conceptualized  at  the  level  of  social  groups,  and  why these 
theories are indispensable for making and evaluating claims of social justice. 
Once this basic intellectual foundation has been laid, the second chapter provides 
a  historical  overview  of  cultural  and  aesthetic  conceptions  of  the  fat  body  through 
Western history,  the way in which fear and hatred of the fat  body – that is,  so-called 
'fatphobia'  –  has  come to  be the  dominant  cultural  attitude  towards  fat  bodies  in  the 
contemporary period, and the implications of a fat-hating society for the very ontology of 
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fat people. To be sure, one of the most important aspects of a study on fat oppression is 
that it exposes new dimensions in the central human question of embodiment; that is, the 
relationship of human subjectivity to the material body it inhabits. This question warrants 
recourse to psychoanalytic theory; I am in solidarity with philosopher Slavoj Žižek when 
he  declares  that  “it  is  only psychoanalysis  that  can  disclose  the  full  contours  of  the 
shattering  impact  of  modernity –  that  is,  capitalism combined with  the  hegemony of 
scientific discourse – on the way our identity is grounded in symbolic identifications” 
(Žižek, 2006: 82). Here, I have deployed psychoanalysis to disclose the way subjectivity 
arises  at  the  juncture  of  the  human  body  and  human  socialization;  it  exposes  the 
ontological trauma that comes with inhabiting a fat body in a culture that reduces it to a 
piece of abject trash.
The  astute  reader  may have  noticed  by now that  I  have  shown an  unsettling 
deference  to  the  term 'fat'  ahead  of  'obese'  or  any other  euphemism.  This  choice  of 
language is deliberate. There is nothing inherently bad about the word 'fat', and the extent 
to  which  'fat  person'  (or  especially  'fat  woman')  is  read  as  a  pejorative  or  offensive 
moniker is an index of cultural fatphobia. The word fat in common parlance is loaded 
down with moral signification: to be fat is to be lazy, sloppy, ugly, stupid, irresponsible, 
greedy, unhealthy, and wrong; it has become much more an accusation (or confession) of 
moral wickedness than a simple physical description. To use any of the assorted 'neutral'  
euphemisms commonly substituted in place of 'fat' (e.g. 'bigger', 'larger', 'person of size', 
'curvy', 'plus-sized', etc.) would be to implicitly accept (and perpetuate) these fatphobic 
connotations. Similarly, to use the medical term 'obese' in its stead would be surrendering 
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the ontological terrain to those who would argue that the fat body (and the fat person) is  
inherently a pathology,  a clinical (and social)  disease for which we must find a cure. 
Given that this work outlines and directly challenges societal fatphobia, my unabashed 
employment of the word 'fat'  here is thoroughly political.  Just  as LGBT activists  and 
intellectuals over the past twenty years have had considerable success in re-appropriating 
and transforming the  term 'queer'  from a  homophobic  slur  into  a  positive  and proud 
statement of subjectivity, I align myself with those fat activists (see; Braziel and Lebesco, 
2001; Lebesco, 2004; Solovay and Rothblum, 2009; Bacon, 2010; Farrell,  2011) who 
would reclaim the word as a point of positive identification. If nothing else, the word's  
jarring appearance here underscores how deeply politicized and contentious the fat body 
is even at the level of basic semantic representation.
Much  of  the  theoretical  arsenal  I  wield  in  this  analysis  is  greatly  indebted  to 
feminist theory. Recognition of the way that the female body (and the female subject) has 
historically  been  contorted  and  subordinated  to  oppressive,  patriarchal  power 
relationships is clearly one of the intellectual starting points for broader analyses into the 
way bodies and subjects are positioned and oppressed by social  relationships; indeed, 
most of the early investigations into fat oppression come from feminists. This is because, 
as I will explore in the third chapter of this work, the experience of fat oppression is 
overwhelmingly gendered. Fear and hatred of the fat body has been inextricably linked to 
fear and hatred of the female body since the dawn of Western reason; fat women are in a 
particularly painful double-bind. Many feminists  have argued that  as restrictions have 
been lifted on what women are allowed to do, more constraints have been imposed on 
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what women are allowed to look like. Fat women, by failing to make their bodies into 
objects of aesthetic and sexual pleasure, defy their gender roles; their occupation of public 
space puts them at odds with social conventions that mandate women make room for 
men. Even if they are not fat, women suffer the effects of fat oppression acutely. At its  
most benign, the fear of becoming fat locks many women into an endless repetition of 
anxious self-regulation and self-depreciation in the service of fatphobic beauty norms; at 
its  most  malignant,  these  misogynistic  and  fatphobic  cultural  norms  converge  in  the 
explosion of eating disorders that has occurred across the West since the early 1980s. One 
need look no further than the emaciated body of the anorexic to see the obscene mirror 
image of contemporary femininity.
Certainly,  no one would argue that anorexia and bulimia are not serious health 
concerns;  but  is  not  the  larger  epidemic  of  obesity  an  equally  (if  not  more)  serious 
problem? The last chapter in this work brings us to the question of the so-called obesity 
epidemic.  Drawing  on  extensive  reviews  and  critiques  of  the  empirical  research  on 
obesity, it can be demonstrated that some of the dire pronouncements around the obesity 
crisis are somewhat overblown; in order to trace the lines of fat oppression through our 
the contemporary 'war on fat', there is a serious need to disentangle the ideological knot 
where  medical  science  and  longstanding  cultural  prejudices  against  the  fat  body 
intertwine. This is not a medical treatise, nor does it seek to malign legitimate medical 
research;  however,  it  will  highlight  that,  taken  in  historical  perspective,  much 
contemporary hand-wringing about obesity is the latest expression of very old fears about 
the decline of Western civilization; a century before opinion columnists would lament 
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how  televisions,  computers,  and  fast  food  are  making  us  lazy,  fat,  and  decadent, 
commentators were regularly warning that telephones and elevators were having much 
the same effect. What is unique about the current moral panic surrounding obesity is the 
way that these cultural and medical prejudices have been transformed by the social forces 
of  biomedicalization  which  permeate  the  late  capitalist  mode  of  production.  Human 
health is now a commodity, and the value of your body (and your life) is measured with  
the Body Mass  Index.  In  a  consumerist  society where everyone is  always  'at  risk'  of 
succumbing to the “scourge” of obesity, it is ironically the dieter that turns out to be the 
consuming subject par excellence. As a matter of history, there are fat profits to be made 
from fat oppression.
These  are  bold  claims;  many  of  them are  also  moral.  I  take  for  granted  the 
normative proposition that every human being should be equal in their basic life situation; 
I  also take it  for granted that many structures of oppression wrongfully permeate our 
society  because  of  the  ongoing  stigmatization  of  human  difference,  and  that  these 
injustices are physically,  psychically,  and ontologically damaging. I would expect that 
these  commitments  are  broadly  shared  by  all  political  theorists  insofar  as  they  are 
committed to a vision of social justice signified by liberté,  egalité, solidarité. As Young 
aptly formulates in Justice and the Politics of Difference, to the extent a society is divided 
by  oppression,  as  theorists,  we  either  reinforce  or  resist  them;  insofar  as  we  allow 
oppressions to persist unexamined and unchallenged, our own freedoms are diminished.
I understand that this may be a lot  to digest all at once; the “roast pigeons of 
knowledge” (Marx, 1843) rarely go down easy, and in this instance, they are scandalously 
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fattening. I can only hope that the intellectual feast I have prepared here will leave the 
reader satisfied.
Bon  appétit.
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II. A Hunger for Justice – The Social Ontology of Iris Young
The  philosopher  is  always  socially  situated,  and  if  the  society  is  divided  by 
oppressions, she either reinforces or struggles against them.
- Iris Young
Any investigation into the relationship between body size and oppression must begin with 
a simple question: what is oppression? In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Mari-
on Young provides a concise definition: oppression refers to social and institutional struc-
tures and power relationships which adversely affect members of social groups (Young, 
1990: 42). More specifically, Young describes oppression as the “institutional constraint 
on self-development” that “consists in systematic institutional processes which prevent 
some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recog-
nized settings, or institutionalized social processes which inhibit peoples' ability to play 
and communicate with others or to express their feeling and perspectives on social life in 
contexts  where others  will  listen” (ibid.:  37-38).  It  is  important  to  note here  that  for 
Young, oppression 'functions' on the level of the social group; individuals experience op-
pression by virtue of their belonging to a group. As we shall see, this fits with her overall  
ontology, wherein groups are prior-to, and constitutive of, an individual's identity.
For Young, a social group is “a collective of persons differentiated from at least 
one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life” (Young, 1990: 43). These 
groups are a function of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one oth-
er  group,  and identification  with  a  group arises  out  of  the  encounter  and  interaction 
between social  collectivities which experience some difference between one another - 
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even if both groups regard themselves as belonging to the same society (ibid.). In this 
sense, group identity is created through social contact with other groups; “group identities 
must always be defined in relation to what they are not – in other words, to non-members 
of the group” (Eriksen, 2010: 14).
It  is  important to note that a social  group is not defined primarily by a set of 
shared attributes, but rather by a sense of shared identity - “though sometimes objective 
attributes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or others as belonging to a cer-
tain social group, it is identification with a certain social status (...) and self-identification 
that define[s] the group as a group” (Young, 1990: 44). More importantly is the relation-
ship - and distinction - between individuals and social groups: social groups are not entit-
ies which exist apart from empirical individuals, but nor are they aggregates of individu-
als according to attributes which are 'external' to their identities. The social meanings of 
belonging to  a  group partially constitute  individual  identities  in  terms  of  the  cultural 
forms, social situation, and history that members of the group share. This is true insofar as 
these meanings are either forced upon the group, forged by the group, or a dialectical 
combination of both. As Young aptly explains, groups are 'real' in a very Lacanian sense - 
they exist not as substance, but as the function and form of social relations (ibid.).
Young's group-based social ontology forms the core of her conceptions of justice 
and oppression. This differentiates her from what she criticizes as the “individualist social 
ontology” at the core of liberal conceptions of justice (see, for instance: Rawls, 1971; No-
zick, 1974), which she claims is co-morbid with a normative conception of the self as a 
unified, homogenous entity that ontologically precedes socialization, wherein the subject 
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qua individual is  an autonomous unit  to  which attributes and identities  (gender,  race, 
class, etc.) attach themselves (ibid: 45). Against this position, Young presents a 'poststruc-
tural' ontology, wherein identity is a “socialized sense of individuality, an internal organ-
ization of self-perception concerning one's relationship to social categories, that also in-
corporates views of the self perceived to be held by others” (Epstein, 1987: 29); in this 
conception, group categorization and norms are major constituents of individual identity. 
By locating identity in  the dynamics  of  the social  relations in  which individuals  find 
themselves (Young here invokes Heidegger's notion of 'thrownness': “one finds oneself as 
a member of a group, which one experiences as always-already having been” (Young, 
1990: 46)), Young both presents a fluid and nuanced conception of social ontology, and 
prefigures  the  psychoanalytic  model  of  subject-formation  explored  in  the  following 
chapter. Insofar as liberal social ontology presumes the individual to prefigure or tran-
scend the impact of social relations on identity formation, it remains incompatible with 
the insights of psychoanalysis on the development of human subjectivity; by illuminating 
the way socialization constitutes identity, Young's post-structuralist approach is signific-
antly more compatible to the study of social justice.
In this conception, individuals never forge their own identities ex nihilo; instead, 
subjects experience (group-derived) identity as given, and then appropriate that identity as 
'their own' in a certain way. Groups, then, effectively constitute individuals; “a person's 
particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person's mode of reason-
ing, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinit-
ies” (ibid.: 45). While this is not to say individuals are limited to the horizon of their 
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group identities, those identities – as well as the group's position vis-à-vis other groups in 
the grand network of social relations – form the bedrock of their subjectivity.
Groups  are  a  function  of  social  relations;  they  exist  only  in  relation  to  other 
groups. These groups may come into being in a number of ways. Groups may be identi-
fied by outsiders without those so identified having any specific consciousness of them-
selves as a group; certainly this is the case for many fat people, who have been extens-
ively categorized and pathologized by public health officials  and social  commentators 
since the outbreak of the 'obesity epidemic,' regardless of whether or not they consciously 
self-identify as such. Other times, a group comes to exist only because another group ex-
cludes and labels a category of persons, and those labeled come to understand themselves 
as group members based solely on the shared experience of oppression; this is the history 
of contemporary 'fat activism,' which grew out of feminist and civil rights struggles in the 
1960s as people began to challenge the way fat people (and particularly, fat women) were 
stigmatized in Western society2. In certain cases, a person's group identity may be for the 
most part only a background or horizon to his or her life, becoming salient only in specif -
ic interactive contexts3; for instance, an individual may not be conscious of their identity 
as 'fat' until they are denied health insurance because of their weight. (ibid.: 46).
2 New York City was the site of the first “Fat-In” protest in 1967, out of which grew both the North 
American Association for Fat Acceptance (a civil rights organization dedicated to protecting the rights 
and improving the quality of life of fat people) and more radical Fat Underground (authors of the 1973 
Fat Liberation Manifesto) (Schwartz, 1986: 331).
3 Young makes the point that it is generally only individuals in privileged groups who do not experience 
themselves  as  part  of  a  group,  whereas  individuals  in  oppressed  groups  are  often  unable  to  not  
experience  themselves  as  defined  to  a  great  extent  by  their  group  identity;  the  oppression  they 
experience always makes that identity salient (Young, 1990: 124).
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Young is  quick to  point  out,  however,  that  while  recognizing the dynamics  of 
group difference is paramount to her social ontology, it is important to avoid falling into 
the 'essentialist' trap. Essentialism refers to the attribution of a fixed essence to a social 
group; that is, the theoretical commitment that “fixed, independent [generally biological] 
mechanisms steer individual desires and behaviours (…) irrespective of circumstance or 
experience” (De Cecco and Elia, 1993: 11). This essence is assumed to be given, univer-
sal, and is usually, though not necessarily, rooted in biology and 'natural' characteristics4 
(Grosz, 1989). In essentialism, identity and difference are naturalized and rendered unal-
terable, often anchored in biology and largely unaffected by culture, history, and socializ-
ation. As Young aptly points out, “oppression has often been perpetrated by a conceptual-
ization of group difference in terms of unalterable essential natures that determine what 
group members deserve or are capable of, and that exclude groups so entirely from one 
another that they have no similarities of overlapping attributes” (ibid.: 47). Groups must 
therefore be conceptualized as highly relational and fluid; whereas they arise from social 
relations and processes, group differences generally cut across one another. In a large, 
complex, and highly differentiated society like our own, social groups are not homogen-
ous blocks but are themselves heterogeneous and differentiated, impossible to reduce to 
an 'essential' identity.
Indeed, Young makes such a convincing case for the potentially infinite sub-strati-
fication within a social group that some liberal critics have charged that it actually under-
4 Essentialism, of course, can be asserted on both theological (e.g. women are inherently morally weak, as 
displayed by Eve's actions in the Book of Genesis) and ontological (e.g. the assertions by many early 
Freudians that women's social position is a function of her genital morphology) grounds.
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mines her argument that groups should take precedence over individuals at the level of 
analysis. Specifically, Adam Tebble – following Chandran Kukathas' critique of group-
based theories of justice – charges that asserting social groups as ontologically given is 
succumbing, at the level of groups, to the theoretical 'atomism' that Young associates with 
methodological individualism. These social groups must be asserted as given, Tebble ar-
gues, so that the theory “actually [has] something – the group – that can act as the bearer  
of the rights to be parcelled out” (Tebble, 2002: 270). However, because social groups are 
never ontologically given – they are “always constituted within a matrix of sociality” 
(Tebble, 271) – group-based theories of justice must  necessarily essentialize, reify, and 
otherwise atomize the subjects of their inquiry. 
Following Young's own theorization that groups themselves are internally differ-
entiated  and  dynamic  in  continually  new  ways  (arising  from interactions  with  other 
groups, subgroups, etc.), social groups would constantly be shifting in constitution and 
character. For Tebble, this is the point where Young's theory hangs itself; because of what 
she  has  “correctly  [identified]  (…) as  the  cross-cutting  nature  of  group-differentiated 
identity, (…) the kind of entity [i.e. the social group] to which rights are supposed to ad-
here is not there to receive them” (ibid.). Kukathas here underscores the point to be made 
from all this, noting that “the divided nature of cultural communities strengthens the case 
for not thinking in terms of cultural rights” (Kukathas, 1992: 110).
To be sure, as we have seen above, Young has argued that social groups are not 
themselves 'real' in any substantive sense. Seizing on this point, Tebble points out that if  
this is the case, then while there might be value to theories of social explanation that muse 
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about social groups, in political practice, “how groups are important and to what extent 
they should feature in people's lives are questions that can only be meaningfully answered 
by individuals  once  groups  are  described  at  the  level  of  ontology in  anti-essentialist 
terms” (Tebble, 2002: 272). The logical conclusion of Young's anti-essentialist ontology is 
that it undermines her entire argument for thinking in terms of group rights rather than a 
“liberal individualist institutional arrangement to grapple with the challenges of differ-
ence” (ibid.). Following Kukathas' claim that whereas groups are “constantly forming and 
dissolving in response to political and institutional circumstances,” the task of political 
theory is to “articulate and justify that set of institutions that best reflects the fact of the 
dynamism of groups” (ibid.). Inevitably, “what this points to (…) are liberal individualist 
institutions as the most appropriate for  eliciting, on a free and equal basis, the ever-un-
folding character of groups, without presupposing at any stage either their ontological 
stasis or internal homogeniety” (ibid.).
From all this, moreover, Tebble diagnoses Young with a crippling case of “unac-
knowledged liberalism”; her commitment to a radically anti-essentialist ontology as well 
as her theoretical emphasis on such 'universal' values such as the promotion of individual 
self-determination, individual self-development and the equal moral worth of all human 
beings (Young, 1990: 37; 2000: 31) place her all squarely in the camp of the liberal theory 
she often appears to be criticizing. Ultimately, Tebble believes Young's entire emphasis on 
social groups is but a thin (and mistaken) theoretical veil for a clear and overarching con-
cern with individuals:
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The entire concern with groups – and the centrality [Young] accords them in her critical and 
normative projects – is no more than instrumental to an even deeper concern with the dom-
ination and oppression that  is  experienced in countless  individual lives the world over. 
(Tebble, 2002: 274-5)
Young, by her own admission, has never tried to deny that she has taken some theoretical  
influence from liberal philosophy; in fact, it seems a stretch that any worthwhile political 
philosopher,  from any  ideological  background,  who  theorizes  oppression  and  justice 
would not be concerned with the 'really existing' suffering of the empirical individuals un-
derlying their conceptual models5. Leaving aside this (rather silly) point of criticism, there 
are valid reasons to dispute Tebble's claims contra a group-centric theory of identity and 
oppression.
First and foremost, it should be noted that nowhere does Young take social groups 
as ontologically given; she goes to great lengths to argue that groups are constituted rela-
tionally in the mediated 'matrix of sociality' of structurally differentiated society. Specific-
ally with regards to Tebble's charge that she mistakenly privileges groups above individu-
als, she asserts:
Individuals come into a world where social groups are a given, and people treat one another  
partly on the basis of imputed groups membership. Because so much about political con-
flict and social inequality turns on these relational group experiences, I have argued that  
political theory and public policy must take account of and respond to such experiences 
5 In her (rather scathing) response to Tebble, Young succinctly points out that “if liberalism means only a 
commitment to the postulate that all persons are of equal moral worth and that just politics requires a  
rule of law, civil liberties, and procedures of democratic decision making, then I am happy to claim 
membership in the group, as does today much of the rest of the world, including all the theorists called  
communitarian” (Young, 2002: 287).
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rather than try to ignore, level, suppress or transcend them. For political theory to do that, 
however, it cannot take groups as ontologically given but rather requires a social theory of 
their nature and constitution. (Young, 2002: 285).
As a matter of fact, I interpret Young's theorization of group differentiation as multiple, cross-cut-
ting, fluid and shifting – that is, the model that Tebble believes undermines her argument – as a  
launchpad for her most devastating critique against the model of the autonomous, unified self pre-
supposed by individualist social ontologies. Prefiguring the Lacanian critique of orthodox 'indi-
vidualism' I will elaborate in the following chapter, Young points out that
in complex, highly differentiated societies like our own, all persons have multiple group 
identifications. The culture, perspective, and relations of privilege and oppression of these 
various groups, moreover, may not cohere. Thus individual persons, as constituted partly by 
their groups affinities and relations, cannot be unified, are themselves heterogeneous and 
not necessarily coherent. (Young,  1990: pg. 48)
To be sure, Young's group-level analysis is more than just an explanatory expedi-
ency; there is a legitimate epistemological need to theorize social justice at the level of 
groups. Many claims of social justice – especially those which claim inequality is unjust – 
are bound up in the evaluation of society's institutional relations and structural processes. 
Evaluating inequality solely by comparing the situation of individuals provides little or no 
basis for making claims about social justice because they do not reveal the depth of these 
institutional  and  structural  processes  to  the  same extent  as  group  level  analysis.  For 
Young, “identifying inequalities according to group categories helps identify  structural 
inequalities” (Young, 2001: 2). Again, this is obviously not to imply that Young is not 
concerned with inequality as it is experienced on the level of individuals, but identifying 
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the social dynamics which underlie those inequalities requires a social theory that oper-
ates conceptually at the level of groups.
Structural inequality can be theorized as a set of reproduced social processes that 
reinforce one another or enable or constrain individual action in many ways. Indeed, the 
very group differentiations that are made (gender, race, class, age, size, etc.) in the context 
of evaluating inequality as unjust ultimately name structural social relations that tend to 
privilege some more than others. Identifying patterned inequalities and forms of oppres-
sion (as well as identifying and measuring their inverse, such as well-being and privilege) 
is the most fundamental step of identifying basic forms of persisting, structural injustice. 
It is only be evaluating social relations  qua the dynamics of social groups that political 
theorists can identify and process how these social processes produce and reproduce pat-
terns of injustice and oppression (ibid.)
In this sense, then, when we discuss fatness or body size – that is, when we name 
fatness as an identity, fat people as a social group – what we are in fact doing is naming  
the structural social relations that privilege and oppress individuals as a function of the 
signifier 'fatness'.  These structural dynamics are only visible at the level of the group 
identity; that is, the way that particular identity is infused with socio-symbolic meaning, 
which in turn both shapes how an individual is  constituted  as an individual and also 
names the broader institutional relations and structural social processes in which they are 
embroiled as members of the named group.
Having settled the question of the ontological validity of Young's conception of 
social groups, the task now becomes to elucidate what exactly she means when she refers 
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to the “unjust structural inequalities” which groups name. This is best theorized through 
Young's conception of oppression as multifaceted, with five broad modes of structural op-
eration: specifically, she names exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural im-
perialism, and violence as the 'five faces' of oppression which social groups are subjected 
to.
The Five Faces of Oppression
These five facets of oppression  can be broadly broken down into two categories: those 
forms  of  oppression  which  stem out  of  the  economic  or  material  existence  of  social 
groups (economic exploitation, etc.) and those which are related more to a group's cultur-
al and symbolic existence6. As each form is elaborated, so too will be the argument that 
fat people, as a social group, are affected by each particular form Young names.
6 In her famous interrogation of Young's work, Nancy Fraser points out that  although Young's theory 
admirably  encompasses  issues  of  both  economic  distribution  and  cultural  recognition  into  a 
conceptualization of oppression, these two elements are not seamlessly integrated with one another. 
There are indeed some tensions in the way Young attempts to integrate theories of oppression based in  
political economy and those based in theories of cultural rights, and at times the distinction between the  
two (and the way this distinction would play out in practice) is somewhat muddled. Fraser points out 
that  in  many  instances  of  cultural  oppression,  justice  would  be  served  through  recognition  and 
affirmation of group difference; but in cases where cultural differences are tied to differentially desirable 
locations in  the  political  economy,  justice  may require the effacement  of  these  differences  and  the 
restructuring of the division of labour, which problematizes the very premise of a 'politics of difference' 
(Fraser, 1995: 173). While these points definitely warrant further extrapolation, Young 's theory still 
captures  the  general  interplay  between  culture,  political  economy,  identity  and  oppression  with 
exceptional breadth and nuance, and as such provides the best rubric for conceptualizing oppression as a 
function of social relations and processes.
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Exploitation
Young draws her notion of exploitation largely out of Marxist theory. Specifically, she 
employs Marx's theory of exploitation to explain how exploitative and oppressive class 
structures can exist “in the absence of legally or normatively sanctioned class distinc-
tions” (Young, 1990: 48). Young's concerted effort here in appropriating Marx's theory of 
exploitation is to expand it beyond its employment as part of the labour theory of value 7 
by adding an explicitly normative dimension to it in order to elucidate more clearly its 
connection to injustice and oppression.
Following C.B. Macpherson (1973), Young teases out a more explicitly normative 
theory of exploitation: the injustice of capitalist  society consists  in the fact that some 
people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the 
benefit of other people:
Through private ownership of the means of production, and through markets that allocate 
labour and the ability to buy goods, capitalism systematically transfers the powers of some 
persons to others, thereby augmenting the power of the latter. In this process of the transfer 
of powers, (…) the capitalist class acquires and maintains an ability to extract benefits from 
workers. Not only are powers transferred from workers to capitalists, but also the powers of  
workers diminish by more than the amount of transfer,  because workers suffer material 
7 In the interest of thoroughness, a brief summary of the 'classical' Marxist labour theory of value: every  
commodity's value is a function of the labour time necessary for its production; labour power is the one  
commodity which, in the process of being consumed, produces new value; profit, in capitalism, comes 
from the difference between the value of the labour performed by workers, and the value of workers' 
capacity  to  labour  (which  the  capitalist  purchases);  this  difference  –  the  surplus-value  –  is  then 
appropriated by the capitalist as profit.
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deprivation and a loss of control, and hence are deprived of important elements of self-re-
spect. (Young, 1990: 49)
In this reading, then,  justice requires that institutional arrangements which enable this 
parasitic transference of powers must be eliminated and replaced by institutional forms 
that enable all people to develop and use their capacities in ways that also enhance similar 
development for others; that is, in the words of Marx and Engels, political and economic 
institutional arrangements which encourage the “free development of each [as] the condi-
tion for the free development of all” (Marx and Engels, 2000 [1848]). In terms of a theory 
of oppression, however, the central insight in this reading of exploitation is that oppres-
sion occurs as the steady process of the transfer of the fruits of the labour of one group to 
benefit another. Class injustice does not exist only in the distributive fact of wealth in-
equality  –  rather,  exploitation  names  the  unjust  structural  relationship  between  social 
groups (Young, 1990: 49-50). Exploitation names the social rules about what work is, 
who does what for whom, how work is compensated, the social process by which the res-
ults of work are appropriated, and the way these rules operate to enact relations of power 
and inequality. Moreover, exploitation names the process by which these social relations 
are produced and reproduced through a systematic process wherein “the energies of the 
have-nots  are  continuously expended to maintain and augment  the power,  status,  and 
wealth of the haves” (ibid.: 50).
Young also stresses that the concept of exploitation must be expanded to encom-
pass broader dynamics of oppression tied to exploitation, such as sexist and racist exploit-
ation. Gendered and racialized modes of exploitation are easy to demonstrate; women's 
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oppression does not consist solely in an inequality of status, power, and wealth resulting 
out of men's excluding them from privileged initiatives, but rather the power, status, free-
dom and self-realization of men is possible precisely because women work for them. The 
gendered nature of this exploitation, however, expands beyond the exclusively economic 
dimension, however – women are also exploited in the sense that their  nurturing and 
sexual energies are also transferred to men8 (ibid.). Moreover, the reality of economic ex-
ploitation has a distinctly female face: up to 70 per cent of those living on less than a dol -
lar or less a day are women (Plan UK, 2007), women make up two-thirds of the 780 mil-
lion  people  worldwide  who  are  illiterate  (Department  of  International  Development, 
2007), and in areas where there is little or no access to healthcare, it is predominantly wo-
men who, often foregoing their education, care for the sick (Jubilee Debt Campaign brief-
ing, 2007). Women, as a group, undergo “specific forms of gender exploitation in which 
their energies and power are expended, often unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to 
benefit men by releasing them for more important and creative work, enhancing their 
status or the environment around them, or providing them with sexual and emotional ser-
vice” (ibid.: 51).
Young also specifies race as a structure of exploitation at least as basic as class or 
gender. This is especially discernible in the United States, where racialized groups (e.g. 
Blacks and Latinos) are oppressed through capitalist super-exploitation as a result of a 
8 Young provides  a  few examples:  Delphy (1984)  on  the  gendered  division  of  labour  and  marriage;  
Ferguson (1984a; 1984b; 1989) on the gender socialization leading to women 'servicing' men sexually 
and domestically, etc.; Brown (1981) on the dependency of working mothers on the state as a form of 
gendered exploitation; and Alexander (1987) on the way traditionally 'feminine' jobs usually involve 
women expending their energies in jobs that enhance the status of, please, or otherwise comfort others  
(usually men).
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segmented  labour  force  that  tends  to  reserve  skilled,  high-paying,  unionized  jobs  for 
whites (ibid.). It is useful here to employ the distinction of 'menial' labour to demonstrate 
the nature of racial exploitation: menial signifies the labour of servants, and wherever 
there is racism there is the 'practical' assumption, more or less enforced, that members of 
the oppressed racial group are or ought to be servants of those in the privileged group 
(ibid.: 52). Moreover, menial labour refers not only to service, but also to any servile, un-
skilled, and low-paying work lacking in autonomy in which a worker is subject to taking 
orders from many people. As Young points out,  there remains strong cultural pressure in 
American society to fill servant jobs (bellhop, porter, chambermaid, busboy, etc.) with 
Black and Latino workers (ibid.: 52). More recently, Elvin Wyly et al. (2006) have identi-
fied that many predatory mortgage capital lending agencies extensively and specifically 
targeted marginalized racial groups in the years immediately preceding the 2008 financial 
collapse, and suggest that race and racial exploitation is inextricably linked to many con-
temporary forms of financial exploitation in the United States.
The injustice of exploitation is most often recognized – and approached – as a 
question of the distribution of goods and wealth, but this is too narrow a scope to fully 
capture the grander scope of the processes which produce exploitation. This is because, as 
we have seen, the injustice of exploitation consists in the social relations and processes 
which transfer the energies from one group to another to produce these unequal distribu-
tions of resources, and in the way in which social institutions enable a few to accumulate 
vast wealth as they constrain many more. Moreover, economically exploitative relation-
ships between groups are rarely arbitrary; as we have seen with the cases of gender- and 
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race-based exploitation, they are often rooted in group memberships that stretch beyond 
class. To this end, attempting to address injustice by approaching it solely as a question of 
resource allocation will be ineffective, because as long as exploitative institutionalized 
practices and structural relations remain unaltered, the process of transfer will perpetuate 
an unequal distribution of benefits (ibid.: 53).
Marginalization
Marginalization denotes people whom the system of labour cannot or will not use; while 
typically these people are racially marked (e.g.  Blacks and Indians in Latin America; 
Blacks, East Indians, East Europeans and/or North Africans in Europe, etc.), significant 
numbers of others are not – such as the elderly, young people, single mothers and their 
children, the mentally and physically disabled, Aboriginal people, etc. (ibid.: 53). Two 
decades later, Young's insight still holds true: youth unemployment in the West has spiked 
since 2008 and remained chronically high throughout the 'Great Recession'; what little ac-
cess to employment young people have is often (and in some jurisdictions, almost always) 
in the form of temporary positions (O'Higgins,  2012). Likewise,  Aboriginal people in 
Canada face significant income and earning gaps compared to Canadian-born majority 
group workers with similar characteristics (e.g. age and education); these gaps were as 
high  as  10-20% for  women  and  20-50% for  men  for  the  period  between  1995-2005 
(Pendakur and Pendakur, 2011). Tellingly, Pendakur and Pendakur also note that these 
gaps decrease the less an individual  identifies as Aboriginal;  “among Aboriginals,  re-
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gistered Indians fare worst, persons with self-reported Aboriginal identity fare somewhat 
better, and persons with Aboriginal ancestry (but not identity or registry) fare better still” 
(ibid.).
Young points out that marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of op-
pression: “a whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life 
and thus  potentially subjected to  severe material  deprivation and even extermination” 
(ibid.). While this material deprivation is definitely a matter of distributive justice, there is 
much more to addressing marginalization beyond the redistribution of wealth. Although 
redistributive policies such as welfare alleviate some of the material poverty associated 
with marginalization, it also creates its own forms of injustice through the way it deprives 
those dependent on it of certain rights and freedoms; and that said, even when material 
deprivation is (partially) mitigated by the welfare state, marginalization is unjust because 
it “blocks the opportunity [for people] to exercise capacities in socially defined and re-
cognized ways” (ibid: 54).
On the first point, because they depend on bureaucratic institutions for support or 
services, the old, the poor, and the mentally and physically disabled are subject to patron-
izing, punitive, demeaning and arbitrary treatment by the policies and people associated 
with welfare bureaucracies. Being dependent (whether on state agencies or otherwise) in 
Western capitalist society means being legitimately subject to the “often arbitrary and in-
vasive authority of social service provides and other public and private administrators, 
who enforce rules with which the marginal must comply, and otherwise exercise power 
over the conditions of their lives” (ibid.). Indeed, in the contemporary United States (and 
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increasingly in Canada; see Crookshanks, 2012), welfare has been synonymous in the 
public mind with fraud and laziness since the early 1980s (Hudson and Coukos, 2005), 
and welfare policies have shifted focus from the social and systemic causes of poverty to 
the moral failings of the poor themselves (Martin, 2012). As a result, welfare policies are 
now geared more towards the disciplining and punishment of marginals than their rehabil-
itation;  in  the  United  States,  this  has  been especially acute  in  cases  involving Afric-
an-Americans (Wheelock et al., 2012). Welfare agencies may be meeting the subsistence 
needs of the marginalized, but they also construct and frame the very nature of those 
needs; increasingly, the construction of welfare recipients is as failed or partially failed 
citizens (Martin, 2012). In this framework, medical and social service professionals, as 
'experts', know better what their dependents need than the dependents themselves, and as 
such, the latter do not have the right to claim to know what is good for them. As Young 
opines, “dependency in our society thus implies (…) a sufficient warrant to suspend basic 
rights to privacy, respect, and individual choice” (Young, 1990: 54.).
That said, while dependency in our society does produce injustice, there is nothing 
inherently oppressive about dependency in and of itself. Rather, Young argues – following 
the work of feminist moral theory – that this marginalizing character of dependency has 
been tied to deeply held assumptions in bourgeois society that moral agency and full cit-
izenship require that a person be autonomous and independent; that is, values typically 
stemming from a distinctively masculine experience and interpretation of social relations 
which favour competition and solitary achievement.  “Dependency,” Young points out, 
“should not be a reason to be deprived of choice and respect, and much of the oppression 
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marginals  face  would  be  lessened  if  a  less  individualistic  model  of  rights  prevailed” 
(ibid.: 55).
Moreover, marginalization is not solely a question of material sustenance; “even if 
marginals  were provided a  comfortable  material  life  within institutions  that  respected 
their dignity, injustices of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness, boredom, 
and lack of self-respect” (ibid.).  Whereas most of society's productive and recognized 
activities take place in contexts of organized social cooperation, any social structures and 
processes which shut people out of participation in that social  cooperation are unjust. 
Again, although marginalization is often a serious issue of distributive justice, it also en-
tails the deprivation of cultural, practical, and institutionalized conditions for self-devel-
opment and self-actualization in a context of recognition and interaction (ibid.).
It is very easy to discern structural marginalization specifically affecting fat people 
as a group. Fatness is strongly linked to socio-economic status (SES) in contemporary 
Western  societies  (Sobal,  1991;  Sobal  and  Stunkard,  1989),  and  recent  surveys  have 
shown an increasingly strong relationship between poverty and high body weight (Banks 
et al., 2006). The assumption that poverty is fattening is taken for granted in most main-
stream discussions of obesity; poor neighbourhoods high in crime or pollution may limit 
leisure-time physical activity, and processed or fast food is more readily available and 
consumed by the working poor, who may have more than one job, or childcare obliga-
tions (Ernsberger, 2009: 26). Poverty has been strongly linked to low-quality nutrition, 
which can result in weight gain because excess calories must be consumed to maintain 
adequate intake of nutrients (Drewnowski and Specter, 2004). Both fatness and poverty 
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are associated with low self-esteem, high job stress, and a lack of self-care (Wamala et al., 
1997), and a loss of employment (and by extension, a decline in socio-economic status) 
can often precede a significant (10% or more) gain in body weight (Morris, Cook and 
Sharper, 1992).
There is, however, equally compelling evidence to suggest that fatness may be im-
poverishing; specifically, fatphobia and discrimination against fat people can result in un-
employment or low-paying work (Sorensen, 1995). In one longitudinal study of fat and 
thin teenagers and their life circumstances over a seven-year period, researchers found 
that after that period, fat young women were much less likely to be married (28% versus 
56% of the thin women), their household income was a third lower, they were three times 
more likely to live in poverty, and they were half as likely to have finished college (Gort-
maker et al., 1993). This was not related to self-esteem, as levels of self-esteem (as meas-
ured by psychological testing along the Rosenberg Scale) were the same among both fat 
and thin women (the findings applied to men as well, but the effects in each instance were 
less pronounced) (ibid.). They also found that not only were fat young people no more 
likely than others to have chronic health conditions, but that when they looked at young 
people who really did have chronic health conditions (asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.), 
rates  of  marriage,  college  completion,  and income levels  were completely unaffected 
(ibid.).  Poverty (and fatness) is also more common among minority groups, and these 
three factors taken together tend to compound oppression9.
9 Given that fatness is pathologized as a contributor to ill-health, it is worth noting here that low socio-
economic status is a powerful  predictor of death due to cardiovascular disease (Banks et  al.,  2006;  
Marmot, 2003). In one representative U.S. sample, low income was associated with a higher risk of  
cardiovascular  disease  among  both  men  and  women,  and  these  relationships  persisted  even  when 
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Powerlessness
Young defines powerlessness as a specific form of 'economic' oppression experienced by 
non-professional workers in relation to professional workers under capitalism (ibid.: 56) – 
professionals are privileged in relation to non-professionals by virtue of their position in 
the division of labour and the status it carries.
Young notes that in advanced capitalist countries, “most workplaces are not organ-
ized democratically, direct participation in public policy decisions is rare, and policy im-
plementation is for the most part hierarchical, imposing rules on bureaucrats and citizens” 
(ibid.). The powerless, then, are those over whom power is exercised without their exer-
cising it; they are positioned in society and the labour force such that they must take or-
ders but rarely get the chance to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in 
the division of labour (and its concomitant social position) that provides individuals with 
very little room to develop and exercise skills. In this conception, the powerless have little 
or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no technic-
al expertise or authority, and command little respect (ibid.).
In this sense, powerlessness is perhaps best described  negatively; the powerless 
tend to lack the authority, status, and sense of self that professionals tend to have. Young 
argues that professional workers have three main identifying features, and the absence of 
these marks those subject to the oppression of powerlessness. First, acquiring and practi-
cing a profession has an expansive, progressive character – one first acquires the creden-
statistically adjusted for cigarette smoking, alcohol intake, exercise level, and body weight (Lantz et al., 
1998). Most significantly,  the risks related to poverty remained constant across the weight spectrum 
(Marmot, 2003); while many may assume poor people are unhealthy because many of them are fat, it 
may be the case that many fat people are unhealthy because they are poor.
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tials to join the profession, and then one experiences progress through professional ad-
vancement and rising status. The powerless non-professional, on the other hand, lacks this 
orientation towards progressive development and has very few avenues for recognition 
(ibid.: 57). 
Second, while most professional workers have superiors to whom they must an-
swer, they nonetheless have considerable day-to-day work autonomy (and often their own 
authority over clients and other workers); non-professionals, on the other hand, lack this 
autonomy, and in both their working and consumer-client lives they often stand under the 
authority of professionals (ibid.). Lastly, the dichotomy between the professional and non-
professional  (named colloquially in  the distinction between the 'middle'  and 'working' 
classes) denotes not just a position in the social division of labour, but also extends into 
each group's wider social life – the privileges of the professional expand to their whole 
way of life, a way of life Young terms 'respectability'; she highlights that the “norms of 
respectability in our society are associated specifically with professional culture” (ibid.). 
There is thus a great emphasis placed on non-professionals to look, dress, and act 'profes-
sional' whenever they appear in public, when they apply for jobs or loans, when they buy 
homes and cars, etc. (ibid.).  This dialectic of privilege and oppression is visible most 
starkly in the dynamics of racism and sexism: “in daily exchange, women and men of col-
our must prove their respectability (…) [whereas] working-class white men, on the other 
hand, are often treated with respect until their working-class status is revealed” (ibid.: 58).
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Cultural Imperialism
Up to now, the faces of oppression hitherto detailed by Young – exploitation, marginaliza-
tion, powerlessness – are all forms of oppression generated out of the division of labour 
and relations of production; that is, who works for whom, who does what work, and how 
the content of the work defines one institutional position relative to others (ibid.). There 
are  forms  of  oppression  not  explicitly  tied  to  economic  well-being,  however;  one  of 
which that Young, following the work of feminist and Black liberation theorists, denotes 
as cultural imperialism. According to Young, “to experience cultural imperialism means 
to experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of 
one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's own group and mark it 
out as the Other” (ibid.: 58-59).
Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experi-
ence and culture, and its establishment as the norm. In a setting of cultural imperialism, 
some groups have exclusive or primary access to what Nancy Fraser (1987) terms soci-
ety's means of interpretation and communication (that is, the means of cultural produc-
tion). Often unconsciously and unintentionally, dominant groups project their own experi-
ence of social life as representative of humanity as such, and cultural products express the 
dominant group's perspective and interpretation of historical events and social elements 
(including all other social groups; at least, insofar as they are recognized at all) (Young, 
1990: 59).
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This universalization of a particular culture and subjectivity necessarily means that 
other groups which exhibit difference from this norm are constructed as lacking and devi-
ant – they become marked as Other (ibid.). This puts the culturally dominated in a para-
doxical position wherein they are simultaneously marked out by stereotypes at the same 
time as they are rendered invisible – they are positioned as remarkable, deviant beings 
who are essentialized, confined by their stereotypes to a distinct 'nature' (often attached in 
some way to their bodies) which cannot be easily denied. These stereotypes so thoroughly 
permeate society that they are not even perceived to be contestable:
Just as everyone knows that the earth goes around the sun, so everyone knows that gay 
people are promiscuous, that Indians are alcoholics, and that women are good with chil -
dren. White males, on the other hand, insofar as they escape group marking, can be indi-
viduals. (Young, 1990: 59)
Those subject to cultural imperialism find themselves totally defined from the outside, 
positioned and placed by a network of social discourses which stamp meanings on them 
produced by those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them 
(ibid.).  This  results  in  the  uncanny  experience  American  civil  rights  activist  W.E.B. 
DuBois described as 'double consciousness'  -  “the sense of always looking at  oneself 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in  
amused contempt and pity” (DuBois, 1969 [1903]: 45). This double consciousness arises 
when an oppressed subject refuses to coincide with these devalued, objectified, stereo-
typed visions of themselves, but they find no representation in the symbolic order with 
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which to identify beyond those which judge them different, marked, stigmatized, or in-
ferior (Young, 1990: 60).
In many ways, however, the groups marked out by the dominant culture as differ-
ent are in fact different; their status as Othered creates specific experiences not shared by 
the dominant group. Furthermore, because culturally oppressed groups are also often so-
cially segregated and occupy lower positions in the social division of labour, cultural im-
perialism often  overlaps  with  exploitation,  marginalization,  and powerlessness  (ibid.). 
Double consciousness, then, arises out of the tension in one's being defined by two (or 
more) socio-symbolic networks: the dominant culture and subordinate culture(s). Because 
they can  affirm and recognize  one  another  as  sharing  similar  social  life  experiences, 
people in  culturally imperialized  groups can maintain  a  sense of  positive  subjectivity 
(ibid.).
Cultural imperialism involves being caught in the paradox of experiencing oneself 
as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The injustice of it resides  
in the fact that the oppressed group's own experience and interpretation of social life finds 
little expression that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes its 
own experiences and interpretations upon oppressed groups (ibid.).  Cultural  fatphobia 
colours virtually all aesthetic, moral, and medical representations of fat people, and the 
remainder of this work will examine the way this prejudice translates into material forms 
of oppression.
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Violence
Lastly, Young identifies systematic violence as a form of oppression. While this obviously 
includes more heinous acts of violence (murder, rape, assault, etc.), she also includes in 
this category less extreme incidents of violence, such as harassment, intimidation, or ri-
dicule employed with the purpose to degrade,  humiliate or stigmatize group members 
(ibid.: 61). What makes violence oppressive, however, is less the particular acts of viol-
ence themselves than the social context surrounding them, that which makes them pos-
sible and even acceptable. What makes violence an instance of social injustice, according 
to Young, “is its systemic character, its existence as a social practice” (ibid.: 61-62).
Violence is a social practice, a given that is always at the horizon of social imagin-
ation;  within  prevailing  social  logic,  there  are  circumstances  where  violence  is  more 
'called for' or 'acceptable' than others (for instance, the social practice of putting the onus 
of responsibility on women in cases of date rape, etc.). Moreover, group-directed violence 
approaches legitimacy in that it is very often socially tolerated10. This tolerance is pain-
fully visible in cases where fat women are (verbally or physically) abused, assaulted, and 
raped; many fat women have disclosed that, upon reporting instances of sexual assault to 
the police, the officers have refused to take their reports seriously and ridiculed them as 
insufficiently attractive to rape (Goodman, 1995; Mabel-Lois and Aldebaran, 1983). In-
deed, the experiences of some fat women suggest that some male strangers are not only 
more likely to become verbally aggressive with a fat  woman, but also to “physically 
10 Young here cites Manning Marble's  (1984) cataloguing of cases  where police officers  had severely 
beaten, killed, or raped Blacks while on duty and who were acquitted of any wrongdoing.
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threaten and intimidate her, perhaps because they regard her as lacking sexual utility” 
(Royce, 2009: 154).
This type of violence is qualitatively different from the 'rational' violence of state 
repression.  Whereas repressive violence serves the purpose of solidifying state or rul-
ing-class power, the systemic violence Young describes is ultimately irrational in charac-
ter, stemming from fear and hatred of the targeted group (Young, 1990: 62). Violence-in-
ducing fear or hatred of the other at least partly involves insecurities on the part of the vi-
olator;  “its irrationality suggests that unconscious processes11 are at  work” (ibid.:  63). 
Moreover, this type of violence tends to overlap with cultural imperialism; the fact of 
group difference puts the lie to a dominant group's claim to universality, and the cognitive 
dissonance this challenge to hegemony generates can often erupt into violence (ibid.). Not 
all the 'irrational' violence that occurs in society is motivated by (or directed towards) 
group difference, of course, but this investigation is mainly concerned with the way viol-
ence functions systemically as a form of oppression.
Fat People as an Oppressed Social Group
Young's multifaceted account of oppression here allows for a relatively unified concep-
tion of oppression while being sufficiently pluralized to avoid reductionism, such as the 
orthodox Marxist reduction of all oppression as stemming from class-based oppression. 
Where traditionally Marxist  theories of oppression often foundered on assumptions of 
11 As we shall see in the next chapter, there is a compelling psychoanalytic account to be made that the  
fear and hatred towards some groups (specifically fat people, in this case) is bound up with fears of  
identity loss and subjective disintegration.
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economic determinism or a homogenous, unified working class underpinning all other 
identities, Young's approach opens a space for pluralism and contingency in both historic-
al and political processes, as well as in the constitution and dynamics of group (and, by 
extension, individual) identity12. While the organization of the political economy and the 
social division of labour have a significant impact on group constitution, identity,  and 
questions of justice, they do not provide a complete picture of oppression; a myopic focus 
on economic forces may obscure the way other forms of oppression (notably, cultural im-
perialism) themselves influence the constitution of the political economy.
Likewise, Young's ontology is not so pluralized and differentiated that it collapses 
into its opposite; that is, it does not provide an account of identity or oppression so spe-
cialized  and  theoretically  complex  that  it  becomes  “conceptually  sophisticated  to  the 
point of depoliticization” (Viner, 1999). Indeed, in the commitment to a theory of sub-
jectivity emphasizing the complexity of identity, many Anglo-American appropriations of 
post-structuralist  and  post-modern  thought  (Judith  Butler's  work  in  Gender  Trouble 
(1990)  is  often  cited  as  an  example  of  this13)  have  tended  to  emphasize  the  'correct' 
destabilization of general categories of identity such as race, gender, and class to the point 
that  it  undermines  practical  political  struggle  (Bordo,  2003:  242).  As  Susan  Bordo 
acerbically notes, “most [social] institutions have barely begun to absorb the message of 
modernist social criticism; surely it is too soon to let them off the hook via postmodern 
heterogeneity and instability” (ibid.). Although Young's theory leaves room the complex-
12 Some scholars have argued that more the expansive social theories presented by theorists like Young 
that blend together elements of Marxism, post-structuralist and post-modern thought have reinvigorated 
the “emancipatory impulse of Marxism” (Sim, 2000: 13).
13 For an extended critique of Butler on precisely this point, see: Bordo, 2003.
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ity and nuance of 'really existing' group identity formation, at the same time it does not 
abandon subjectivity to total abstraction, instead keeping focus on the way group identity 
and oppression are materialized in social practice in a way that “gives content and force 
to the notions of social interest, historical location, and cultural perspective” (ibid.).
Young's conceptions of oppression can function as criteria for determining wheth-
er individuals and groups are oppressed, rather than as a 'full theory' of oppression: “each 
criterion can be operationalized; each can be applied through the assessment of observ-
able  behaviour,  status  relationships,  distributions,  tests,  and  other  cultural  artifacts” 
(Young, 1990: 64). In this sense, they are 'objective' criteria and measurements of social 
oppression and injustice. Moreover, applying these criteria to the circumstances of groups 
makes it possible to compare oppressions without reducing them to a common essence, or 
claiming that one form of oppression is more 'fundamental' than another (ibid.). The pres-
ence of any of these five conditions is sufficient for calling a group oppressed. Different 
group oppressions exhibit different combinations of these forms, as do different individu-
als within the groups themselves. Moreover, it is important to note that while these are 
general categories of oppression, causal explanations of a group's oppressions will always 
be particular and historical;  “an explanatory account of why a particular group is  op-
pressed in the ways that it is must trace the history and current structure of particular so-
cial relations” (ibid.: 65). This is the object of the rest of this inquiry – to demonstrate 
how each of these five criteria can be applied to 'fat people' as a social group, and to trace 
the history of the particular social and cultural forces which produce and reproduce these 
relations of oppression.
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III. 'A Dreadful Parasite': Subjectivity, The Body & Cultural Fatphobia
One must comfort the patient's fantasy as he suffers more from the idea of his 
illness, than from the illness itself.
       - Friedrich Nietzsche
This chapter will endeavour to do two things: first, to provide an account of ontology 
compatible with Young's conception of social groups, in which the subject and its body 
are integrated – rather than seen as opposed or otherwise arranged in a hierarchy – and the 
way in which this integrated, embodied subjectivity is produced by culture. Through re-
course to psychoanalytic theory – particularly, Jacques Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage 
and ego formation, Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection, and Sigmund Freud’s theory of 
the sexual drives – it will build a compelling case that subjectivity is intimately tied to the 
empirical body, and that both of these things are conditioned and positioned by networks 
of socio-symbolic relations.  Second, it  will  trace the evolution of normative concerns 
about body fat (and the fat body) – so-called ‘fatphobia’ – since its emergence in the mod-
ern context during the mid-19th century, as well as the way it has developed up to the 
present day.  By linking the way cultural  discourses are intimately involved in subject 
formation,  and profiling the way contemporary cultural discourses surrounding the fat 
body present it  as marginalized,  utterly unintelligible and thoroughly abject,  it  can be 
demonstrated that fat bodies (and the subjects which inhabit them) are indeed subjected to 
the form of social oppression that Iris Young defines as cultural imperialism.
Any discussion of identity must first be buttressed by a discussion of subjectivity 
itself: what is the subject, what is its relationship to the body, and what are the dynamics 
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by which the subject 'obtains' its identity(ies)?
Jana Braziel (2001), following Susan Bordo (2003) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994), 
identifies the root of contemporary anti-fat sentiment in the way the human body has been 
historically conceptualized in Western thought, originating primarily with Plato14. Indeed, 
according to Grosz, “since the inception of philosophy as a separate and self-contained 
discipline in ancient Greece, [it] has established itself on the foundations of a profound 
somatophobia,”  (Grosz,  1994:  5)  which  she  identifies  as  the  mind/body dualism that 
privileges the mind or spirit at the expense of the material body. This privileged dualism 
runs the course of Western intellectual history; Young points out that “modern philosophy 
and science [has] established unifying, controlling reason in opposition to and mastery 
over the body, and then identified some groups with reason and others with the body” 
(Young, 1990: 124).
Beginning  with  Plato,  the  body was  regarded  as  a  source  of  interference  and 
danger to the operation of reason; “in the  Cratylus, Plato15 claims that the word  body 
(soma) was introduced by Orphic priests, who believed that man was a spiritual or non-
14 All three authors also identify this intellectual denigration of the body as the foundation of patriarchal  
and misogynist thought, a point to which I will return later in greater detail.
15 Bordo, however, indicates that Plato's thought about the body may have been somewhat more nuanced; 
she points out that although in many instances he conceives of the body as an 'epistemological deceiver', 
“its  unreliable  senses  (...)  continually  tricking  us  into  mistaking  the  transient  and  illusory  for  the 
permanent and real,”  she also notes that  in the  Symposium he claims that  love of the body is “the 
essential  first  step on the spiritual  ladder that  culminates  in  the recognition of  the eternal  form of  
Beauty.” (Bordo, 2003: 3-4). Moreover, Plato's approach – that the body is ultimately irrelevant to our  
moral being – is not so much the root of fatphobia per se (especially when contrasted with Aristotle's 
position that the body is indeed a symptom of our moral being, an approach more directly linked to an 
aesthetic and normative denigration of the fat body) so much as it more broadly lays the intellectual  
groundwork for the subordinate status of the body vis-a-vis the mind in Western thinking. This makes 
Plato an obvious starting starting point for feminist critiques of the body's place in Western cultural and 
political thought.
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corporeal being trapped in the body as in a dungeon (sema)” (Grosz, 1994: 5). Aristotle, 
in contrast, characterizes the 'softness' (malakia) of corpulence – it is worth noting here 
that corpulence is, etymologically, an excess of corporeality, an excess of the body itself – 
as a kind of moral weakness16 (Braziel, 2001: 239). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
stresses this connection between softness and moral weakness: 
Someone who is deficient in withstanding what most people withstand, and are capable of 
withstanding,  is  soft  and  self-indulgent;  for  self-indulgence  is  a  kind  of  softness.  This 
person trails his cloak to avoid the labour and pain of lifting it, and imitates an invalid,  
though he does not think he is miserable – he is [merely] similar to a miserable person. (...)  
The female is distinguished [by softness] from the male. (Aristotle, 1999: 7.7 1150b 1-6,  
16)
The  contemporary  conception  of  fatness  as  a  signifier  of  moral  weakness  and  an 
intrinsically  pathological  condition  –  stereotypes  which  persist  in  medical  and 
psychological discourses of obesity – can here be traced to the very threshold of Western 
reason (Braziel, 2001: 240).
While this Aristotelian reading of the body as a 'moral symptom' was inherited and 
further expounded by the Christian tradition, Grosz notes that René Descartes effectively 
codified the mind/body opposition as the dominant ontology in Western thought (cogito  
ergo sum),  placing “the mind in a position of hierarchical superiority over and above 
nature, including the nature of the body” (Grosz, 1994: 6). This dualism is problematic; it  
16 Again,  it  is  worth  noting  here  that  corporeality  (and  its  excess,  corpulence)  for  the  Classical 
philosophers is gendered concept; women are associated with the soft body and its corresponding moral 
weakness while men are associated with the mind, reason, etc. The gendered nature of anti-fat bias will 
be examined further at a later point.
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establishes a (gendered) concept of the body “as animal, as appetite, as prison of the soul 
and  confounder  of  its  projects”  (Bordo,  2003:  3),  and  as  a  barrier  to  'objective'  and 
'universal' knowledge. The Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and 
the  body  serves  as  a  “practical metaphysics  that  has  been  deployed  and  socially 
embodied  in  medicine,  law,  literary  and  artistic  representation,  the  psychological 
construction of self, interpersonal relationships, [and] popular culture” (Bordo, 2003: 13-
14). To the extent that this dualism necessarily denigrates the body and casts those groups 
traditionally associated with corporeality in a negative or marginalized social position, it 
serves as the intellectual foundation for many forms of identity-based oppression.
Bordo,  Grosz,  and  Braziel  are  all  interested  in  reconceptualizing  the  subject's 
relationship to their body in a way that overcomes the mind/body dualism which they 
perceive as inherently oppressive, specifically to women and more broadly to the 'really 
existing' multiplicity of human bodies; as Grosz points out, “there is no body as such: 
there are only  bodies – male or female, black, brown, white, large or small – and the 
gradations in between” (Grosz, 1994: 19). Rethinking the subject's corporeality in this 
way destabilizes the supposedly 'neutral' or 'universal' perspective of this dualist ontology. 
This makes it an important theoretical endeavour for feminist theory,  'fat studies',  and 
indeed any identity-based emancipatory theoretical project:
The  subject,  recognized  as  corporeal  being,  can  no  longer  succumb  to  the 
neutralization  and  neutering  of  its  specificity  (...)  [;]  [the  body]  helps  to 
problematize  the  universalist  and  universalizing  assumptions  of  humanism, 
through which women's – and all groups' – specificities, positions, and histories 
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are rendered irrelevant or redundant; it resists the tendency to attribute a human 
nature to the subject's interior; and it resists tendencies to dualism, which splits 
subjectivity into two mutually exclusive domains. (Grosz, 1994: ix-x)
In this  conception of  embodied subjectivity,  the body 'as such'  is  not  some 'naturally' 
given, ahistorical constant to be contrasted against all social and cultural 'constructions'; 
rather, following Foucault, these theorists propose that the body is always “in the grip” of 
culture (Bordo, 2003: 142). In this sense, there is no 'natural' body. Against the 'intuitive'  
position that cultural practices exert their power against the spontaneous physiological 
needs, 'basic' pleasures or instincts, or 'fundamental' structures of bodily experience, these 
cultural practices are always-already inscribed “on our bodies and their materiality, their 
forces,  energies,  sensations,  and  pleasures”  (Foucault,  1980:  155).  Indeed,  as  Bordo 
emphasizes,  “our bodies, no less than anything else that is  human, are constituted by 
culture” (Bordo, 2003: 142).
That is not to say that the body is some kind of tabula rasa onto which culture can 
inscribe and re-inscribe itself  in  endless textual play.  On this  point,  Grosz provides  a 
compelling  account  of  how  psychoanalysis  provides  the  theoretical  means  to  think 
through  the  interaction  between  the  body,  the  subject,  and  culture  in  a  way  that 
acknowledges both the materiality and primacy of the physical body in contributing to the 
formation  of  subjectivity  and  the  way  in  which  cultural  processes  and  discourses 
constitute the subject's relationship to this corporeality.
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Let's Get Oedipal: Psychoanalysis & the Body
Psychoanalytic  theory makes  a  radical  presumption  of  a  correspondence  between the 
forms of the body and the forms of mind or psyche. Yet more radically, it also proposes 
that “the constitution of the subject as an integrated and functional psychical totality is an 
active ingredient in the constitution of the body, for it provides the subject with a body 
which  has  particular,  socially  distinctive,  and  culturally  determined  attributes  and 
abilities, individual idiosyncrasies and styles of behaviour” (Grosz, 1994: 27). Sigmund 
Freud  effectively  outlines  a  clear,  two-way  overdetermination  with  regards  to  the 
interaction between the biological and the psychological, the body and the mind.
In  The Ego and the Id, Freud posits that the ego – the 'I'  of the subject – is a 
mediator between the instinctual and corporeal cravings of the id, on the one hand, and 
the demands and requirements of 'civilization' (a notion later refined as the superego) on 
the other. The ego has the “structure and form” of a corporeal projection; it is the internal  
psychic  rendering  of  physical,  bodily  sensations.  As  such,  the  subject  acquires  “an 
underlying sense of unity and identity only as the end result of a series of processes which 
construct the ego as such” (Grosz, 1994: 29-31). In this configuration, the subject only 
gradually acquires a unified sense of self over and above the wildly disparate sensations 
that actually comprises its life experience. Grosz notes that,
if  the  subject  were  merely  a  perceiving  and  experiencing  being  –  as  naive  
empiricism presumes  –  then  there  could  be  no  way of  unifying  the  subject's 
experiences as the experiences of a single being. (...) The subject would simply be 
an aggregate of otherwise disconnected perceptual events, which could give it no 
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index of the existence of objects or the world. (Grosz, 1994: 31)
According to Freud, the ego is what brings a sense of unity to the overwhelming and 
disconnected array of perceptions the young child experiences. In this sense, the ego (that 
is, the sense of self, the 'I', etc.) does not arise out of a preordained biological order, but 
more radically, arises from “a psychosocial intervention into the child's hitherto natural 
development” (Grosz, 1994: 32). That is to say, the child's internal sense of self is formed 
primarily out of external factors as perceived and registered by the surface of the body.
This prefigures the Lacanian theory of the mirror stage – that is, the moment when 
the child is first  able to separate subject from object;  self  from other.  For Lacan, the 
mirror stage results from two complementary processes: first, the ego is formed out of 
'identificatory relations' with other subjects –  either other children, the mother herself, or 
even the subject's own reflection in a mirror. These (entirely external) identifications are 
then integrated within the newly-formed ego as the 'ego ideal', i.e., the “idealized model 
of itself for which the ego strives” (ibid.). Second, the ego results from the blocking or 
channelling of libidinal impulses in the subject's own body in the form of a 'narcissistic'  
(that is, a vested libidinal interest in one's self) attachment to a part of the whole of its 
body. Effectively, the ego here is the meeting point, the conjunction, between the body 
and the social. As such,
the narcissistic genesis of the ego entails that the subject cannot remain neutral or  
indifferent to its own body and body parts. The subject is libidinally invested. The 
subject always maintains a relation of love (or hate) to its own body because it 
must  always  maintain a  certain level  of  psychical  or  libidinal  investment.  No 
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person lives in his or her body merely as a functional instrument or a means to an 
end. Its value is never simply or solely functional, for it has a (libidinal) value in  
itself.  The subject  is  capable  of  suicide,  of  anorexia  (...)  because the body is 
meaningful, has significance. (Grosz, 1994: 32)
For Freud, “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego (...)[;] the ego is ultimately derived 
from bodily  sensations,  chiefly  from those  springing  from the  surface  of  the  body” 
(Freud, 1960 [1923]: 26). In this sense, the ego works to connect two different 'surfaces', 
the  inner  surface  of  affects  and  the  'subjective  experience'  of  bodily  sensations  and 
excitations, and the otherwise disparate sensory experiences of the body's various sense 
organs into an 'imaginary anatomy' of the body's outer surface (Grosz, 1994: 37). It is 
worth pointing out here that the subject's very notion of the body as a unified whole is  
dependent on its (mis)recognition that the body of the other (either other subjects or its 
own mirror image) is experienced as unified, complete, and autonomous; in this way, the 
ego is both a 'map' of the body's surface and a reflection of the other's body. The subject's 
ego, then, is an image of the body's significance or meaning both for itself and for the 
other;  the subject's  fundamental  sense of self  is  thus as much a function of mistaken 
perception, of fantasy and desire, as it is of sensation and empirical perception – it is, in  
effect, an 'occupation' of sensation and perception by a fantasmic dimension (ibid.: 38).
Freud's  conception  of  the  ego  has  profound  implications:  this  sociocultural 
dimension of the ego's construction implies that bodies, egos, and subjectivities are not 
simply  reflections  of  their  cultural  contexts  and  associated  values,  but  are  instead 
constituted  as  such by them,  marking  bodies  in  their  'biological'  configurations  with 
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sociosexual  inscriptions  (ibid.).  Indeed,  “the 'natural'  body,  insofar  as  there  is  one,  is 
continually  augmented  by  the  products  of  history  and  culture,  which  it  readily 
incorporates into its own intimate space” (ibid.). Within the psychoanalytic model, the 
once rigid demarcations between mind and body, nature and culture, are rapidly worn 
away.
For Lacan, the ego is not so much a representation or projection of the actual 
anatomical/physiological body as it is an 'imaginary'  outline or projection of the body 
insofar as it is imagined and represented for the subject by the image of others (or itself in 
the mirror). Critically, the earliest recognition by the child of its bodily unity is at the 
same  time  a  fundamental  misrecognition,  in  that  the  images  with  which  the  child 
identifies belie the child's own sensory and motor incapacities. This, of course, means that 
this 'imaginary anatomy' is the internalized image of the meaning the body has not only 
for the subject, but also for others in its social world, and the symbolic order (that is, the 
web of social discourses and significations in which all subjects are caught) writ large. It 
is “an individual and collective fantasy of the body's forms and modes of action” (ibid.: 
39-40).
According to Lacan, the mirror's promise of unity is preserved (after the resolution 
of the Oedipus complex; that is, the subject's positioning in the symbolic order) as the 
'ego ideal', a model of bodily integrity and wholeness that is fundamentally alien to the 
subject's self-experience. The ego is thus existentially split between a psychical interior in 
need of constant stabilization and a corporeal exterior which remains labile and open to 
many meanings (ibid.: 42-3). As a result of this process of ego formation, the stability of 
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unified body image – even in the so-called 'normal' subject – is always precarious; “the 
constitution  of  the  subject's  imaginary  identity  in  the  mirror  phase  establishes  a 
provisional identity which still requires the stabilization, ordering, and placement of the 
subject  in  a  sociosymbolic  position  where  it  can  engage  in  symbolic  and  linguistic 
exchange with others17” (ibid.: 44). In order to fully take up this sociosymbolic position, 
the  subject  must  be  situated  in  the  space  occupied  by  its  body.  The  anchoring  of 
subjectivity to its body is the condition for coherent identity18 (ibid.: 47).
Iris Young, following the work of Julia Kristeva, notes that there is an ‘obscene’ 
obverse to this process of subject-formation and the drive to stabilize body image: that is, 
the process of subject formation also necessarily produces its negative inverse, the abject. 
Social groups under the yoke of cultural imperialism are not only associated with the 
body (in a subordinate position to groups associated with reason), but particularly those 
aspects of bodily existence deemed abject and repulsive. 
The  abject  is  to  the  subject  as  the  unconscious  is  to  consciousness;  it  is  the 
difference between the symbolic (signification and meaning) and the semiotic (arbitrary 
signifiers) as the two heterogeneous and irreducible sides to the coin of language. The 
symbolic, in this configuration, is the capacity to signify; that is, to make an element (i.e. 
signifier) stand for an absent other – it  is the possibility of representation,  sense, and 
logic.  The  process  of  symbolization  always  functions  by  displacement  (and  the 
17 The actual moment of the subject's insertion into a 'sociosymbolic' position is, of course, the Oedipus  
complex.
18 It  is  worth noting that  the failure of  the subject  to mesh with the body is generally an instance of  
psychosis. Many psychotics are unable to locate themselves where they should be, either in a dissociated 
observation of themselves from the outside, or in hearing alien voices within their own head.
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repressions  this  process  involves),  as  well  as  the  opposition  between  conscious  and 
unconscious associations of meaning (Young, 1990: 143). By contrast, the semiotic is the 
“heterogeneous, bodily, material, nonsensical aspect of speech always present with, but 
not  integrated  into,  its  signification  (…).  The speaking self  always  carries  along this 
shadow, its spilled-over body expressed in comportment and excitations” (ibid.).
Abjection is the (necessary) by-product of ego formation and a precursor to the 
process of subjectivization – that is, the insertion of the material body into a network of 
sociosymbolic relations – at the moment of separation between self and other. The abject 
is that chasm, the necessary structural gap between the self and the other, the lack or gap 
that makes representation possible; as such, it cannot be symbolized, it exists solely as a 
‘traumatic’, unrepresentable affect (ibid.). For Young, abjection is
the feeling of loathing and disgust the subject has in encountering certain matter, 
images, and fantasies – the horrible, to which it can only respond with aversion,  
with nausea and distraction. The abject is at the same time fascinating; it draws 
the  subject  in  order  to  repel  it.  The  abject  is  meaningless,  repulsive  in  an 
irrational, unrepresentable way. (Young, 1990: 143)
Young locates the process of abjection in the ‘foundational’ separation of the infant from 
the mother; in order to become a self, the infant must “separate from its joyful continuity 
with the mother’s body and establish a sense of the border between itself and the Other. In 
the primal fluidity of the mother’s  jouissance the infant introjects the Other” (ibid.). In 
this  conceptualization,  the  self  can  only  be  established  by  “expelling,  rejecting  the 
mother, which is only then distinguished from the infant itself;  the expulsion that creates 
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the border between inside and outside is an expulsion of itself” (ibid.: 144). This primary 
separation is experienced by the nascent subject as an existential loss, and the expelled 
self  survives to  us in  the form of  the abject  (ibid.).  This  expelled self  is  particularly 
loathsome (that  is,  abject)  because  it  always  threatens  the  stability  of  this  necessary 
separation; it threatens to re-enter the self and obliterate the formative gap between self 
and Other. The defence of the self against this disintegration is the aversion and repulsion 
of the abject (ibid.). At its most elementary level, abjection is most clearly expressed in 
reactions of disgust to bodily excretions (e.g. blood, pus, sweat, excrement, urine, vomit, 
menstrual fluid, etc.) – that is, matter literally expelled from the body’s insides.
Abjection, then, is not only prior to the emergence of a subject in relation to an 
object – it makes that very distinction possible. Abjection makes signification possible by 
creating a subject capable of dividing, repeating, and separating. Unlike the object, the 
abject does not stand in clear distinction and definable difference from the subject; it is 
instead the obscene obverse of the subject. It is other than the subject, but it is the flip side 
of the same coin, always too close for comfort and always threatening to overwhelm the 
subject’s self-sustaining divide between inside and outside (ibid.). The abject provokes 
fear and loathing because it exposes the boundary between self and other as constituted 
and fragile,  and it  threatens  to  dissolve  the  subject  by destroying this  border.  Young 
defines this fear of the abject as phobia, “an irrational dread that latches onto a material to 
which it is drawn in horrified fascination” (ibid.).
Due to its proximity to the subject, abjection, for Kristeva, is a peculiar experience 
of  ambiguity;  the  abject  arises  potentially in  “whatever  disturbs  identity,  system,  and 
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order (…)[;]  what does not respect borders,  positions, rules” (Kristeva,  1982: 4).  The 
border between self and other, in the way it is structurally configured, is fragile, and the 
self “experiences this separation as a loss and a lack without name or reference” (Young, 
1990: 145).  The subject thus reacts to the abject with intense loathing as a means of 
restoring the integrity of the border between self and other.
This conception of abjection underscores the way in which certain identities and 
embodied subjects are subjected to a body aesthetic that defines them as ugly, grotesque 
or fearsome, and induces reactions of aversion in others (ibid.). The way in which certain 
bodies and groups are marked as abject is always socially constructed and historically 
variable; once the connection between identity and abject matter (that is, as that which 
signifies  ugliness,  degeneracy,  and death),  the  subject  will  react  to  these  groups  and 
bodies  with  fear,  nervousness,  and  aversion.  As  abject,  they  signify  a  threat  to  the 
cohesion of identity itself.
This outline of abjection is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the way in 
which fatness has been constructed as ‘abject’ in contemporary culture. As we shall see 
over the following pages, the fat body in Western society has been come to signify little 
more than ugliness,  physical  and spiritual  degeneracy,  sickness,  and death.  Moreover, 
aesthetic  and  normative  pressures  oriented  towards  regulating  and  producing  'ideal' 
bodies (and the virtuous subjects which supposedly inhabit them) are necessarily fragile, 
and can only be maintained through the production and reproduction of bodies  deemed 
abject. 
In order to round out this exposition on the nature of embodied subject formation, 
Drew Brown – 53
we must return to psychoanalytic theory’s most compelling challenge to the mind/body 
divide:  Freud's  notion  of  the  sexual  drives.  In  Freud's  own words,  the  drives  are  “a 
concept at the frontier between the mental and the somatic” (Freud, 1915: 122).
First and foremost, a distinction must be made between the Freudian notion of 
sexual drives and biologically-determined instincts. Where instincts are basic biological 
mechanisms, pre-social processes and behaviours necessary for the maintenance of life, 
drives  are  the  product  of  the  interaction  between  a  subject's  biology  and  their 
socialization. The drive “deviates from the instinct insofar as it takes for itself not a real  
object – food, etc. - but a fantasmic object, an object defined primarily through the lack or 
absence of a real object” (Grosz, 1994: 53). That is to say,
If  the  instinctual  can be defined as a biologically universal,  preformed set  of  
processes  and  behaviours,  endogenous  in  origin  and  necessary  for  the 
maintenance of life (in its simplest form it is usually represented on the model of 
the reflex), then it  can be argued that  even apparently incontestable processes  
such  as  hunger,  thirst,  and  the  need  to  urinate  or  defecate  –  (...)  generally 
regarded as instincts par excellence – are not biologically fixed but are amenable 
to  a  psychosymbolic  takeover,  in  which  they  are  retraced,  taken  over,  as 
sexualized drives. From the moment this sexualization occurs, instincts can no 
longer be considered purely programmed: the drive transforms and transcends the 
instincts. (Grosz, 1994: 53)
The drives are attached to biological processes, in the sense that they are 'propped up' by 
them.  That  is,  the  drive  is  supported  by  the  instinct  and  “retraces”  the  neurological 
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pathways  across  the  subject's  body that  the  instinctual  and biological  processes  took, 
“thus mimicking them and taking on the same attributes as preformed instincts19” (ibid.). 
The drive props itself up on the instinct by borrowing the sites, sources, and aims of the 
instincts, inserting a new fantasy object in place of the object of need, enervating and 
disrupting the circuit between the external object, the bodily erotogenic source, and the 
fantasmic link between them. Freud describes this as 'somatic compliance'; that is, when a 
part of the body is singled out as different from or otherwise significant relative to other 
biological processes or organs (an occurrence that will  be radically different  for each 
subject depending on their own specific and contingent life history, experiences, etc.), it 
becomes susceptible to psychical takeover in this way. In this formulation, any part of the  
body is capable of sexualization: “there is a complete plasticity in the body's compliance 
with sexual meanings” (ibid.: 54).
Sexuality develops in this way – that is, insinuating itself in the body's various 
biological  processes  –  because  there  is  a  fundamental  incompleteness  at  the  level  of 
human instincts that it can harness for its own purpose. Human newborns are effectively 
'biologically premature'; a child's instincts are insufficient in supporting the child's needs 
because of its sensory and motor incapacities. Small children are physically helpless and 
“naturally dependent, not only for its well-being but also for its barest survival, on the 
active good will of others” (ibid.: 55). In this sense, Grosz points out, human subjects are 
paradoxically “biologically social, social out of biological necessity. A lack at the level of 
19 Grosz suggests that this may be the reason why the sexual drives are assumed to be instinctive in the 
popular imagination.
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instincts  distinguishes the advent  of  human desire  from animal  need” (ibid.).  It  bears 
repeating again: as a result  of this fundamental incompleteness at  the level of human 
instinct, any corporeal process, event, or experience is capable of sexualization.
That said, although biology seems to provide the preconditions for the emergence 
of sexual impulses insofar as the drives displace the reality of the objects,  aims, and 
bodily sources  of the instincts,  the two cannot  be conflated.  Without  these biological 
processes tracing a path through the body,  the 'raw materials'  for sexuality would not 
exist, but biology alone is not enough; sexual drives result from the insertion of biological 
or bodily processes into networks of signification and meaning. Through this immersion 
they become bound up with and intimately connected to the structures of individual and 
collective fantasies and significations. In this sense, “the drive is a result of corporeal 
significances,  the  binding  of  bodily  processes  and  activities  to  systems  of  meaning” 
(ibid.).
The  psychoanalytic  theory  of  the  sexual  drives  has  a  number  of  profound 
implications for thinking about the relationship between the body, the subject, and culture. 
First and foremost, given that sexuality results out of the insertion of the body into social 
discourse, it means that sexuality is effectively imposed from without. The way a child 
actually, subjectively experiences its sexuality is a retracing, “a psychical transcription,” 
of biological processes, organs and pathways - “the body is literally rewritten by desire” 
(ibid.: 55-56). Psychoanalysis here powerfully subverts traditional notions of mind/body 
dualism. Insofar as sexuality is derived from the dialectics of the biological body caught 
in the web of social signification, the human psyche is not reducible to the endpoint of a 
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purely biologically-ordained process; neither are the two neatly divided by the ontological 
gap presumed by dualism. The psychic agencies are the transliteration of neurological 
structures by culture. Rather than providing the base to a psychological superstructure, 
neurology and biology “are the material  constraints  from which psychical  and sexual 
phenomena are the deviation and conclusion” (ibid.).
Ultimately, psychoanalytic theory provides the intellectual tools needed to tackle 
the  question  of  fat  subjectivity  with  regards  to  the  way  the  body,  and  the  subject's 
experience of its body, is gripped and shaped by culture. Psychoanalysis lays bare that the 
body is literally written on and inscribed by desire and signification; culture carves itself 
into our bodies at the anatomical, physiological, and neurological levels. Biology does not 
determine the outcome of psychic agencies, sexuality, or subjectivity; the body is a pliable 
set  of  significations,  capable  of  being  rewritten  and  reconstituted  in  different  social 
constellations (ibid.: 60-61).
Now that it has been established how the symbolic order inscribes itself on, in, and 
through the  subject's  body,  it  is  time to  examine the  way in which  social  discourses 
surrounding fatness  have changed over time,  and the way in which contemporary fat 
subjects are constituted.
A Whale of a Tale: A Cultural History of Fatness
The  fat  body  has  been  valued  differently  throughout  Western  cultural  and  aesthetic 
history. Richard Klein points out that to us moderns, Nefertiti, the ‘immortal beauty’ of 
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Antiquity,  would  be  considered  ‘fat’  (with  all  its  pejorative  weight),  as  would 
representations of Aphrodite, Greek goddess of beauty, and the Venus de Milo20 (Klein, 
2001: 24-26). That said, in keeping with the metaphysical commitments of the Greeks 
profiled earlier, Klein does note that for the Classics, “fat has always been conceived as a 
kind of cancerous cell growth, inessential  to the body or its image, an excrescence,  a 
corruption of the flesh whose removal left the body intact or in better shape (…)[;] it 
doesn’t belong to us exactly, and it doesn’t belong where we find it” (ibid.: 27). They 
were not averse to a ‘moderate’ thickness, however; in keeping with the Greco-Roman 
ideal that moderation as a principle was a key component of virtue, the ancient Greeks 
and Romans found “fat in moderation” to be a principle source of pleasure and a major 
component of beauty (ibid.).
According  to  art  historian  Kenneth  Clark,  when  Christianity  triumphed  over 
paganism in Europe, “the body ceased to be a mirror of divine perfection and became an 
object of humiliation and shame” (Clark, 1956: 89). Indeed,
the  pious  Christian  ideal  of  beauty  starts  (…)  in  the  hatred  of  the  flesh.  It  
bespeaks  a  hatred  of  every fleshy thing  that  prevents  the  soul  from instantly 
achieving its spiritual destiny. (…) For Christians, appetite is a lure that ensnares 
the soul and perverts its pious impulses. (Klein, 2001: 27-28)
With  the  Christian  Middle  Ages,  moral  attitudes  towards  flesh  changed;  statues  and 
representations of full-bodied women gave way to the emaciated Gothic ideal of a skinny 
woman whose body was “no longer seen and loved for itself,  as an object of sensual 
20 Klein also notes that if projected to a life-size scale, the famous Venus of Willendorf (one of the earliest  
representations of the human form) “is about the fattest woman one can imagine” (Klein, 2001: 21).
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contemplation,  but  envisaged  as  a  vessel  devoted  to  reproduction  (…)[;]  the  Gothic 
skinny is a philosophical decision and a moral judgement about the place of the body in 
the hierarchy of values” (ibid.: 33).
The Gothic chic appears to have been largely confined to the upper classes during 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance21, however; as far as the peasantry were concerned, fat 
was very much still ‘in’:
A thin wife brought disgrace to a peasant, but of a plump one it was said that a 
man  will  love  her  and  not  begrudge  the  food she  eats.  (…) Men,  too,  were 
supposed to be stout, to judge (…) from the painter Breughel’s scenes of high life 
and low, where mostly everyone is tubby, afloat in rolling fat. (Klein, 2001: 33)
The aesthetic value of fat continued to swing back and forth as the Renaissance gave way 
to  the  Enlightenment;  the  ‘frivolous  excess’ of  18th century Rococo gave  way to the 
‘ethereal  thinness’ of  19th century  Romanticism  –  and  then  back  again  in  the  Gay 
(Eighteen-)Nineties, when all classes aspired to look and feel fat, in what Klein suggests 
was  a  desire  to  have  their  bodies  echo  the  material  abundance  of  the  Industrial 
Revolution. This was the fashion until the first decade of the 20 th century, when “almost 
overnight,” thin became sleek and modern (ibid.).
There  is  more  going  on  here  than  just  the  evolution  of  Western  aesthetics, 
however; there is also some basis for the changing cultural valuation of fatness in broader 
changes in the political economy of food and their corresponding class relationships. As 
the  industrial  production and distribution  of  food advanced in the 19 th and early 20th 
21 Though there are exceptions here as well; consider, for instance, the early modern nudes of Rembrandt 
or Rubens (the term 'Rubenesque' is itself a particularly baroque euphemism for fatness).
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centuries, with the increased access of poorer classes of people to richer foods (sugars and 
dietary fats, etc.), a fat body was no longer something exclusively tied to wealth (for a 
more thorough rundown of the changes in the political economy of food and fatness, see: 
Guthman and DuPuis, 2006). The changing class perceptions of fatness at work in the 
Victorian era can be illustrated by way of Charles Dickens; Juliet McMaster suggests that 
Charles Dickens' Pickwick Papers highlights the way that in the Victorian era, there could 
be said to be two different 'classes' of fat people. The first is embodied by the titular 
character, Mr. Samuel Pickwick, a virtuous 19th-century bourgeois who is properly stout; 
Pickwick is plump and “charged with energy, solar or otherwise. He bursts, he beams, he 
bulges (...). His fatness (...) is scarcely even heavy” (McMaster, 1987: 338). By contrast, 
Pickwick's slothful servant Joe is distinguished simply by the moniker of 'fat boy', and 
represents the degenerate masculinity of a lower social strata; as Sander Gilman notes, in 
contrast  to  the  novel's  bourgeois  characters,  Joe  is  perceived as  fat,  as  truly  'obese' 
(Gilman, 2008: 49).
Unlike the vital stoutness of the bourgeoisie, in Victorian discourse, the truly 'fat' 
members of the lower classes signify a certain anxiety and tension about modern life. Fat 
people are simultaneously holdovers of a primeval, survivalist avarice (a submission to 
'primitive' biological imperatives to consume as much as possible as a bulwark against 
scarce  food  supplies,  etc.)  while  also  being  a  distinguishing  symptom  of  modern 
degeneracy and decadence22. As Gilman puts it, “fat had a true function, at least in our 
22 This notion survives to this day in the form of carb-averse dietary fads which harken back to our proto-
Atkins Paleolithic ancestors as the apex of human fitness.
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distant  past,  but  today such 'fat  boys'  are  primeval  throwbacks,  unable to  function in 
contemporary society” (ibid.: 60)23. As fatness became associated with poverty, Victorian 
moralists  were able  to  reinterpret  the fat  body as  a  sign of  moral  laxity on par  with 
drinking and 'idleness'.
It is in this historical moment – the late Victorian era – where we can most clearly 
trace  the  (re-)emergence  of  a  social  preoccupation  with  fatness  as  both  an  aesthetic 
problem  and  a  moral  one;  this  period  marks  the  dawning  of  the  utterly  ideological 
moment when the “prejudice against fat seems universal and eternal [while] thin belongs 
to  what is  truly good and beautiful”  (ibid.:  35).  While pre-twentieth century attitudes 
towards  corpulence  were  varied,  complex,  and  nuanced,  contemporary  normative 
attitudes towards the fat body (in and of itself) can be traced back almost entirely to the 
1863 publication of William Banting’s pamphlet, “A Letter on Corpulence.” Despite pre-
dating  the  devaluation  of  the  fat  body most  readily associated  with  the  20 th century, 
Banting’s letter is one of the first publications to “represent corpulence as a stigmatized 
mode of being” (Huff, 2001: 39).
Although  other  books  and  pamphlets  on  dieting  proliferated  before  Banting’s 
23 Race, too, has a place in this anxiety about fatness and modernity. As early as 1825, French gourmand 
Jean  Brillat-Savarin  characterised  obesity  as  a  distinctly  modern  phenomenon  in  contrast  with  the 
'healthy' eating practices of an Edenic past, writing that “obesity is never found among savages or in  
those classes of society which must work in order to eat or which do not eat except to exist” (Brillat-
Savarin,  1999 [1825]).  But  he  also  noted  that  even  these  'noble  savages'  and  plebians  would  “eat 
gluttonously and  drink  themselves  insensible  whenever  they have  a  chance  to”  (ibid.).  One of  the 
earliest medical commentators on dieting, Christopher Hufeland, intimated that 'savages' would in fact 
fare worse when brought into contact with the fattening decadence of civilization when he noted that “a 
certain degree of cultivation is physically necessary for man, and promotes duration of life. The wild 
man does not live so long as man in a state of civilization” (Hufeland, 1797: 169). Fatness, in relation to  
modernity, is a signifier of both primitiveness (in non-whites) and degeneracy or devolution (in white 
people).
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publication, the “Letter” is distinguished by a number of novelties. First and foremost, 
Banting  promoted  dietary  regulation  not  as  a  general  principle  of  physical  self-
management (common enough in a Victorian society obsessed with ‘proper’ behaviour 
and self-control) but specifically as a means to combat fatness. Secondly, he was emphatic 
that  all fat  people  had  a  need  to  reduce  their  weight,  whereas  previous  works  on 
corpulence tended to recommend weight loss only when obesity explicitly interfered with 
health; and, finally, Banting writes his pamphlet from the (sociosymbolic) position of a 
‘fellow sufferer’ of corpulence, rather than as a medical authority (ibid.: 40-41). In this 
sense, it is possible to read Banting’s pamphlet as one of the ‘founding documents’ of 
contemporary constructions of the fat body in social discourse.
Written by a self-identified ‘fat subject’, Banting’s pamphlet is revealing in that it 
displays both a recognition, and endorsement, of the stigmatization or demonization of fat 
people within Victorian society; his pamphlet opens with the declaration that “of all the 
parasites that affect humanity, I do not know of, nor can I imagine, any more distressing 
than that of obesity” (Banting, 1864: 5). This distress is in no doubt partially a reaction to 
the stigmatization of fat people to which Banting is particularly sensitive:
Any one so afflicted [by obesity] is often subject to public remark (…) and I am 
confident  that  no man labouring under  obesity can  be quite  insensible  to  the 
sneers and remarks of the cruel and injudicious in public assemblies (…) and 
therefore he naturally keeps away as much as possible from places where he is  
likely to be made the object of the taunts and remarks of others. (Banting, 1863: 
9)
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Recognition of the pain this  stigma causes does not dissuade Banting from his moral 
outrage at fatness, however; the pamphlet’s conclusion extols the virtues of the diet which 
freed him from “that  dreadful  tormenting parasite  on health  and comfort  (…) [which 
causes such] bodily and (…) mental infirmity” (ibid.: 20).
This normative attitude towards the fat body is not difficult to discern from even a 
cursory examination of contemporary popular media; the novelty of Banting, here, is the 
way in which his  pamphlet  inaugurates the contemporary construction of  fat  subjects 
familiar  to us in the 21st century.  Joyce Huff presents his import in the history of fat 
subjectivity in Althusserian terms:
Banting’s system thus embeds fat-phobia and the desire to normalize the body 
within the very identity of the corpulent subject. To answer the ‘interpellating’ 
voice of Banting’s pamphlet, to recognize – or to recognizance – oneself as the 
corpulent subject whom Banting addresses, is to accept a stigmatized mode of  
being within a fat-phobic society. (Huff, 2001: 42)
We can say that Banting’s pamphlet is distinguished as one of the founding documents of 
modern  fat  subjectivity  because  the  subjective  position  of  fatness  qua corpulence  he 
outlined survives to this day as the dominant discourse for thinking the fat subject. Any 
sociosymbolic position occupied by a fat person today involves “negotiating the primary 
role offered to him or her within a prevailing narrative that seeks to define corpulent 
bodies as weak-willed, unhealthy, and out of control” (ibid.)
Beyond this, however, Banting is also significant in that he effectively inaugurated 
a  normative discourse (which has  since  worked its  way into  various  other  [aesthetic, 
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medical, psychological, etc.] discourses) which specifically frames body fat and the fat 
body as  intrinsically ‘bad’ and  pathological.  Although  it  would  not  be  until  the  20 th 
century was well underway that this normative discourse would work its way into the 
power-relations  of  bourgeois  culture,  we  can  definitely  trace  the  development  of  the 
modern ‘morality of fat’ from this pamphlet up to the present day – from William Banting 
to MeMe Roth24.
This normative preoccupation with fatness, of course, precedes (and ultimately 
supersedes) social or personal preoccupations with ‘health’, at least since the middle of 
the 19th century in the English-speaking world. In their study of normative biases in the 
field of obesity science and its popular advocates, Michael Gard and Jan Wright note that 
the advent of contemporary fatphobia is linked to the emergence of a broader ‘health 
movement’ in  the  mid-Victorian  era;  that  is,  the  notion  that  modern  life  (particularly 
modern urban life) creates ‘soft’ bodies and weak minds, which ultimately tends towards 
the general moral and physical decline of society writ large (Gard & Wright, 2005: 28). 
Despite  the  invocation  of  ‘health’,  “the  desire  to  eliminate  fat  frequently  motivates 
individuals whose body fat arguably puts them at little risk to engage in diet and exercise 
practices that have proved to be unhealthy, often with full knowledge of the harmfulness 
24 Roth is perhaps the poster child of fatphobia; founder and president of National Action Against Obesity, 
she was profiled in  2009 by  The Guardian as  ‘the woman who hates  fat’ (Wood, 2009).  Her self-
reported motivations are revealing: “No one taught me to be ashamed of obesity, but the day (...) that my 
mother was to bring cupcakes to my [3rd grade] class, I put my head on the table because I knew that (...)  
everyone was going to know that my mother was fat. I felt ashamed. I was grateful that down the block  
there was another mother who was fatter than my mother. [My greatest fear is] that my children will 
become sick [with obesity]... [M]y husband also comes from overweight people [and] feels the way I  
feel. [I wonder] who [my children] will partner with. It scares me. And it's Darwinian. This isn't just my 
opinion: males with obesity have lower sperm counts and sperm motility; females have higher rates of  
infertility, higher rates of pregnancy complication and a higher rate of birth defects. So don't listen to 
me, listen to Darwin!"
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of their actions. Now, as in the mid-nineteenth century, fat avoidance is a goal in and of 
itself” (Huff, 2001: 47).
In fatphobic discourse, body fat  is not ‘mere’ matter,  adipose tissue, or even a 
health risk factor; it is, above all, a signifier of one’s character flaws and moral weakness 
(if not outright immorality) (Farrell, 2011: 36). While this connection between fatness and 
moral weakness is not new, our attitude towards corpulence (known to us as ‘obesity’) 
has, since the 19th century, been one of ‘moral panic’ – that is, obesity is presented to us 
through discourse as an “episode, person, or group of persons (…) defined as a threat to  
societal values and interests” (Gilman, 2008: 9). As a moral panic,
Obesity is characterized (…) by its ‘stylized and stereotypical’ representations, 
imposed  by  the  mass  media,  together  with  a  tendency  for  those  ‘in  power’ 
(politicians,  bishops,  editors,  and  so  on)  to  man  the  ‘moral  barricades’ and 
pronounce  moral  judgements.  Moral  panics  do  not  need  to  be  focused  on 
‘invented’ categories  such as  witches;  they can be associated with real  health 
problems in a way to shape their  meanings.  They can use ‘real’ categories of  
illness to explain such health problems within the ideological focus of the time. 
(Gilman, 2008: 9)
For instance, one of the earliest indicators that this normative discourse was seeping into 
popular  culture  qua advertising  is  an  1878  ad  for  “Allen’s  Anti-fat  Remedy”  in  the 
Philadelphia  African-American  newspaper  the  Christian  Reporter.  Asking  rhetorically 
whether or not fat people are really happy, the ad answers itself:
Why are fat people always complaining? Ask someone who entertains the popular 
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though erroneous notion that health is synonymous with fat. Fat people complain 
because they are diseased. Obesity is an abnormal condition where oleaginous 
elements of the food are assimilated to the partial exclusion of the muscle forming 
and brain producing elements. In proof of this, it is only necessary to assert the  
well  known  fact  that  excessively  fat  people  are  never  strong,  and  seldom 
distinguished for mental powers or acuity. (Farrell, 2011: 38-39).
This ad teaches that fatness is a disease which makes you sad, weak, and stupid – and that 
its product holds the cure, of course. This is a recurrent theme in the history of the diet 
industry.
All  of  these  discursive  constructions  of  fatness  (as  immoral,  the  result  of  a 
decadent modernism, a signifier of moral, spiritual, and physical weakness and stupidity, 
an index of one’s worth as a subject, a marker of ill  health and ‘the most distressing 
parasite ever to afflict humanity’) remain today and shape fat identity. Fat subjects are 
constructed as abject, stigmatized, and marginalized. One’s body size and shape has today 
come to function as a
symbol for the emotional,  moral, or spiritual state of the individual.  The firm, 
developed body has become a symbol of the correct  attitude; it means that one 
‘cares’ about  oneself  and  how  one  appears  to  others,  suggesting  willpower, 
energy, control over infantile impulses, the ability to ‘shape your life’. (…) The 
‘relentless pursuit of excessive thinness’ is an attempt to embody certain values,  
to create a body that will speak for the self in a meaningful and powerful way. 
(Bordo, 2003: 193-95; 67)
Conversely, then, corpulent bodies have come to represent the opposite: a lack of these 
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qualities, a personal failure. The fat body serves as a symbol of being in a state of ‘bodily 
incorrectness’, of immorality as it related to the ‘proper’ way to live in one’s body (Huff, 
2001: 49).  Bordo bears this  out in her analysis  of popular discourse, noting that “the 
obese elicit blinding rage and disgust in our culture and are often viewed in terms that 
suggest  an infant  sucking hungrily,  unconsciously at  its  mother’s  breast:  greedy,  self-
absorbed, lazy, without self-control or willpower” (Bordo, 2003: 202).
In fatphobic discourse,  fat  subjects  are  represented to  others  and the symbolic 
order writ large by this stigmatized signifier – the fat body – onto which is attributed a  
history of  deviance;  that  is,  an  aetiology of  their  fatness  (they  ‘must’ eat  too  much, 
exercise too little,  or otherwise not possess the ‘normal’ self-discipline of the non-fat 
subject) and a  pathology of their fatness (they ‘must’ have an underlying psychological 
reason for overeating, for their immorality, etc.) (Huff, 2001: 51). Within this discourse, 
the fat subject is entirely marginalized,  and the position of the fat  subject is rendered 
abject, unintelligible and uninhabitable25.
To put it in the terms of the psychoanalytic outline of subjectivity described above, 
fatphobic discourse integrates shame and hatred of the body into the very subjectivity into 
those who both inhabit, and do not inhabit, a fat body. If subjects are formed out of the 
25 Activist Le'a Kent puts pointedly: “Little in late-twentieth century U.S. culture has given any inkling 
that it might be possible to  live as a fat [person]. Die as a fat [person], yes. Die  because you’re a fat 
[person], unquestionably. It is all too easy to find images of fat shot through with warnings about one’s  
impending  death  –  images  of  revulsion,  images  in  which  fat  bodies  are  fragmented,  medicalized, 
pathologized, and transformed into abject visions of the horror of flesh itself. In contemporary culture,  
the fat body becomes visible only at the margins, if at all, and only when written into a pathologizing  
narrative in which fat is a cause of ill-health and a symptom of poor behaviour. This narrative creates  
fatness as a ‘spoiled identity’, an identity that can communicate only its own failure, an identity for  
which all other narratives are impossible. The fat body is never portrayed as effective, as powerful, or as 
sexual.” (Kent, 2001: 132) 
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insertion of bodies into a discourse, and if subjectivity is inseparable from the body – if a 
subject must always maintain a libidinal investment (of love or hate) in its own body – 
then fatphobic social discourse will create fat subjects who are  innately always-already 
structurally subordinate, marginalized, and – in a word – oppressed. Le'a Kent highlights 
that much of this hatred of the fat body falls back onto dualist disaffection for the body as 
such of the sort this psychoanalytic model of subjectivity seeks to overcome:
‘Imprisoned in every fat man, (…) a thin one is wildly signalling to be let out.’ In 
this scenario, the self, the person, is presumably thin, and cruelly jailed in a fat  
body. The self is never fat. To put it bluntly, there is no such thing as a fat person. 
The before-and-after [photo, a popular diet culture motif] scenario both consigns 
the fat body to an eternal past and makes it bear the full horror of embodiment, 
situating it as that which must be cast aside for the self to truly come into being. 
(Kent, 2001: 135)
Within fatphobic social discourse, the fat body becomes a symbol which “takes on the 
burden of representing the horror of the body itself for the culture at large. (…) The fat 
body represents the inevitable death of all bodies” (ibid.). Once we consider that the fat 
body, here, is portrayed as abject, a signifier onto which is condensed the ‘horror of the 
body itself’,  which represents  the devalued nature  of  the body upon which dominant 
notions of subjectivity are founded, it is not difficult to discern why many fat persons face 
the social stigma they do. The more intense the fatphobic discourse, the more rigidly the 
ideal body is defined, the more that any body fat (and especially its corollary,  the fat 
body) becomes transgressive.
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This transgression operates on a number of levels. Bordo suggests that at its most 
basic level, the fat body elicits such rage because it signifies resistance to cultural norms. 
“Constant watchfulness over appetite and strenuous work are required to conform to this 
ideal,” she writes, “while the most popular means of ‘correction’ – dieting – often insures 
its own failure, as the experience of deprivation leads to compensatory binging, with its 
attendant  feelings  of  defeat,  worthlessness,  and  loss  of  hope”  (Bordo,  2003:  202). 
Between the dominant discourse and its images of self-containment and self-mastery, and 
the practical reality of constant, everyday stress and anxiety about the body’s appearance 
lies  “the  chasm  that  produces  bodies  habituated  to  self-monitoring  and  self-
normalization” (ibid.: 203). In contrast to this, the obese – most insidiously, those who 
claim to be happy although overweight – are registered as living in positive defiance 
against this normalization process. Fat people are perceived as not playing by social rules; 
“if the rest of us are struggling to be acceptable and ‘normal,’ we cannot allow them to get 
away with it; they must be put in their place, humiliated and defeated” (ibid.).
As an example of this reaction in practice, Bordo submits transcripts from the 
Donahue daytime talk show. Much of the audience’s reaction to one obese woman was 
disbelief that she was really happy at her size; one spectator uttered “I can’t believe you 
don’t want to be slim and beautiful, I just can’t believe it,” while another declared “I 
heard you talk a lot about how you feel good about yourself and you like yourself, but I 
really think you’re kidding yourself” (ibid.). On another episode, in an effort to assuage 
an increasingly raucous audience, one of the doctor-guests reassured the crowd that “the 
‘fat and happy’ target of their attacks did not  really mean that she didn’t  want to lose 
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weight;  rather,  she was just  simply tired  of  trying and failing” (ibid.:  204).  This  last 
construction preserves the dominant discourse and its so-called ‘normal’ subjects against 
the ‘trauma’ of the transgressive fat person through the (implicit) self-acknowledgement 
that to be ‘normal’ is their most desired goal, unattainable only on account of personal 
inadequacy.
The  fat  body  is  also  transgressive,  then,  in  its  abjection.  As  the  fat  body  is 
constructed as the abject Other to the ‘normal’ body, to bear the burden of embodiment 
and the ‘horror of the body itself’, its spectacle serves to confirm and consolidate the 
boundaries of this normality. A well-managed body is one above ‘mere’ embodiment, and 
as such it is symbolically designated as ideal through displacement of its other, the fat 
body. In this sense, “corpulence thus enables and creates the ‘proper’ body” (Huff, 2001: 
52). It is this displacement – and as such, the corresponding structural integrity of the 
entire discourse – that the ‘traumatic’ appearance of the ‘unrepentant,’ abject fat body 
threatens.
In light of these explorations of the way identities, bodies, and embodied subjects 
are constructed through discourse – and the way in which contemporary discourse around 
the fat body shapes and marginalizes the fat embodied subject – it is worth recalling one 
of Judith Butler’s  observations  on the nature of discourse and oppression.  “Discourse 
becomes oppressive,” Butler writes, “when it requires the speaking subject, in order to 
speak, participate in the very terms of their  oppression – that is,  take for granted the 
speaking  subject’s  own  impossibility  or  unintelligibility”  (Butler,  1990:  112).  In  our 
culture, to echo Le'a Kent, it is practically impossible to live or speak as a positively-
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existing fat person; one must be either a thin-person-in-becoming, or a failed thin person. 
The  fat  body  is  positioned  as  always-already  ontologically  wrong,  subordinated  and 
marginalized; it cannot speak or act on its own terms, only with the abject and stigmatized 
terms it signifies to the dominant culture26.
Young  is  fundamentally  in  agreement  with  Butler  on  this  point,  although 
expressed  through different  terminology.  For  Young,  this  discursive  displacement  and 
abjection of the fat body (and the integration of this abjection into the very formative 
process of fat subjectivity) meshes closely with her definition of cultural imperialism as a 
form of oppression:
Cultural imperialism consists in a group’s being invisible at the same time that it 
is  marked  out  and  stereotyped.  (…)  Victims  of  cultural  imperialism are  (…) 
rendered invisible as subjects, as persons with their own perspective and group-
specific  experience  and  interests  [in  contrast  to  the  position  of  the  ‘normal’ 
subject in social discourse]. At the same time they are marked out, frozen into a 
26 In  their  review and comparison  of  two weight  discrimination cases  in  California,  Dylan  Vade and 
Sondra Solovay identify Butler's insight in practice. John R. of Berkeley and Toni C. of Santa Cruz both 
faced employment discrimination because they were fat. Toni applied to work at a grocery cooperative, 
but  was  turned  down when  the  members  told  her  they  thought  her  weight  might  interfere;  John, 
meanwhile, was fired from his job at an auto parts company after years of employment, and later learned 
from a fellow manager that his weight had been the issue. Both sued for weight discrimination; John  
was  awarded  over  a  million  dollars  while  Toni,  who  went  all  the  way  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
California, lost. The difference in these case outcomes, Vade and Solovay argue, lies in the attitudes of 
the claimants: Toni did not locate the problem in, or on, her body, instead arguing that the obstacle was 
the fatphobic social attitudes she faced and the perception that she was disabled despite the fact that  
there was nothing 'medically wrong' with her. John, on the other hand, argued that his weight constituted 
a physiological disorder, and admitted that the problem was that something was 'wrong' with his body;  
he had reportedly tried fasting, hypnosis, and even having his jaws wired shut in attempts to become a  
thin person. Because he was apologetic, and re-affirmed his identification with the marginalized and 
'wrong' position afforded to him by fatphobic discourse, he won; because Toni refused to accept this 
position, she lost. To date, the only successful courtroom strategy used in American cases of weight  
discrimination  (outside  the  few  jurisdictions  with  specific  protections)  is  disability  law  (Vade  and 
Solovay, 2009: 167-9).
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being marked as Other.  The dominant  group need not  notice their  own group 
being at all; they occupy an unmarked, neutral, apparently universal position. But 
victims  of  cultural  imperialism cannot  forget  their  group identity because  the 
behaviour and reactions of others call them back to it. (…) When the dominant 
culture defines some groups as (…) the Other, the members of those groups are 
imprisoned in their bodies. Dominant discourse defines them in terms of bodily 
characteristics,  and  constructs  those  bodies  as  ugly,  dirty,  defiled,  impure, 
contaminated, or sick. (Young, 1990: 123)
As we have seen, the fatphobic discourse that has percolated through Western society 
since the middle of the 19th century (in tandem with changes in the political economy of 
food production/consumption and its corresponding class relationships) functions as an 
oppressive form of cultural imperialism along the lines of Young’s definition. Fat bodies 
are constructed as abjected, marked out to bear the full horror of embodiment at the same 
time as the fat body is effaced by cultural representation of it as unintelligible and unin-
habitable. As we shall see in the following chapters, this denigration of the fat body is 
both co-constitutive of, and compounded by, the other forms of oppression to which fat 
people are subjected.
Drew Brown – 72
IV. 'Nobody Loves A Fat Girl' – Fat as a Feminist Issue
Like  “corporate  lawyer”  or  “sullen  teenager,”  the  phrase  “fat  woman”  contains  the 
implication that you now know all you need to know about the person being discussed.
- Debbie Notkin
So far, we have established two things; first and foremost, that fat people constitute a 
social group subject to its own forms of oppression. Second, whereas the constitution of 
subjectivity  is  always  historically  situated,  the  constitution  (and  oppression)  of  the 
contemporary 'fat subject' can be traced to the hegemony of normative fatphobia in social 
discourse surrounding the body, and its constitution of the subject's relationship to their 
own body.
However,  because social,  economic,  and political processes and institutions are 
already structured along lines which reinforce other forms of group oppression (sexism, 
racism, class, etc.), fatphobic oppression is experienced differently along these lines. It 
compounds each form of oppression in unique ways,  and each  particular category of 
fatphobic oppression highlights its general characteristics.
Women,  as  a  group,  are  acutely  affected  by fatphobic  discourse  and practice. 
Cecilia Hartley, Naomi Wolf, Elizabeth Grosz and Susan Bordo, as well as many others, 
have all  outlined the way in which feminine subjectivity is  tied to the body,  and the 
female body, as a matter of “practice and history,” has been subject to constraints and 
monitoring.  In  our  state  of  advanced  consumer  capitalism,  these  restrictions  are 
increasingly in the form of self-constraint and self-policing behaviour in the service of 
beauty norms. In the contemporary period, many of these “tyrannical” beauty ideals are 
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underpinned by fatphobia. This culture of fatphobia, at its most benign, locks women into 
an endless cycle of self-depreciation and self-policing, and at its most extreme fuels the 
epidemic of eating disorders that has emerged in the West since the early 1980s.
Hartley  points  out  that  women  learn  at  a  young  age  that  their  bodies  are 
fundamentally  flawed;   self-hatred  and  a  sense  of  bodily  deficiency  are  effectively 
integrated to the body image of most women by the onset of puberty. She cites one survey 
of teenaged girls which reported that 53% of thirteen-year-old girls are dissatisfied with 
their bodies; by the time the girls reached eighteen years old, that number rose to 78% 
(Hartley,  2001: 60).  Susan Bordo cites  a 1984 survey of 33,000 American women in 
which  75% of  the  respondents  claimed  they  felt  “too  fat”27 (Bordo,  2003:  154);  by 
contrast,  it  is worth noting that only 25% of these women were above their  “optimal 
weight” (according to the Body Mass Index, itself loaded with cultural bias), while a full  
30%  were  actually  underweight (ibid.).  Although  men  are  also  subject  to  fatphobic 
discourse, the gendered dimension of fatphobic oppression weighs heaviest on women, 
and  this  is  because  it  reinforces  (and  is  reinforced  by)  broader  sexist  sociocultural 
institutions. 
The  account  of  S.  Bear  Bergman  provides  an  illuminating  case  study  of  the 
gendered dimension of fatphobia. Bergman, a transgendered individual, is – empirically – 
a five-foot-nine, 275 lb. Caucasian (with a penchant for wearing nondescript or 'gender 
neutral' clothing), and although “all of these things are true all of the time, (...) [Bergman 
27 In 2009,  Glamour magazine undertook the same survey to determine if and how women's attitudes 
towards their bodies had changed over 25 years; the results remained “virtually unchanged” from the 
original survey (with the fortunate exception that significantly fewer women were using diet pills in 
2009) (Dreisbach, 2009).
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is] only Fat in the normative, cultural (...) sense about a third of the time” (Bergman, 
2009: 139). That is, the perception of Bergman as fat in the “normatively offensive” sense 
depends entirely on the way gender is perceived in the situation.
When perceived as a man, Bergman is big, but not outside the range of what is 
considered acceptable for men. “He” can order, receive and eat any kind of 'bad' food 
(extra fries, ice cream, etc.) in a restaurant without comment, can find appropriately-sized 
clothing without resorting to speciality shops, and can move about (and occupy) public 
space without much threat of verbal (or physical) abuse (ibid.: 141). When Bergman is 
perceived as a woman, however,
I am revolting. I am not only unattractively mannish but also grossly fat. (...) No matter  
how clearly I order a Coke in a restaurant I must be on a diet, and so I get a Diet Coke (...). 
Wait staff develop selective amnesia about my side of fries or my request for butter, and G-
d help me if I get caught eating (or even shopping) in public as a woman. Packs of boys 
follow me, mooing; women with aggressively coordinated outfits accost me in the grocery 
store to inform me that I can lose thirty pounds in thirty days and that they would love to 
help. There are pig calls and (...) the fat woman that I am some days does not view a stroll  
down a dark street with anything but barely disguised fear. (ibid.)
Hartley,  following  Naomi  Wolf,  argues  that  the  differential  gendered  experiences  of 
fatness Bergman describes arises out of the linking of a woman's body size to her social  
subordination; by becoming large (either through body fat or muscle mass), a woman is 
implicitly  violating  social  rules  that  demand  physical  subordination  to  men  (Hartley, 
2001:  62).  According  to  Wolf,  the  focus  on  the  smallness  of  a  woman's  body  has 
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increased (in North America) at the same time that the feminist movement began to see 
substantive political success and women gained a real measure of social power. In this 
sense, “a cultural fixation on female thinness is not an obsession about female beauty but 
an obsession about female obedience” (Wolf, 1991: 187)28. 
Indeed, many feminist authors have pointed out that cultural expectations have 
progressively shifted away from what a woman is allowed to do onto what a woman is 
allowed to look like. Susan Bartky argues that “normative femininity is coming more and 
more to be centred on woman's body – not its duties and obligations or even its capacity 
to  bear  children,  but  its  sexuality,  more  precisely,  its  presumed  heterosexuality  and 
appearance”  (Bartky,  1990:  80);  Laura  Brown goes  so  far  as  to  claim that  the  ideal 
feminine body is a “manifestation of misogynist norms flowing from a culture where we 
are devalued and disempowered” (Brown, 1985: 63).
It should be emphasized that these 'misogynist norms' are not heaped on women as 
a purely external force; as Foucault notes, the success of social body policing depends on 
those bodies learning to  regulate themselves (Foucault,  1979: 135). Whereas feminine 
socio-cultural  norms  are  structured  by  the  'male  gaze',  even  when  the  male  gaze  is 
physically absent, women experience internalized pressure to continually produce bodies 
that are acceptable to that gaze; in this sense, “a woman's own gaze becomes a substitute 
for a man's gaze, and she evaluates her own body as ruthlessly as she expects it to be 
28 Fatphobia has a long historical entanglement with feminist backlash; anti-suffrage activists would often 
employ the motif of the fat woman's body to lampoon feminists as mannish, overbearing fat women 
whose struggles “threatened to ruin the social order and 'unsex' both men and women” (Farrell, 2011: 
83). Early feminists, in turn, portrayed themselves as alluringly young and slender, and their female anti-
suffrage opponents as old, fat, stupid, and resistant to progress.
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evaluated by him” (Hartley, 2001: 62). Hartley underscores this point with reference to 
the way fat women are said to have 'let themselves go': the very phrase conjures up the 
image of loosening restraints.
Accordingly,  woman  and  girls  have  been  consistently  found  to  be  more 
dissatisfied with their bodies than men and boys (Bosson et al.,  2008: 257-66); when 
evaluating themselves, young girls tend to place greater emphasis on how attractive their 
bodies  look compared  to  others,  whereas  boys  focus  more  on  what  their  bodies  can 
physically achieve (John and Ebbeck, 2008: 623-32). That women place such an intense 
focus on their physical appearance is not because it is an innately-preferred mode of free 
expression (as some feminist theorists have argued29) or because they have been duped by 
the beauty industry, but because most women have correctly discerned and internalized 
(whether consciously or unconsciously) that they live in a society where a woman's worth 
is based primarily on her appearance. 
Most women are aware, on some level, that dominant beauty ideals shape the way 
they are perceived by friends,  family,  potential  partners and employers,  and even the 
strangers they pass on the street; that these people will be able to discern how near or far a 
particular woman is to the ideal, “how vigilant she has been, how disciplined she is and 
how committed she is to providing it” (Banyard, 2011: 18-19). These 'tyrannical' beauty 
ideals – however they are constituted – retain their material power over women (despite 
occasional flurries of media coverage about their harmfulness) because of the enduring 
29 One such example is  Natasha Walter's  The New Feminism (1998),  which claimed that  “times have 
changed [and] women's feelings about their clothes and bodies are easier now than at any time in the  
recent past,” and that 'new feminism' must “unpick the tight link that feminism in the seventies made 
between our personal and political lives” (Walter, 1998: 4).
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social  forces  of  objectification.  Female  bodies  are  “widely  denigrated  as  inanimate 
objects to be publicly scrutinized, judged, maintained, and manipulated for the benefit of 
others;  they are  shared public  property (...),  [objects]  that  could  and should be made 
beautiful – at almost any cost – for the benefit of those looking at it” (ibid.: 19-20).
Critiques  of  beauty-as-objectification  are  not  new,  however;  Andrea  Dworkin 
wrote in 1974 that:
standards of beauty describe in precise terms the relationship that an individual will have to 
her own body. They prescribe her mobility, spontaneity, posture, gait, the uses to which she 
can put her body. They define precisely the dimensions of her physical freedom. (Dworkin, 
1974: 112)
Similarly, in 1991 Naomi Wolf stated that “we are in the middle of a violent backlash 
against  feminism  that  uses  images  of  female  beauty  as  a  political  weapon  against 
women's advancement” (Wolf, 1991: 272)30. 
Today, it is easy to discern that a thoroughly fatphobic emphasis on 'thinness' (and 
increasingly, not just thinness, but a visibly toned, worked, tightly controlled body) is the 
most pervasive beauty ideal in contemporary culture. An analysis of American women's 
magazines from 1999 found that 94% of them had a model or celebrity on the cover who 
conformed to this thin ideal (Harper and Tiggemann, 2008: 269-84); moreover, the actual 
content of these magazines (the articles, advertisements, and images) focused largely on 
how readers  could  (and should!)  improve their  lives  by changing their  appearance  – 
30 These beauty ideals are not simply matters of culture; they have even been institutionalized in many 
cases. Kat Banyard reports that in 2009, the Bank of England held a seminar for female employees  
called 'Dress for Success' that emphasized how important it was that they always wear high-heels and  
makeup (Banyard, 2011: 29). There was, of course, no corresponding seminar for men.
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specifically, that being thin means being more lovable, sexier, and happier (Malkin et al., 
1999:  647-55).  Unsurprisingly,  the material  effect  of these explicitly fatphobic beauty 
ideals break down along visibly gendered lines: women are up to ten times more likely 
than men to worry about their weight (Banyard, 2011: 33), and are significantly more 
likely  than  men  to  go  on  crash  diets,  abuse  laxatives,  and  engage  in  compulsive 
exercising31 (Bordo, 2003: 154-6).
While external media sources are a significant vehicle of the fatphobic cultural 
norms women internalize, these norms are also enforced in everyday discussions among 
friends, loved ones, and colleagues. Channelling Foucault's notion of bodies which police 
themselves,  Kat  Banyard  identifies  'fat  talk'  –  that  is,  conversations  between  friends, 
family,  etc.  which  focuses  on  negative  self-assessments  of  the  body –  as  an  equally 
important conveyor of these fatphobic norms. Women are thoroughly steeped in body-
depreciating discourse; research in the US showed that women feel worse about their 
bodies after hearing a thin woman talk negatively about her own (Tucker et al., 2007: 
157-64). The message at every level of Western culture is clear: curves (in the wrong 
place) and fat (in any place) are not welcome on the female body (Banyard, 2011: 35).
So what is so distressing about the fat female body? By its presence, the fat female 
body disrupts social rules governing gender performance; it is abject, and it signifies the 
subject's  failure to remain within the boundaries of what her relationship to her body 
31 As a testament to the incredible power of media imagery, researchers who interviewed indigenous Fijian 
girls within one month of television being introduced to their area – and then again 3 years later – 
discovered the rate of disordered eating spiked dramatically. The percentage of girls who ranked high on 
tests of disordered eating jumped from 12.7% to 29.2%, while the proportion of girls who admitted to 
vomiting to control their weight increased from 0% to 11.3% (Baker et al., 2002: 509-14).
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should  be  (and,  implicitly,  the  fragility  of  these  rigid,  fatphobic  gender  roles).  These 
fatphobic norms are so deeply ingrained in North American culture that “virtually every 
woman learns to hate her body, regardless of her size, and so she learns to participate in 
her  own oppression” (Hartley,  2001:  64).  Indeed, “data suggests that  North American 
women of most cultures, and all body sizes and eating styles tend to have fat-oppressive 
and fat-negative  attitudes  towards  their  own bodies,  and by inference,  those  of  other 
women” (Brown, 1989: 20).
The  fat  woman,  as  such,  is  read  in  our  culture  as  both  too-feminine  and 
unfeminine, as asexual and hypersexualized (as a woman who cannot control herself or 
her appetites), as aggressive and in general violation of socially-prescribed gender roles 
(Hartley, 2001: 64). As a result of these cultural pressures, fat women in North America 
are  perpetually  victimized  by  public  ridicule;  “fat  bodies  are  invaded  by comments, 
measured with hatred, pathologized by fear and diagnosed by ignorance” (Brown, 1989: 
47).  These  cultural  attitudes  translate  into  material  forces  of  oppression;  one  study 
indicates fat women only have a third of the chance of being admitted into prestigious 
colleges compared to slim girls with similar school records (Millman, 1980: 90). Fat is a 
thoroughly moral signifier in society; fat women are often dismissed as sloppy, careless, 
lazy, and self-indulgent (Hartley, 2001: 65).
There are differing interpretations as to why fat women elicit so much disgust in 
Western culture. Laura Brown has argued that “a fat woman by her presence violates 
primal norms of misogynist society that deny nurturence, space, power and visibility to 
women” (Brown, 1989: 26); this interpretation fits with Iris Young's earlier observation 
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that women undergo “specific forms of gender exploitation in which their energies and 
power  are  expended,  often  unnoticed  and  unacknowledged,  usually  to  benefit  men” 
(Young, 1990: 51). Susan Bordo also suggests this may be the case when she observes 
that women are taught to feed others, not themselves, and that any desires they have for 
self-nurturing and self-feeding are not  only greedy and excessive,  but  in  violation of 
gender  norms  (Bordo,  2003:  171);  Tracy Royce  has  argued  that  in  addition  to  these 
factors,  fat  women elicit  contempt  from many men because they are seen as  lacking 
sexual utility (Royce, 2009: 154). 
Others,  however,  have  drawn  a  link  to  the  way  fatness  signifies  a  certain 
relationship  to  desire  within  our  current  symbolic  coordinates,  and  that  the  way our 
society looks at fat is analogous to the way sex (and desire) was viewed in the Victorian 
era;  Naomi Wolf goes as far as to suggest that “what hysteria was to the nineteenth-
century fetish of the asexual woman locked in the home, anorexia is to the late-twentieth-
century fetish of the hungry woman” (Wolf, 1991: 198). For the (post-)modern woman, 
“fat” is forbidden, dirty,  and shameful, and the strict  control and repression of bodily 
needs mandated by our culture are again manifested in the body – not in hysteria, but in 
eating disorders (Hartley, 2001: 65). Susan Bordo, in her analysis of eating disorders and 
cultural representations of the female body, takes care to emphasize that the “escalation of 
eating  disorders  into  a  significant  social  phenomenon  arises  at  the  intersection  of 
patriarchal culture and post-industrial capitalism” (Bordo, 2003: 32); that is, they are a 
physical manifestation of the psychic pressure that arises out of living in a culture which 
demands  that  women's  bodies  be  tightly  controlled  and  toned  as  a  symbol  of  self-
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discipline, while simultaneously soliciting women, as consumers, to consume much and 
consume often. It is this argument – that anorexia is the material inscription upon the 
female  body of  sexist  and fatphobic  social  norms – that  we shall  now investigate  in 
greater detail.
A Triumph of the Will: Anorexia as Ontology
Reported cases of anorexia and bulimia – and eating disorders writ large – exploded a 
little  over  thirty  years  ago  in  the  West.  This  explosion  is  an  instance  of  what 
anthropologist Jules Henry called psychopathology; that is, “the final outcome of all that 
is  wrong  with  a  culture,”  (Henry,  1963)  the  physical  and  psychical  manifestation  of 
pathological cultural dynamics. These disorders are a social symptom of the sexist and 
fatphobic power structures at work in post-industrial capitalism. It goes without saying 
that  eating  disorders  most  heavily affect  women;  up  to  70 million  people  worldwide 
suffer from an eating disorder, and the vast majority of them are women (Banyard, 2011: 
36).
Historically, eating disorders were generally rare; psychiatrist Hilde Bruch, one of 
the pioneers in the clinical study and treatment of eating disorders, noted that instances of 
anorexia nervosa were “rare indeed” as late as 1973 (Bruch, 1973: 4). By contrast, in 
1984 the New York Center for the Study of Anorexia and Bulimia received 252 requests 
for treatment in the first five months of the year, up from just 30 requests over the entire 
year in 1980 (Bordo, 2003: 140). In their authoritative study on anorexia as a clinical 
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disorder, Paul Garfinkel and David Garner describe the disorder as “multidimensional,” 
with  familial,  perceptual,  cognitive,  and  biological  factors  interacting  in  varying 
combinations in different individuals to produce a “final common pathway” (Garfinkel 
and Garner, 1982: xi). Given the disease's growing frequency throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, and the way it appeared at different rates among different cultural groups32, there is 
compelling evidence that cultural factors do play a significant role in the pathogenesis of 
eating disorders (Bordo, 2003: 140).
While most 'cultural'  analyses of anorexia centre on the recognition that eating 
disorders are related to the emphasis placed on slenderness by the fashion industry and 
the popular media, approaching the question of anorexia as an anomaly or aberration – 
arising among women who take these beauty ideals “too far” – does not really deepen our 
understanding of the contemporary epidemic of eating disorders. By contrast, anorexia 
can be better  understood as a “remarkably overdetermined” symptom (to use Bordo's 
term, a crystallization) of “some of the multifaceted and heterogeneous distresses of our 
age”  (ibid.:  141).  A variety  of  Western  cultural  currents  find  their  perfect,  precise 
expression in anorexia.
Bordo identifies  three  major  'currents'  which  converge  in  anorexia,  which  she 
refers to as “axes of continuity” ('axes' because they converge in the anorexic symptom, 
'continuity' because they illuminate the synchronicity between anorexia and other cultural 
symptoms). Specifically, these are: the dualist axis (that is, the tendency within Western 
32 While anorexia was originally found to predominate among white, upper-class families, the disorder has 
since become more equally distributed among different and previously unaffected cultural groups (e.g. 
Blacks, East Indians) as well as across all socio-economic levels (Garfinkel and Garner, 1982: 102-3). 
The disorder remains overwhelmingly gendered, however.
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thought  to  segregate body from mind,  as  we explored  in  our  previous  elaboration of 
embodied  subjectivity);  the  control  axis  (the  cultural  emphasis  on  the  ability  –  and 
normative duty – of the mind to 'control' or 'rule' the body; that is, 'instrumental reason' in 
general); and, the gender/power axis (the gendered nature of social power relations writ 
large and, especially in this context, the way they relate to the other two axes) (ibid.: 142). 
Simply  put,  these  three  axes  address  the  central  question  of  the  explosion  of  eating 
disorders in the West: 'why anorexia?', 'why now?', and 'why women?', respectively. It is  
worth recalling here the ontology of the 'embodied subject' elucidated previously; Bordo 
reminds us that there is no 'natural' body, untouched by cultural processes: “our bodies, no 
less than anything else that is human, are constituted by culture” (ibid.).
As  we  saw  earlier,  culture  often  works  to  change  (and  indeed  constitute)  a 
subject's lived experience of their own body; for anorexics, the cultural practice of dieting 
– of saying no to hunger, of frustrating the body's needs and desires – transforms the 
hunger drive into a dangerous eruption from some alien part of the self, and generates a 
growing intoxication with the control of that eruption (ibid.: 143). Moreover, the body can 
also serve as an instrument and medium of power – a classic example, in terms of the 
manipulation of a woman's body as object and reflection of male power, is the way in 
which the nineteenth-century corset both physically incapacitated its wearer and worked 
as an emblem of the power of culture to impose its designs on the female form (ibid.:  
143).
With regards to both extremes of the body's subjection to culture (ie. manipulation 
of the body's lived experience as well as manipulation of the physical body itself), women 
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have, as a matter of history, been significantly more vulnerable to this subjection than 
men. This is directly related to the Western tendency to associate women with the body in 
scientific,  philosophical  and religious  ideology,  as  well  as  the  way women  are  often 
reduced to the level of their bodies  qua objects. Indeed, the social manipulation of the 
female body (symbolically and materially) is at the heart of the processes which have 
maintained the power relations between the sexes over the past century (ibid.)
Even  though  fatphobic  oppression  (from  which  anorexia  obviously  draws 
strength)  contributes  to  the  reinforcement  of  patriarchal  social  relationships,  this 
'patriarchy' is not literally a cadre of male oligarchs actively conspiring against women as 
a  whole.  As  Foucault  reminds  us,  although  historical  power  relations  may  be 
characterized by a perfectly clear logic with perfectly decipherable aims and objectives, it 
is nonetheless generally the case that “no one was there to have invented these aims and 
strategies, whether through the choice of individuals or the grand, rational plan of some 
'presiding  headquarters'”  (Foucault,  1980:  95).  Even  though  some  individuals  do 
consciously pursue goals that would solidify or advance their own position within these 
power relations, they do not consciously direct the overall movement of these relations, or 
actively engineer their structure(s) or dynamics (Bordo, 2003: 144). Nor does it mean that 
power relations involving domination by a particular group entails that the dominators are 
in full,  monolithic control of the situation,  or that those dominated do not sometimes 
(consciously or otherwise) advance and extend the situation themselves (ibid.) Anorexia 
is an exemplary instance of this collaboration.
The first, and broadest, axis underpinning anorexia is the dualist axis. As we have 
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already discussed at length, this is the tradition in Western thought – stretching back to 
Plato and codified by Descartes – that views human existence as being fundamentally and 
irreconcilably split between the (lower) material body and the (higher) mind or spirit. In 
this framework, the body is experienced as fundamentally alien, as not-self, but simply as 
a fleshy container for the soul or mind – that is, the  true self. This fleshy container is 
overwhelmingly experienced  as  a  confinement  and  limitation  which  the  soul/mind  is 
always struggling to transcend. The body is also generally seen as the enemy of the soul  
or  mind  (especially  pointed  in  the  Christian  tradition),  the  source  of  obscurity  and 
confusion in our thinking with its 'filthy' and 'base' needs and desires. Most importantly, 
however, is that whether the body is seen as an impediment to reason or the immortality 
of the soul, it is always conceptualized as the locus of “all that threatens our attempts at 
control” (ibid.: 144-145). Plato's declaration in  Phaedo that “Nature orders the soul to 
rule and govern and the body to obey and serve” (Plato, 1953: 80a) remains in force 
today.
This identification of control over the body's desires and hungers with the self 
inaugurates a vicious cycle, however: the more the self is defined and strengthened by the 
success of the will, the more everything outside the self becomes a perceived threat, up to 
and ultimately including the subject's own body. The attempts by the subject to subdue the 
spontaneity of the body only succeeds in reinforcing its alien power, making its need for 
rigid  control  more  urgent.  Taken  to  its  logical  conclusion,  the  only  way out  of  this 
impasse, for the pathologically controlling subject, is to kill off the body's spontaneity 
altogether – that is, to  cease experiencing hunger and desire (Bordo, 2003: 146). This 
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correlates well with the experience of many anorexics; recovering anorexic Kim Chernin, 
upon reflecting on her experience with the disorder, mused she “realized that [her] secret 
goal  in  dieting  must  have  been  the  intention  to  kill  off  [her]  appetite  completely” 
(Chernin, 1981: 8).
Indeed, anorexics are just as obsessed with  hunger as they are with being slim; 
Ellen West, one of the earliest publicized anorexic patients, described hunger as “the real 
obsession (...) I don't think the dread of becoming fat is the real neurosis, but the constant 
desire for food” (Binswanger, 1958: 253); that is, she interpreted her dread of becoming 
fat not as originary but as a “brake” on her horrifying, uncontrollable desire for food. 
Bruch reported that her patients were often terrified at the prospect of taking just one bite 
of food lest they be unable to stop (Bruch, 1973: 253) – a fear confirmed in the cases of  
bulimics, who can binge on enormous quantities of food (sometimes upwards of 15,000 
calories a day) (Levenkron, 1982: 6).
These  women  generally  experience  hunger  as  an  alien  force,  divorced  from 
themselves; Bruch notes that this “basic delusion (...)  of not owning the body and its  
sensations” is a typical symptom of all eating disorders – “these patients act as if for them 
the regulation of food intake was outside [the self]” (Bruch, 1973: 50). This sense of 
bodily alienation goes beyond just hunger – Bruch also reported that patients with eating 
disorders have similar problems in identifying heat, emotions, and anxiety as originating 
in the self (ibid.: 254). As a corollary to this, the body is also experienced as a prison, as a 
constraint to be transcended; Ellen West described anorexic self-starvation as “the ideal of 
being too thin, of being without a body” (Binswanger, 1958: 251).
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From all  this,  we can  glean  that  anorexia  presents  a  'metaphysics'  that  makes 
explicit  various  elements  that  run  deep  in  Western  culture  –  specifically,  a  quasi-
Augustinian schematic where the mind and soul must battle for control against the sinful 
lusts of the flesh (Bordo, 2003: 147). In this metaphysical battle, thinness represents a 
triumph of the will over carnality, and the thin body (that is, the non-body) is associated 
with purity and transcendence; conversely, fatness (or corpulence, becoming too-much-
body) is “associated with the taint of matter and flesh, 'wantonness', mental stupor and 
mental decay” (ibid.: 148). This coheres tightly with the framing of the fat body in the 
broader fatphobic discourse we surveyed earlier.
But although metaphysical dualism is a fairly old strain in Western thought, it gets 
a new lease on life in our culture as a result of our cultural impetus towards control of the 
unruly  body.  Clinical  investigation  has  borne  out  that  the  'classical'  anorexic  subject 
experiences  her  life  (and her  hungers) as  being out of  control;  she is  a perfectionist, 
almost  always  failing  to  meet  the  impossibly  high  standards  she  sets  for  herself; 
characteristically, her parents expect a great deal from her both in terms of individual 
achievement and personal appearance, but tend to make most of the important decisions 
for her  (Bruch, 1979: 33).  Tellingly,  the anorexic syndrome usually emerges not as a 
conscious decision to get as thin as possible, but as the result of beginning a casual diet 
(often at the suggestion of a parent) which succeeded in dropping 5 or 10 pounds, and 
becoming hooked on the “intoxicating feeling of accomplishment and control” (Bordo, 
2003: 149). According to one recovered anorexic, “the diet [was] the one sector of my life 
over which I and I alone [wielded] total control” (Liu, 1979: 141); another of Bruch's 
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patients explicitly formulated that in anorexia, “you make your own body your very own 
kingdom where you are the tyrant, the absolute dictator” (Bruch, 1979: 65).
Anorexia, in this sense, is an expression of deeper anxiety and longing for the 
security of control among people living in a world increasingly defined by an individual's 
lack of control over significant aspects of their lives; Bordo notes that:
in  a  culture  (...)  in  which our  continued survival  is  often  at  the  mercy of  'specialists',  
machines and sophisticated technology, the body acquires a special sort of vulnerability and 
dependency. We may live longer, but the circumstances surrounding illness and death may 
often be perceived as more alien, inscrutable, and arbitrary than ever before. (Bordo, 2003: 
153)
But  cultural  preoccupations  with  body-mastery  express  more  than  just  a  craving  for 
control, however; they also represent a subjective position striving against all reminders 
of the inevitable decay and death of the body (and the self) – ironically, although many 
anorexics come very close to death (and roughly 15% of sufferers do actually die), the 
dominant experience throughout the illness is one of invulnerability (ibid.).
“Disgusting, Womanish Fat”: Diet Culture & the New Corset
The  most  immediately  visible  and  pressing  axis  to  bear  in  mind  when  considering 
anorexia, however, is its gendered dimension: 90% of all anorexics are women (ibid.: 
154). If we recall the study discussed earlier where women consistently overestimated 
their  own  degree  of  'fatness'  (even  though  almost  a  third  of  those  who  perceived 
themselves  as  overweight  were  in  fact  clinically  underweight),  then  suddenly  the 
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anorexic's distorted body image – her inability to see herself as anything but too fat – is 
simply an extreme expression of a common female misconception (ibid.).
Tellingly, Bruch reported that many of her anorexic patients talked of having a 
'ghost' inside or surrounding them; one patient referred to it as “a dictator who dominates 
me,” while another described it as “a little man who objects when I eat” (Bruch, 1979: 
58). Bruch noted that this dictator, this 'other self' (as he was often described) is always 
male;  conversely,  the  anorexic's  'base'  self  –  the  self  of  uncontrollable  appetites,  the 
stupid, flabby, worthless self – is her own body, which is also the female self.  For the 
anorexic, these two selves are in a constant struggle, and it is the  male side – and its 
associated values of greater spirituality, heightened intellect, and strength of will – with 
which the anorexic identifies (Bordo, 2003: 155).
Clinical  evidence  indicates  that  in  (not  uncommon)  instances  where  anorexia 
develops at the onset of puberty, normal body changes are experienced by the anorexic 
subject  as  “the  takeover  over  the  body  by  disgusting,  womanish  fat”  (ibid.:  156). 
Revulsion with menstruation is common, and anorexics are generally ecstatic when their 
periods stop (as they do in all sufficiently advanced instances of anorexia) (Bruch, 1979: 
65). Many authors have interpreted the symptoms of anorexia as “unconscious feminist 
protest” against the limitations of the traditional female role, rejection of its associated 
values,  and rebellion  against  following the  same trajectory as  their  mothers  (see,  for 
instance: Orbach, 1985).
Fatness  is  equivocated  by  many  anorexics  with  femininity  –  specifically,  the 
limited social roles they associated with women. Ellen West, one of anorexia's 'patient 
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zeroes',  explicitly  equated  becoming  fat  with  the  domestic  confinement  and  stupor 
expected of affluent women in her time: “dread is driving me mad (...), the consciousness 
that ultimately I will lose everything; all courage, all rebelliousness, all drive for doing; 
that it – my little world – will make me flabby, flabby and fainthearted and beggarly” 
(Binswanger, 1958: 243). Out of these articulations of fatness as a signifier of women's 
oppression in the clinical literature on anorexia, many feminist theorists have argued that 
our contemporary epidemic of anorexia is, in effect, a  political phenomenon. Lacanian 
feminist Dianne Hunter argues the anorexic symptom is the transformation of the body 
into a non-linguistic medium of communication “addressed to patriarchal thought (...), a 
self-repudiating  form of  feminine  discourse  in  which  the  body signifies  what  social 
conditions make it impossible to state linguistically” (Hunter, 1985: 114); Susie Orbach 
echoes this viewpoint, suggesting the anorexic is engaged in a(n unconscious) 'feminist 
hunger  strike'  where  the  refusal  of  food  and  the  dramatic  reduction  of  body  size 
“expresses with [the] body what [the anorexic] is unable to tell us with words” (Orbach, 
1985: 102). For both theorists, this message is a clear political indictment of a culture that 
disdains and suppresses female hunger, makes women ashamed of their needs and desires, 
and demands they labour relentlessly towards transforming their bodies into objects of 
aesthetic and sexual pleasure.
Despite  the  force  of  this  statement,  the  anorexic  is  often  unaware  that  she  is 
engaged in a political act; consciously, in practice, her life is often organized around and 
devoted to the values her body protests. Although 'subjectively' she may be in pursuit of 
decidedly anti-feminist values, 'objectively' – through embodiment rather than deliberate 
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demonstration – the anorexic's body exposes and condemns those ideals,  precisely by 
pursuing them to the point where their destructive logic is palpably, tangibly revealed. But 
it is with this 'subjective'/'objective' distinction in mind that we should caution against 
framing the anorexic as tragic feminist hero; 'objectively', anorexia as protest is counter-
productive and ultimately self-defeating:
Functionally, the symptoms of these disorders isolate, weaken, and undermine the sufferers; 
at the same time they turn the life of the body into an all-absorbing fetish, beside which all  
other  objects  of  attention  pale  into  unreality.  On  the  symbolic  level,  too,  the  protest 
collapses  into  its  opposite  and  proclaims  the  utter  capitulation  of  the  subject  to  the 
contracted female world. (...) The pathologies of [anorexic] protest function, paradoxically,  
as if in collusion with the cultural conditions that produce them, reproducing rather than 
transforming precisely what is being protested against. (Bordo, 2003: 176-77)
At any rate, it is in this 'unconscious feminist protest' against everything  wrong 
with contemporary feminine gender roles – that is, in the anorexic's body as a text upon 
which modern  femininity is physically inscribed and indicted – that many theorists also 
locate a family resemblance between the contemporary 'epidemic'  of anorexia and the 
'epidemic' of invalidism and hysteria that swept through women in the middle and upper-
middle classes in the Victorian era. Both our own time and the Victorian era put women in 
a  precarious  position:  changing  economic  and  social  structures  opened  up  of  new 
possibilities for women at the very same time that old gender roles and expectations were 
reasserted. Bordo elaborates:
On the one hand, the old pre-industrial order, with the father at the head of a self-contained 
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family production unit, had given way to the dictatorship of the market, opening up new, 
non-domestic opportunities for working women. On the other hand, it turned many of the 
most valued 'female' skills – textile and garment manufacturing, food processing – out of 
the home and over to the factory system. In the new machine economy, the lives of middle-
class women were far emptier than they had ever been before. (Bordo, 2003: 157)
We  can  also  stress  the  connection  between  the  way  both  these  'feminine'  disorders 
(hysteria and anorexia) transform the woman's body into a text onto which the socially-
prescribed  norms  governing  femininity  are  literally  (and  painfully)  transcribed  and 
protested. Consider some of the symptoms present in instances of these two disorders: 
loss of mobility, loss of voice, inability to leave the home, feeding others while starving 
oneself, taking up space, and whittling down the space one's body takes up - “all have 
symbolic  meaning,  all  have  political meaning  under  the  varying  rules  governing  the 
historical construction of gender” (ibid.: 168). In the case of hysteria, doctors of the time 
described  the  'hysterical  personality'  as  “impressionable,  suggestible,  and  narcissistic; 
highly  labile,  their  moods  changing  suddenly,  dramatically,  and  for  seemingly 
inconsequential reasons (...); egocentric in the extreme (...), essentially asexual and not 
uncommonly  frigid”  (Smith-Rosenberg,  1985:  203);  these  are,  of  course,  all 
characteristics normative of femininity in the Victorian era. The inscription of hysteria on 
women's  bodies  in  this  fashion was  in  no  small  part  helped by way of  the  physical 
manipulation they received through the corset; in a corset, a woman could barely sit or 
stoop, was unable to move her feet more than six inches at a time, and had difficulty 
avoiding  regular  fainting  fits.  Moreover,  the  link  between  the  corset  and  (physical, 
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mental,  and spiritual) control was often made explicit  in advertisements;  one 1878 ad 
proclaimed that the corset is  “an ever-present monitor of a well-disciplined mind and 
well-regulated feelings” (Bordo, 2003: 162). Today, women diet to achieve this control. 
With the advent of mass media like cinema and television, these 'symptoms of 
femininity' become increasingly literal as the rules for femininity are transmitted through 
standardized (and homogenizing) visual images. Femininity, as a social practice, is now 
largely a matter of constructing the appropriate surface presentation of the self; “we learn 
the rules directly through bodily discourse: through images that tell us what clothes, body 
shape, facial expression, movements, and behaviour are required” (Bordo, 2003: 170). In 
the case of anorexia, it is easy to read the emaciated body of the anorexic as a caricature 
of  the  idea  that  hyperslenderness  is  beauty;  in  order  to  unpack  the  meaning  of  this 
inscription, however, it is necessary to interpret 'slenderness' in its cultural and historical 
meaning – specifically as it applies to feminine gender roles.
Slenderness, here, signifies the contradictory ideals and directives prescribed to 
women in the West today. On the one hand, our culture still widely advertises domestic 
conceptions of femininity – “the ideological moorings for a rigorously dualistic sexual 
division of labour that casts women as chief emotional and physical nurturer” (ibid.: 171). 
Women are taught to feed others, not the self, and to see any desires for self-nurturing and 
self-feeding  as  greedy  and  excessive;  they  must  learn  to  develop  an  other-oriented 
emotional economy wherein the control of female appetite for food is just the most literal 
iteration  of  the  general  rule  wherein  all female  hunger  –  for  public  power,  for 
independence, for sexual gratification – be contained, and that the public space a woman 
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is allowed to take up is limited and circumscribed (ibid.). On the other hand, although 
young  women are  still  taught  traditionally  'feminine'  virtues,  “to  the  degree  that  the 
professional  arena  is  open  to  them  they  must  also  learn  to  embody  the  'masculine' 
language and values of that arena – self-control, determination, cool, emotional discipline 
and  mastery,  etc.”  (ibid.:  171).  In  this  sense,  the  ideal  of  the  slender  body (and the 
corresponding diet and exercise regimes that have become inseparable from it) offers the 
illusion of meeting, through the body, the contradictory demands of normative femininity 
in the contemporary period.
The  anorexic,  then,  embodies  this  double-bind  in  a  particularly  painful  and 
graphic way; many anorexics explicitly understand their condition as a war between the 
male  and  female  sides  of  the  self.  These  afflicted  feminine  bodies,  insofar  as  their 
disorders represent the literal transcription of normative femininity, are “speaking to us of 
the pathology and violence that lurks just around the corner, waiting at the horizon of 
'normal'  femininity” (ibid.:  175). As we have seen, anorexia generally erupts out of a 
casual diet – that is, the disease begins in and emerges from what is a ubiquitous feminine 
practice in our culture. Through disciplined adherence to a decidedly feminine cultural 
practice,  in  pursuit  of  a  slender  beauty ideal  (i.e.  the  normative  physical  dimensions 
prescribed to women's bodies), the anorexic also conveys traits traditionally ascribed to 
men;  “at  [work or] school,  the anorexic discovers that  her steadily shrinking body is 
admired (...) for the strength of will and self-control it portrays” (ibid.: 178).
Here, the anorexic has paradoxically – by pursuing prescribed and conventional 
feminine behaviour (dieting in order to perfect the body qua object) to the point of excess 
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–  reached  a  state  where  the  conventionally  feminine  deconstructs  into  its  opposite, 
opening onto values culturally coded as male. But this transubstantiation of femininity 
into male power and privilege is catastrophically illusory; reshaping a female body in the 
image of masculine ideals is not  really assuming male privilege,  nor is it  in any way 
empowering or  liberating  to  harness  body and soul  to  an  obsessive  body practice  in 
pursuit  of  beauty  ideals  delineated  by  patriarchal  power  relations.  In  reality,  all  it 
accomplishes  is  the  service  and  reproduction  of  a  social  order  that  limits  female 
possibilities.  It  is  bitterly  ironic  that  millions  of  women  and  girls  suffer  from eating 
disorders,  compulsive  exercising,  and  paralysing  self-scrutiny  and  self-castigation  in 
pursuit of images and ideals that promise self-mastery and transcendence.
These ideals, above all, suggest a certain relationship to desire – dieting is above 
all a way to transcend our desires and master ourselves. But in practice, dieting merely 
frustrates desire – and  as everyone knows, frustrated desire only grows more powerful. 
This economy of (frustrated) desire lies at the heart of the political economy of fatphobia, 
and the way fatphobic discourse is produced and reproduced throughout the social, eco-
nomic and institutional constellation of late capitalism. It is this aspect of fat oppression 
that we will explore in the next chapter.
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V. The 'Scourge of Modernity': The Fat Body in the War on Obesity
Medicine is a moral enterprise, and therefore inevitably gives content to good and evil. In  
every society, medicine, like law or religion, defines what is normal, proper, or desirable.
 Ivan Illich
To even the most casual observer, the truth is obvious: obesity is a major public health 
crisis, and is regularly ranked on the scale of social catastrophes anywhere between 'as 
bad as smoking' to 'worse than global warming' (Gard, 2010: 14). Rates of obesity among 
all sections of all populations in every place globalization touches have skyrocketed in 
recent  decades.  Economists  and  doctors  are  frantically  trying  to  calculate  how much 
money this  epidemic  of  fatness  is  going to  cost  the  general  public,  whether  through 
publicly-funded healthcare  to  treat  obesity-related  diseases,  or  how many millions  of 
dollars of GDP will vanish beneath the ever-encroaching folds of blubber. Thanks to fast-
food,  television,  and automobiles,  North  Americans  have  become “the  most  diseased 
group of people in the history of human civilization” (Adams, 2004). This terrible illness 
can befall anyone, anywhere, at any time in their lives: the cost of our freedom from fat is 
the  eternal  vigilance  of  dieting.  The  consensus  is  monolithic  and  backed  by the  full 
authority of medical science; dissent is both madness and a menace to public safety.
These and similar themes have been oft-repeated in the flurry of media coverage 
that has followed the (official) outbreak of a global 'obesity epidemic' in the mid-1990s. 
While we have seen that fatphobia as a cultural phenomenon is much older, the last two 
decades have seen an intensification in the way fat people are demarcated as a pressing 
social  problem.  As  I  will  argue,  the  present  'obesity  epidemic'  has  a  significant 
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ideological component; it is related to fatphobia's cultural hegemony in Western attitudes 
towards the body, the increasing biomedicalization of contemporary Western society, and 
the interconnection of these phenomena with broader dynamics in political economy at 
this particular juncture in the historical development of late capitalism.
We have already explored the cultural history of normative fatphobia and the way 
it  shapes  Western  conceptions  of  the  body  and  the  way  contemporary  individuals 
(especially women and the poor) experience living in their  own bodies;  now we will 
explore the implicit normative discourse underpinning some of the scientific literature on 
obesity, as well as the economic interests underpinning it. The way the obesity epidemic 
is presented in both the scientific literature and popular press has all the markings of a 
morality play: “Western life has produced a never-ending array of temptations which we 
have not had the self-discipline or moral fibre to resist” (Gard and Wright, 2005: 6-7).
'For Your Health': Ideology, Medicine & Morality in Obesity Science
It is important here to qualify a number of points. For one, when most people talk about 
the obesity epidemic they are including people who are not actually obese at  all  (the 
'overweight' category), as well as a narrow conception of obesity as being anyone with a 
Body  Mass  Index  above  30.  While  there  are  obviously  health  risks  associated  with 
obesity  (which  we  will  discuss  later),  what  is  at  issue  here  is  the  way these  health 
concerns have been mobilized (however unintentionally) as an intellectual legitimation of 
fat  oppression.  Examining  and  critiquing  fatphobic  ideology  in  contemporary  health 
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sciences should not be read as a denial of the health problems associated with extreme 
obesity.
While there are many ways to read and interpret the statistics on obesity published 
in scientific journals, most mass-media reporting on the matter follows a firm consensus: 
fatness  is  a  disease  and  creeping  obesity  rates  warn  of  an  impending  global  health 
disaster.  Indeed,  firm  pronouncements  that  obesity  will  seriously  damage  Western 
economies, that generations of parents will soon be burying their morbidly overweight 
children  or  that  within  a  few  decades  entire  Western  societies  will  be  classified  as 
overweight or obese are regularly made without qualifications or equivocations of any 
kind (ibid.: 18). Moreover, these prognostications of disaster are generally presented in 
media  reports  as  affecting  'everyone  everywhere';  writing  for  the  New  York  Times, 
Natalie Angier notes that:
The dreaded obesity epidemic that is everywhere in the news is not restricted to any race,  
creed,  ethnicity,  or  slice  of the  socioeconomic supersized pie.  As recent  studies  reveal, 
almost every group known to demography is getting fatter. (Angiers, 2000: 1)
This universal quality of the obesity crisis – that it  affects everyone, everywhere – is 
particularly noteworthy for two major reasons. For one, it creates a perfect context for 
politicians,  journalists  and activists to make vague generalizations (and moralizations) 
about 'Western societies', 'modern lifestyles', or simply a collective 'we'. More subtly (and 
importantly  for  this  work),  it  universalizes  fatphobia  and  'interpellates'  (to  use  the 
Althusserian term) everyone into fatphobic self-regulation. 
It is this same universality that has made the 'obesity epidemic'  itself a loaded 
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symbol in mainstream political discourse. It represents to each of its observers their own 
political  anxieties  about  contemporary  Western  society.  For  many  conservatives,  the 
obesity  epidemic  confirms  their  hypothesis  that  modern  culture  is  decadent  and 
corrupting,  and that if  “African-Americans,  Latinos,  and the poor are becoming fatter 
than [the West's]  predominantly white elite,  it  [is]  only more proof that they lack the 
responsibility to take care of themselves” (Oliver, 2006: 6). On the left, the growth of 
obesity rates is proof that morally questionable transnational corporations are fattening a 
hapless public with insidious junk food advertising and supersized value meals – the poor 
and ethnic minorities, again, are singled out as needing particular protection from these 
malicious corporate entities. Amusingly, these conflicting biases and interpretations of the 
obesity crisis have led to a series of contradictory policies addressing weight in the United 
States;  either  obesity  is  a  matter  of  personal  responsibility  (as  in  the  Personal  
Responsibility  in  Food  Consumption  Act,  a  congressional  bill  that  protects  fast-food 
chains from lawsuits), or obesity must be tackled by reining in the power of junk food 
corporations  by restricting  their  advertisements  and putting  taxes  on junk food.  As a 
result, America now has “a curious combination of laws that simultaneously forbid people 
from suing restaurants for making them fat but also prohibit schools from selling sodas 
and snack foods because they allegedly cause kids to be too heavy” (Oliver, 2006: 7). 
Running through all these narratives, Oliver notes, is a similar thread:
[It] is a paternalistic condescension toward fatness and fat people – not only do people with  
these views assume that fatness is inherently bad, but they also presuppose that fat people 
(that is, minorities and the poor) are too ignorant to know that [or how] they should be thin. 
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(...)  For many people trumpeting the 'problem of obesity'  is an opportunity for them to 
express both their moral superiority and their latent class snobbery and racism. (Oliver,  
2006: 7)
In this way, fatphobia functions particularly well in its role as 'the last socially acceptable 
prejudice'; fatness functions as a proxy, a condensation, of other prejudices.
In  contrast  to  much  of  the  hysteria  found  in  popular  reports  of  the  obesity 
epidemic could be chalked up to the sensationalism of the mass media,  the scientific 
literature is significantly more nuanced. In their excellent and indispensable survey of the 
scientific literature on obesity, Michael Gard and Jan Wright propose that there are “many 
aspects of both the causes and consequences of (...) obesity which are poorly understood” 
and suggest that, in light of this uncertainty, the insistence by medical authorities that too 
much food and not enough physical activity has produced a global health crisis has less to 
do with the weight of scientific evidence, and much more to do with cultural attitudes 
towards  fatness33 (Gard  and  Wright,  2005:  37).  For  instance,  despite  the  ubiquity  of 
authoritative pronouncements that obesity is a result of sloth and gluttony, leading obesity 
researchers Claude Bouchard and Steven Blair note that:
The body of knowledge on physical activity and relevant obesity outcomes is extremely 
limited.  There  are few randomized clinical  trials  that  have lasted 1 year  or  more,  with 
reasonable statistical power, adequate monitoring of intervention protocols, high levels of  
compliance, and proper measurement of the outcome variables. The net result is a general 
33 It is worth noting that at least one U.S. study found that a significant majority of medical professionals 
(particularly those working in the field of obesity treatment and research) held significant anti-fat bias, 
and “regularly associated the stereotypes of lazy, stupid, and worthless with obese people” (Schwartz et 
al., 2003).
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lack of solid research database regarding the role of physical activity in the preventing and 
treatment of overweight and obesity as well as their comorbidities. (Bouchard and Blair, 
1999: S498)
Indeed, the findings of numerous original studies34 have not supported a clear causal link 
between body weight and physical activity and/or food intake. A number of reviews of 
research  found that  the  relationship  between body weight  and physical  activity to  be 
inconsistent, unclear, and controversial35.  In fact,  the extent to which exercise induces 
weight  and/or  fat  loss  in  controlled  studies  is  generally  described  in  the  scientific 
literature as  “minimal” (Brochu et  al.,  2000:  99),  “small”  (Ballor  and Keesey,  1991), 
“disappointing” (Robinson, 1999), “modest” (Wilmore, 1983) and in some circumstances, 
non-existent (Shephard, 1989). Interestingly, on the question of whether or not the health 
benefits of exercise are independent of fat loss, Shephard notes that:
Those who argue that  fat  loss is  the main source of  the health benefit  associated with 
regular exercise thus face the important theoretical difficulty that although long-term health 
benefits can be demonstrated, body fat does not change very much, particularly in the most 
vulnerable, severely obese segment of the population. (1994: 97-98)
Likewise, evidence for the widely-held assumption that obesity is  always the result of 
pathological overeating is also remarkably unsubstantiated. Writing in the Journal of the  
American Medical Association about the tendency for physicians to equate obesity with 
gluttony, researcher A. Frank notes that:
There is no reason to believe patients' behaviour causes [obesity]. Even in 1760, [Malcolm] 
34 Specifically: Donelly et al., 1994; Sweeney et al., 1993; Weinstock et al., 1998.
35 Specifically: Dubbert et al., 2002; Goran et al., 1999; Westerterp, 1999.
Drew Brown – 102
Flemyng noted that 'not all corpulent persons are great eaters or thin persons spare feeders... 
Tho' a voracious appetite be one cause of corpulency, it is not the only cause; and very 
often  not  even  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  thereof.'  For  over  two  centuries,  thoughtful 
physicians have realized that overeating and obesity are not necessarily the same. (...) There  
is remarkably little evidence that patients become fat because they overeat. (Frank, 1993: 
2133)
While it is well beyond the scope of this paper to follow Gard and Wright all the way 
through their critical interrogation of the field of obesity science36, their work (and the 
work of others; see Bacon, 2010) highlights the contentiousness of much of the empirical 
medical  research.  This  is  an  ambiguity  belied  by  the  way  obesity  is  conclusively 
represented in cultural and media discourses as “modernity's scourge.” Indeed, Gard and 
Wright  observe  that  ultimately,  the  question  of  what  is  'true'  about  the  causes  and 
consequences of obesity will probably prove immaterial; “the important questions (...) 
will be political, cultural, and social” (Gard and Wright, 2005: 67).
As we have seen, cultural anxiety about fatness and the physical and moral decline 
of a decadent West are not confined to the genesis of the 'obesity epidemic' over the last  
twenty  or  thirty  years;  it  is  in  fact  much  older.  While  it  is  not  uncommon  for 
commentators to pine for a lost era before television and computers and fast-food outlets, 
this nostalgia for a golden age of physical fitness free from the 'scourge of modernity' 
stretches back much further; it is a reaction to modernity stemming out of the Western 
prejudices towards the body  already documented here.
36 Genetic  influences  on  body  weight  and  composition,  for  instance,  are  obviously  important 
considerations in the science of human metabolism.
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For one thing, despite the current panic about the emergence of a relatively recent 
(within the last twenty to thirty years) obesity epidemic, cultural anxiety about a fattening 
population  stretches  back  well  into  the  19th century;  medical  anxiety has  mirrored  it 
closely. In a strikingly familiar passage from 1899, the Journal of the American Medical  
Association warned that:
The girth of Americans is increasing ... clothing dealers show that the average American of  
1889 was easily fitted with a waistband of 46 inches. In 1899 he requires one of 47 ½ 
inches. At this rate of increase he will reach in 1909 a circumference of 49 or 50 ... The 
dairy-counters  [and]  labour-saving  inventions,  the  elevators,  telephones  and  other 
contrivances supposed to make people indolent and fat, have their part in producing this 
result. (Reiling, 1999: 1501)
Across  the  Atlantic,  this  was  already  an  old  problem;  Charles  Darwin's  grandfather 
Erasmus wrote in 1797 that the children of his day had become too sedentary and were in 
need  of  more  vigorous  daily  exercising  (Darwin,  1968  [1797]).  Concern  about  the 
declining physical capacities of children – particularly ruling class boys – played a vital 
role in the development of organized sports during the second half of the 19 th century 
(Gard and Wright, 2005: 81). Indeed, a number of social historians (e.g. Smith, 1974; 
Schwartz,  1986;  Burt,  1995)  have  made  a  compelling  case  that  the  fear  of  bodily 
deterioration brought on by rapid urbanization and the seductions of modernity was one 
of the defining ideas of the Victorian age.
This  anxious  concern  with  Western  decadence  simmered  on  the  sidelines  of 
American medicine until the end of the Second World War, when a new wave of scientific 
Drew Brown – 104
anxiety  about  fatness  began.  The  American  Society  of  Bariatric  Physicians  was  first 
founded  in  1949;  1956 saw the  establishment  of  the  President's  Council  on  Physical 
Fitness amid widespread concern about the physical activity level of Americans (Gard 
and Wright, 2005: 81). By 1958, Dr. W. Ayers was writing in the Journal of the American 
Dietetic Association that “practically everyone will agree that obesity is the 'number one 
health problem today'” (Ayers, 1958: 23-29). 
The very root definition of obesity as a  disease is deeply problematic, however; 
this classification of obesity as a disease has perhaps the most profound impact on the 
way fat  subjectivity is constituted in a fatphobic society.  The entire ontology of a fat 
subject in the midst of the obesity epidemic is that of a pathology; their fatness is not only 
an indication of moral failure, but also that they are a medical failure. It is worth noting 
here that fat people are not the only oppressed social group to have their very subjectivity 
reduced  to  an  illness;  homosexuality  was  only  removed  from  the  Diagnostic  and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1994, and Louisiana surgeon and psychologist 
Dr. Samuel Cartwright declared in 1851 that African-American slaves who attempted to 
escape their bondage suffered from drapetomania, a mental disease which “induces the 
negro to run away from service, [and] is as much a disease of the mind as any other  
species of mental alienation, and much more curable37, as a general rule” (Cartwright, 
1851).
First and foremost: what  is obesity? At its most elementary medical definition, 
obesity “is  a  condition caused by an excessive amount  of  adipose [that  is,  body fat] 
37 The cure, of course, was 'a devilish flogging'.
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tissue” (Garrow, 1978). The word obesity is itself etymologically derived from the Latin 
obedere, “to eat up, to devour”; consequently, even the very identification of someone as 
'obese' is to implicitly judge their behaviour as well as to describe their apparent physical 
state (Gard and Wright, 2005: 92). Second: is obesity, “an excessive amount of adipose 
tissue,” a disease? According to the World Health Organization,
Obesity is a chronic disease, prevalent in both developed and developing countries, and 
affecting children as well as adults. Indeed, it is now so common that is replacing more 
traditional public health concerns, including undernutrition and infectious disease as one of 
the most significant contributors to ill health. (WHO, 2000: 1-2)
The WHO substantiates the status of obesity as a disease by its contribution to ill health, 
not by obesity being a specific state of ill health like lung cancer or heart disease. This is 
interesting,  as  most  people  would  not  classify  car  crashes  or  sporting  accidents  as 
diseases,  although they also contribute significantly to ill  health (as does poverty and 
industrial  pollution).  Obesity  is  not  a  diagnosable  illness  in  its  own right  (Gard  and 
Wright, 2005: 95), and framing it this way divorces it from its relationship with broader 
social, political, cultural, and economic factors.
Classifying obesity as a disease ultimately comes down to the association between 
obesity and particular  non-communicable  diseases  such as  ischaemic  heart  disease  or 
non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (ie. Type 2 diabetes; see: Bray, 1996; Pi-Sunyer, 
1993).  It  seems  empirically  weak  to  call  obesity  a  disease,  as  the  reasoning  equates 
obesity with bad health by assuming obesity in and of itself causes diseases such as non-
insulin dependent diabetes mellitus when there is conflicting data that the association may 
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mean that obesity is itself symptomatic of type 2 diabetes38 (see: Ernsberger and Koletsky, 
1999;  Bennett,  1986).  Again,  given  the  open-ended  nature  of  much  of  the  empirical 
evidence, it can be reiterated that there is a tendency in modern medical discussions about 
obesity to  problematically conflate  complex and nuanced scientific  evidence with our 
“collective cultural prejudice that personal sinfulness and irresponsibility [cause] obesity” 
(Gard and Wright, 2005: 95). As Gard and Wright put it succinctly,
Many fat people live healthy, active, productive lives and live beyond the lifespan of many 
thin people so it seems nonsense to say that fatness is a disease. This is not to say that very,  
very fat people do not have problems in moving about, using public spaces, breathing when 
lying down or buying clothes that fit. (...) And some of them may be sick – suffering from 
high  blood  pressure,  heart  disease,  cancer,  non-insulin  dependent  diabetes  mellitus, 
damaged joints or emphysema. Many thin people also suffer from these diseases, yet we do 
not call  thinness a disease. Calling obesity a disease because obesity is associated with  
various  non-communicable  diseases  is  like  identifying  short  men  as  ill  because  of  the 
established association between short stature and ischaemic heart disease39. (ibid.)
In the end, the simplification and misreading of the evidence about human body size in 
popular  and  medical  pronouncements  on  the  'obesity  crisis'  reinforces  our  cultural 
38 This discussion of diabetes is particularly sensitive. Obviously, fat tissue is not entirely benign in its  
relation to the progression of type 2 diabetes as a disease; the insulin resistance characteristic of diabetes 
supports the storage of abdominal fat,  and high levels of abdominal fat  facilitate insulin resistance,  
worsening the disease (Bacon, 2010: 135). But while abdominal fat does certainly contribute to the 
process of type 2 diabetes, it is not by any means the most important factor in its progression (and 
certainly not the causative variable), nor is fat loss, by itself, proven to alleviate symptoms of diabetes;  
one  study  of  obese  women  (half  of  whom  were  diabetic)  before  and  ten-to-twelve  weeks  after 
liposuction surgery indicated that despite their fat loss, metabolic profiles did not improve, particularly 
their fasting glucose and insulin levels as well as their insulin sensitivity (Klein et al., 2004). Moreover, 
numerous studies demonstrate that type 2 diabetes can be improved or reversed through changes in 
nutrition or activity habits  even when little or no weight is lost (see: Lamarche, 1992; Barnard et al., 
1992; Barnard et al., 1994; Boule et al., 2001; Gaesser, 2004).
39 See; Yarnell et al., 1992; Kannam et al., 1994; Paajanen et al., 2010.
Drew Brown – 107
prejudices about the sinfulness of being fat, rather than alerting us to other, more complex 
and  contingent  biological  and cultural  processes  that  continue  to  shape  the  health  of 
individuals  and  societies.  It  seems  to  me  that  a  more  fruitful  (and  less  oppressive) 
approach to social health might be to shift the focus away from manipulating the number 
on the scale, and towards the cultivation of healthful eating, exercise, and wellness habits. 
A wide social adoption of these habits may very well result in an overall decrease in the 
obesity statistic; or, it may not. But in any event, whether or not it produces generalized 
and substantial weight-loss will be secondary to the generalized and substantial health 
benefits such practices are guaranteed to produce.
Given that cultural anxiety about fatness is not new, why is the discursive refrain 
that  we  are  living  through  an obesity-induced  international  catastrophe  asserted  so 
forcefully? It is because of the way cultural fatphobia has been caught in the dynamics at  
the centre of post-industrial capitalism and the biomedicalization of Western society.
Never Satisfied: Biomedicalization and the Dieting Subject
That  fatphobia  could  come  to  be  institutionalized  in  (otherwise  well-meaning) 
government legislation aimed at curbing the 'obesity epidemic' is a phenomenon rooted in 
the  biomedicalization of the Western world. Biomedicalization, as we shall see, is the 
continuation  of  a  20th century  process  first  described  by  Irving  Zola  in  1972  as 
medicalization (Zola, 1972). This process of medicalization – that is, where aspects of 
personal  life  previously outside  the jurisdiction of  medicine  come to be construed as 
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medical problems – is one of the most potent social transformations of the last half of the 
20th century in the West (Clarke et al., 2003: 161). 
Initially, the process of medicalization began when traditionally 'morally troubling' 
social 'problems' (e.g. alcoholism, abortion, homosexuality, etc.) began to bleed over from 
the jurisdiction of the law into that of medicine (although this transition and distinction 
was far from clear-cut). Gradually, this process expanded to include any and all instances 
where  new  phenomena  where  deemed  medical  problems  under  medical  authority; 
examples  of  this  process  in  recent  decades  include  the  'appearance'  of  post-traumatic 
stress  disorder  (PTSD),  pre-menstrual  syndrome  (PMS),  and  attention  deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in the 1980s and 1990s (ibid.: 164). Moreover, conditions 
previously understood as undesirable were medicalized – particularly, 'unattractiveness' 
was now a problem for cosmetic surgery40, and obesity could (presumably) be tackled 
with diet medications. Above all else, the medical problematization of these conditions, 
and their treatment, was normalized (ibid.).
Adele Clarke et al. provide a succinct outline of the biomedicalization process. 
Conceptually,  biomedicalization  is  located  as  part  of  larger  social  shifts  from  the 
problems of modernity to the problems of late modernity or post-modernity; “that is, the 
shift to biomedicalization is a shift from enhanced control over external nature (ie. the 
world around us) to the harnessing and transformation of internal nature (ie. biological 
processes  of human and non-human life  forms)” (ibid.).  In  this  sense,  the process of 
40 Of course, the idea of employing cosmetic surgery in this manner is deeply controversial and seriously 
questioned within the medical community; I mention it here largely as an example of the way some 
medical procedures are driven as much by the market dictates of consumer capitalism as they are by the  
discernment of 'legitimate' problems in need of medical intervention.
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medicalization  was  co-constitutive  of  modernity,  and  that  biomedicalization  is  co-
constitutive  of  the  post-modern  condition.  This  process  is  also  extremely  broad.  It 
expands clinically and conceptually,  through the increasing commodification of health 
and the elaboration of risk and surveillance; a result of this process is the production of 
new social forms through the 'dividing practices' of specifying segments of the population 
as risk groups. These groups are given special attention and are subject to interventions 
“not  only  administered  by  medical  professionals  but  [also]  (...)  [as]  forms  of  self-
governance that people apply to themselves” (ibid.: 165). As a result, these biomedical 
technologies pervade more and more aspects of daily life and the lived experience of 
health and illness,  creating new subjectivities,  identities,  and social  forms around and 
through such interventions (ibid.). 
The  term  'governance'  is  used  here  in  reference  to  Foucault's  notion  of 
'governmentality' – that is, particular “kinds of power often guided by expert knowledges 
that  seek  to  monitor,  observe,  measure,  and  normalize  individuals  and  populations” 
(ibid.). This form of power does not rely on coercion; instead, it works through diffuse 
mechanisms such as  discourses  that  promote the pursuit  of happiness and healthiness 
through  certain  modes  of  personal  conduct,  including  self-surveillance  and  self-
regulation. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the biomedicalization of fatness qua 
obesity has singled out and pathologized fat people, subjecting them to interventions from 
medical  authorities  and private  enterprises  oriented  around  dieting.  In  the  era  of  the 
obesity epidemic, fat people are expected to engage in ruthless self-surveillance and self-
regulation as a matter of good citizenship. 
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It is perhaps not too bold to claim that dieting is one of the most pervasive forms 
of Foucauldian governmentality in the Western world today. While Adele Clarke et al. 
describe five facets of the biomedicalization process41, the most relevant aspects for our 
discussion  on  obesity  are  its  political  economic  dimensions,  the  commodification  of 
health and the proliferation of risk and surveillance regimes, and the transformation of 
bodies  and production of new individual  and collective identities.  First  and foremost, 
biomedicalization is characterized by thoroughly privatized and corporatized (as opposed 
to  state-funded)  research,  products,  and  services  (ibid.:  167).  The  size,  power,  and 
influence  of  the  healthcare  industry  should  not  be  underestimated;  as  of  2003,  it 
represented roughly 13% of the $10 trillion annual U.S. economy (ibid.). Pharmaceutical 
sector growth, pre-Recession, was estimated to be roughly 8% a year (Leonhardt, 2001), 
and Americans spent more than $100 billion on drugs in 2000, about double what they 
spent  in  1990  (Wayne  and  Petersen,  2001).  Through  its  sheer  economic  power,  the 
medical-industrial complex frames how we think about social life and social problems in 
ways that constitute biomedicalization.
This corporatization of medical research over the past two decades is especially 
visible in the industry-academy collaborations in many academic medical centres; since 
the  U.S. Balanced Budget Act of 1997 slashed $227 billion (with cuts notably affecting 
hospital budgets and medical education payments), “strapped academic medical centres 
are  filling  this  gap  in  part  by  conducting  extensive  clinical  trials  for  pharmaceutical 
41 Specifically, biomedicalization involves: political economy; the commodification of health, as well as 
the dissemination of risk and surveillance technologies; increasing reliance on technoscience; new ways 
of producing and distributing medical knowledge; and the transformation of bodies and production of 
new individual and collective identities.
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companies, requisite to bringing new products to market” (Clarke et al., 2003: 168). This 
increased corporate  sponsorship of academic research remains controversial,  however; 
current  and former  editors  of  13 major  medical  journals  stated  in  an  editorial  in  the 
Journal of American Medicine that they “would reject any study that does not ensure the 
sponsor gave researchers complete access to data and freedom to report findings” (ibid.). 
Moreover, one study reported that industry-sponsored research is 3.6 times more likely to 
produce results favourable to the sponsoring company (Bekelmen, Li, and Gross, 2003).
When it comes to the 'war on obesity',  there are enormous corporate profits at 
stake in maintaining public distress and negative attitudes about  weight to  ensure the 
continued  success  of  the  weight-loss  industry.  Although  diet  products  have  been 
advertised since the 19th century, they did not begin achieving significant market success 
until the widespread (and institutionalized) anxiety about fatness began in the 1950s and 
1960s.  During  the  1950s,  amphetamines,  diuretics,  and  other  drugs  were  regularly 
prescribed for weight-loss to both adults and children; historian Hillel Schwartz notes that 
amphetamines  were sometimes prescribed to  children as young as two, and that  they 
would remain in diet pills for children well into the 1970s (Schwartz, 1986: 292). In 1962, 
only about 40% of American households were using “low calorie” products, but by 1970, 
that figure had climbed to 70%; Weight Watchers corporate profits spiked from $160,000 
in 1964 to over  $8 million by 1970 (Lyons,  2009:  76).  In 1971, the US government 
estimated that the market for diet products to be somewhere in the ballpark of $250,000 to 
$1 million annually;  by 2009,  expenditure on weight-loss  products  had risen to  $121 
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billion  (BCC, 2010).  Dieting  – a  practice widely acknowledged to fail  in  90-95% of 
cases42 – has proved to be an extremely lucrative source of profits.
Rising  diet  industry profits  have  gone hand  in  hand  with  tight  links  between 
weight-loss  and  pharmaceutical  companies,  and  many  obesity  researchers;  this 
interlocking web has  heavily influenced social  attitudes,  medical  practice,  and public 
health policy. Indeed, it is striking how since the mid-1990s, the weight-loss industry has 
moved  from the  sidelines  to  the  centre  of  American  life,  “managing  to  dramatically 
increase its influence and profits without ever increasing product effectiveness” (Lyons, 
2009: 75). Despite the failure to deliver sustained weight loss, diet doctors and weight 
loss surgeons have become very influential in American federal government public health 
decision-making. Pharmaceutical companies fund research, public health education, and 
policy forums; former drug company consultants hold key federal positions and have 
significant vested interests in promoting a state-sanctioned 'war on obesity' (Moynihan, 
2006). Despite the NIH's admission that weight-loss oriented approaches to health may 
need to be reconsidered, most mainstream obesity researchers and public health officials 
continued to focus research and medical practice on designating obesity a serious illness 
mandating weight-loss treatment – by any means necessary. 
A particularly  shocking  example  of  this  was  the  flurry  of  prescriptions  (and 
42 As early as 1959, researcher Albert Stunkard, MD, concluded: “Of those who enter obesity treatment, 
most will drop out. Of those who stay in treatment, most will not lose weight. Of those who do lose  
weight, most will regain it.” (Stunkard and Hume, 1959: 79). This conclusion would be echoed again  
later by the National Institute of Health in 1992, who admitted that “a focus on approaches that can  
produce health benefits independently of weight loss may be the best way to improve the physical and 
psychological health of Americans seeking to lose weight” (National Institutes of Health Technology 
Assessment Conference Panel, 1992: 947).
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questionable  Food  and  Drug  Administration  approvals  process)  for  weight-loss  drugs 
Phen-Fen  and  Redux  in  the  1990s  (before  they  were  ultimately  withdrawn from the 
market  for  causing  primary  pulmonary  hypertension  resulting  in  death  or  serious 
disability).  Phen-Fen  was  a  cocktail  of  two  drugs  (phentermine  and  fenfluramine, 
respectively; 'Redux' was a variant of the latter, dexfenfluramine) that had demonstrated 
fast, modest weight-loss in clinical studies, and it was heavily marketed by Wyeth-Ayerst 
(since purchased by Pfizer) as a miracle diet drug. When Redux came before the FDA for 
approval,  the medical officer at  the time, Leo Lutwak, insisted on a 'black box'  label 
warning of pulmonary hypertension risk. When he refused to approve the drug, the FDA 
management had someone else sign off on it and approved the drug with no black box 
label in 1996 (Avorn, 2004: 71-84). It was not until later that year – amid hundreds of 
reports of lung and heart damage from Phen-Fen users – that the FDA mandated the drugs 
include  a  warning label,  before  ultimately requesting  that  they be  removed  from the 
market in September 1997 (CDC, 1997).  Amazingly,  even after reports  of illness and 
death among Phen-Fen/Redux users began to emerge and the FDA moved to give the 
drugs  a  'black  box'  warning  label,  the  company remained  largely  unfazed,  with  one 
internal  memo noting that  “a weight-maintenance positioning strategy is  still  possible 
with a primary pulmonary hypertension warning, because physicians may overlook the 
warning  as  they  currently  do  for  other  drugs”  (Mundy,  2001).  In  other  words,  the 
company anticipated that doctors would overlook the very real link between the drug and 
deadly health complications for the more tenuous link between weight-loss and health (in 
order to sustain the most important link of all – drug sales and profits).
Drew Brown – 114
The Phen-Fen/Redux debacle is not an isolated incident. The monetary interests of 
the weight-loss industry are thoroughly intertwined with the medical research and public 
health policy that has developed around obesity since it became an epidemic. In many 
cases, pharmaceutical companies have been instrumental in the very definition of obesity 
as  an  urgent  and  crippling  disease.  When  the  World  Health  Organization  officially 
declared that a BMI above 25 was the international standard for being overweight, the 
documentation it cited in its decision was research produced under the auspices of the 
International Obesity Task Force (IOTF), nominally a group of scientists interested in 
obesity research and policy. The IOTF, however, is funded primarily (approximately 75%) 
from two  pharmaceutical  companies:  Hoffman-LaRoche  (makers  of  weight-loss  drug 
Xenical)  and  Abbott  Laboratories  (makers  of  weight-loss  drug  Meridia).  Its  primary 
organizational goal is to lobby governments and promote particular scientific agendas that 
coincide with the pharmaceutical industry's goals (Oliver, 2006: 29). Few people realize 
that  the  effort  to  establish  an  international  standard  for  what  constitutes  obesity  was 
sponsored largely by companies that manufacture weight-loss pills.
There are many more notable connections between the weight-loss industry and 
the public officials responsible for the very definition of obesity as a serious public health 
crisis. James Hill, PhD, is a prominent spokesperson for community coalitions 'fighting 
obesity'; he was also a paid consultant to Hoffman-LaRoche, Knoll Pharmaceuticals, and 
several other companies developing weight-loss drugs at the same time that he was a 
member  of  the  NIH  Task  Force  on  Obesity  Prevention  and  Treatment  that  declared 
obesity a national emergency (MacPherson and Silverman, 1997; Oliver, 2006). Richard 
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Atkinson, MD, was a major spokesperson for Wyeth-Ayerst and other drug companies 
before teaming up with Judith Stern, DSc (also a consultant to Wyeth-Ayerst, as well as 
Knoll and Weight Watchers) to found the American Obesity Association (with funding 
from Knoll) to “advocate for obese people” (mainly, it turns out, to get federal and private 
health  insurance  coverage  for  weight-loss  treatments)  (Hall,  1998;  MacPherson  and 
Silverman,  1997;  Oliver,  2006).  Xavier  Pi-Sunyer,  MD,  is  a  long-time  consultant  to 
Hoffman-LaRoche,  Knoll,  Eli  Lilly,  and  Weight  Watchers,  and  is  a  member  of  the 
advisory board of Knoll  Pharmaceuticals and Wyeth-Ayerst; at the same time that Pi-
Sunyer was chairing the NIH Task Force on Obesity Treatment and Prevention, he was 
also identified as one of the researchers offered payment by Wyeth-Ayerst to put their 
name on research papers favourable to Phen-Fen that had been written by the company 
(MacPherson  and Silverman,  1997;  Birmingham,  1999).  These  are  just  a  few of  the 
known relationships  between some of  the most  visible  public  health  officials  and the 
weight-loss industry43.
Accompanying this corporate influence in health sciences is the commodification 
of health itself through biomedicalization. In the commodity culture of late capitalism, 
“health becomes another commodity, and the biomedically (re-)engineered body becomes 
a prized possession” (Clarke et al.,  2003: 171). In this framework, health becomes an 
individual  goal,  a  social  and  moral  responsibility,  and  a  site  for  routine  biomedical 
intervention. Increasingly, health is being articulated as an individual moral responsibility 
43 More in-depth reports on the conflicts of interest inherent in these relationships have variously appeared  
in  the  Wall  Street  Journal (Johannes  and  Stecklow, 1998;  McKay,  2002) and  the  New York Times 
(Kolata, 2005).
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to  be  and remain  healthy or  to  properly manage one's  chronic  illness(es)  rather  than 
attempting  to  recover  from  illness  or  disease  whenever  they  strike.  In  the 
biomedicalization era, the focus of the medical gaze is no longer on disability or disease 
but  rather  on health  as a matter  of  ongoing moral  self-transformation.  Health,  in  this 
sense, is not conceived of as a basic or default personal state; instead, health is an ongoing 
personal project composed of public and private performances, and an accomplishment in 
its  own right.  Health is  an endless process of self-disciplining and public-disciplining 
(ibid.: 172).
With this transformation in the way health is conceptualized, risk and surveillance 
practices have become the central means by which health is achieved and maintained. 
Risk  and  surveillance  here  mutually  construct  one  another;  risks  are  calculated  and 
assessed in order to rationalize surveillance, and surveillance in turn standardizes risks in 
order  to  form ever  more  precise  calculations.  The  risk  and  surveillance  practices  of 
biomedicalization  are  the  phenomenon's  most  recognizably  Foucauldian  features;  the 
medical  gaze  is  no longer  confined to  the  hospital,  clinic,  or  even the  doctor-patient 
relationship (Bunton and Peterson,  1997).  They instead implicate  each individual  and 
whole populations through the construction of risk factors, the elaboration of daily life 
techniques of self-surveillance, and the management of complicated regimens oriented 
around risk and chronic conditions (ibid.). In the age of 'surveillance medicine,' it is no 
longer necessarily to even manifest symptoms to be considered ill or 'at risk'; everyone is 
implicated in the process of eventually 'becoming ill.' This produces subjects well-attuned 
to  health-related  discourses  and,  more  importantly,  anxious  to  consume health-related 
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commodities, services, procedures, and technologies.
Since it is impossible for anyone not to be 'at risk,' individuals and populations are 
instead judged by degrees of risk – low, moderate, or high – vis-à-vis different conditions, 
which in turn determine what is prescribed to manage that risk. Biomedicalization, then, 
is  elaborated  through  daily  lived  experiences  and  practices  of  'health'  designed  to 
minimize, manage, and treat 'risk'. Risk and surveillance here are effectively 'normalizing' 
practices; not in the sense that they produce bodies or objects that conform to a particular 
type, but that they create standard models against which objects, bodies and actions are 
judged.  In  particular,  biomedicalization  tends  to  elaborate  on  standardized  risk-
assessment statistics – ostensibly meaningful only at the population level – and transform 
them into  risk  factors  that  are  deemed  meaningful  at  the  individual  level  (ibid.).  An 
excellent  example  of  this  phenomenon  –  with  particular  salience  for  considering  the 
biomedicalization of fatness qua obesity – is the development and implementation of the 
BMI as the standard metric by which obesity is problematized, measured, and addressed.
The BMI originally had nothing to do with health. It was first formulated in the 
1830s by a Belgian astronomer named Adolphe Quetelet, seeking to determine whether or 
not mathematical laws of probability could predict the behaviour of human bodies in the 
same way they could predict the movements of heavenly bodies (Oliver, 2006: 16). In 
Quetelet's estimation, if enough data from a large sample of the general population was 
collected, it could be used to calculate general trends. To test his hypothesis, Quetelet 
began collecting information from French and Scottish army conscripts; he plotted their 
heights and weights along a distribution. For each height, he found a range of weights that 
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statisticians would later call a 'normal distribution', or more famously, a bell curve. At the 
centre of this distribution (i.e. the top of the bell curve), Quetelet found the most number 
of cases – that is,  the average weight of the group. In charting these distributions, he 
observed that the weight (in kilograms) of 'normal' conscripts (those closest to the middle 
of  the  distribution)  was  proportional  to  their  height  (in  meters)  squared;  this  general 
formula would later be used to determine BMI (ibid.: 17).
Because this was the 19th century and the teleology of averages was all the rage, 
Quetelet reasoned that because the average conscript's height was proportional to their 
weight, that is what the ideal weight should be. Anyone who deviated from this average 
'ideal' thus provided the first 'scientific' notion of what 'overweight' could be. Quetelet's 
BMI, then, can be located among a broader trend in 19th century scientific thought that 
assumed whereas most people congregated around average points with regard to their 
physical characteristics, deviants, criminals and other troublesome individuals could be 
identified by their physical abnormalities (Gould, 1981). Scientists throughout the late 
19th and early 20th centuries spent a lot of time measuring skulls, brows, body proportions, 
and other aptitudes in the belief that criminals and other delinquents could be identified 
by their physiognomy (ibid.). As we will see, this normative dimension remains with BMI 
today:  a  high  body weight,  simply  by being  different  from the  average,  is  not  only 
systematically identified but is also problematized.
Although  BMI  had  been  around  since  the  early  19th century,  it  did  not  gain 
significant  social  and  medical  currency  until  it  was  enthusiastically  adopted  by  the 
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American insurance industry as a predictor of mortality44. Louis Dublin, a statistician at 
the  Metropolitan  Life  Insurance  Company,  began  charting  the  death  rates  of  its 
policyholders in the 1940s using a height-to-weight index; not only did Dublin discern 
that thinner people lived longer, but – more importantly – that the closer a person's weight 
was to that of the average 25-year-old, the longer they would live.  From this, Dublin 
developed ranges for each height of what was an 'ideal'  body weight – the weight at 
which each person had the longest life span (Oliver, 2006: 19).
There  are  a  number  of  well-documented  shortcomings  with  the  BMI 
measurement45, however. First and foremost, it is premised on the assumption that there is 
an identifiable 'normal' weight that is 'true' for all individuals, transcending gender, ethnic, 
cultural,  socio-economic  and  geographical  groups.  Moreover,  it  is  a  largely  arbitrary 
metric – BMI describes the relationship between net weight and height, but fails to take 
into account differences in individual physical frames or proportions of body fat, muscle 
and  bone  mass,  cartilage  or  fluid  retention  (Halse,  2009:  47).  Additionally,  the 
relationship between BMI and ill health is anything but straightforward46; genetics and 
activity levels are important mediating factors, and BMI can often disguise the nature of 
health problems – particularly in slim people who may still be at risk for heart disease, 
diabetes,  and  a  host  of  other  “weight-related”  conditions.  Despite  these  serious 
methodological  shortcomings,  the  BMI as  formulated by a  19th century stargazer  and 
44 And, of course, as a justification to charge people more money for life insurance.
45 Some of these are readily acknowledged by many of its advocates; see, for instance: James et al, 2001.
46 For instance, at least one Center for Disease Control (CDC) study found that a BMI of 'overweight' was  
associated with fewer non-cancer and non-cardiovascular disease deaths than a 'normal' BMI, and that  
overweight was not associated with cancer or cardiovascular mortality at all (Flegal et al., 2005).
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reiterated by the Met Life insurance tables in the 1950s has since been institutionalized as 
the standard metric for obesity used by both international organizations and all levels of 
government  throughout  the  world.  In  the  1980s,  the  World  Health  Organization  set 
international standards for BMI (< 20 is underweight, 20-24.9 is 'ideal' weight, 25-29.9 is 
overweight,  and  30+  is  obesity);  in  1998,  the  American  National  Institute  of  Health 
aligned their weight definitions with the WHO, lowering the US overweight cutoff from 
27.8 to 25 and rendering millions of Americans clinically 'fat' overnight (ibid).
BMI has the staying power it does – despite the dearth of meaningful information 
it actually provides about human health – because of the way it functions as a normative 
discourse despite (or, indeed, because of) its aura of scientific positivism. On the surface, 
BMI deploys this language of scientific positivism to convey a sense of 'truth'; it  is a 
simple  mathematical  calculation  that  can  be  performed  by anyone,  without  specialist 
tools, the result of which is represented as a scientific fact, devoid of personal prejudices 
or subjective value (ibid.).  This superficial  scientism, however,  belies that this  'value-
neutral' BMI is thoroughly moralistic - it functions as a normative discourse, designating 
the “'virtuous mean' to which we should  all aspire” (Burry, 1999: 610). BMI implicitly 
functions as a 'virtue discourse'; that is, a set of values, beliefs, practices, and behaviours 
that shape subjects and subjectivities by articulating and constructing certain behaviours 
and qualities as worthy, desirable, and necessary moral virtues (Halse, 2009: 47). It both 
describes and defines weight, bodies, and individuals. A distinguishing feature of virtue 
discourses is that they “configure virtue as an open-ended condition: a state of excellence 
that has no boundaries or exclusions” (Halse et al., 2007: 220). Given this infinitely open-
Drew Brown – 121
ended nature of virtue, it is perhaps impossible to be too diligent in taking up the dietary 
practices,  exercise regimes, or pharmaceutical and cosmetic interventions necessary to 
conform to the 'ideal' (virtuous) BMI.
It  should  come  as  no  surprise,  then,  that  the  virtue  discourse  around  BMI  is 
suffused  with  the  moralism that  we have  already seen  permeating  cultural  fatphobia; 
normative BMI invokes and relies on binaries (thin/fat, healthy/unhealthy, virtuous/sinful, 
etc.) which ascribe “opposing moral attributes to each side of the binary that seem natural, 
logical, and fair” (Halse, 2006: 107). As such, in fatphobic societies, this means a low 
BMI is associated with self-discipline and moral fortitude, while a high BMI (overweight 
and obesity) is the binary 'Other' – the physical manifestation of self-indulgence, a lack of 
self-discipline, and all the other fatphobic tropes already surveyed in this work. These 
binaries go beyond a discourse of 'healthism' (where slenderness is equated with fitness 
and health) into a moral discourse which presents slenderness as a  necessary state of  
being to avoid fatness, which is constructed as a socially repugnant state and a metonym 
for  any  number  of  physical,  psychological,  or  moral  pathologies  that  might  warrant 
oversight,  disciplining,  and correction (Halse,  2009: 48). In this very real sense, BMI 
“disenfranchises  the  individual  as  it  privileges  measurement  over  lived  experience, 
validates presumed behaviours and reveals moral flaws” (Jutel, 2009: 75).
The  virtue  discourse  of  a  normative  BMI  is  omnipresent.  It  is  disseminated 
through  popular  culture,  advertising  and  the  media,  the  weight-loss  industry,  health 
education, school curricula, and the medical profession;
It permeates the pores of individuals and populations by immersion in and habituation to its 
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terms and moral values, and through political tactics that define desirable and approved 
behaviour.  Individuals who take up the discourse by remaining (virtuously)  slender  are 
congratulated and applauded by family, friends, and colleagues; venerated by advertisers  
and  in  the  popular  press;  and  commended in  the  commentaries  of  health  and medical 
authorities. Those who are noncompliant and overweight or obese are likely to suffer social 
exclusion and alienation. (Halse, 2009: 48)
While not all individuals are actively subjugated at the same time or in the same way, the 
pervasiveness  of  the  virtue  discourse  of  normative  BMI  shapes  subjects'  self-
understandings and corresponding behaviour so that it becomes a “mode of personal self-
regulation [and] internal constraint on the conduct of the self” (Halse et al., 2007: 223). 
Echoing  our  earlier  discussion  on  embodied  subjectivity,  the  virtue  discourse  of  a 
normative  BMI  incorporates  the  'outside'  world  (values  and  beliefs)  into  the  'inside' 
(psyche and bodily practices) of an individual.
As  we  have  already  discussed  at  length,  this  normative  dimension  of 
institutionalized BMI has significant effects for subjectivity. By differentiating between 
who are and are not acceptable and approved sorts of human beings within its own moral 
schema, the virtue discourse of BMI works to establish “what qualifies as 'being'” (Butler, 
1993: 188). The institutionalization of BMI as the authoritative measure of human beings 
based on their  weight  also institutionalizes  the production of  fat  subjects  whose very 
being is pathological, a physical manifestation of moral failure, and, in the age of the 
obesity epidemic, harbingers of serious social crisis.
This articulation of a 'virtuous being' qua medical risk and surveillance techniques 
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brings us to the final  major aspect of the biomedicalization process:  the division and 
reconstitution of populations (and subjects, identities,  etc.)  along the lines of risk and 
pathology. Clarke et al., refer to these as technoscientific identities, a generic term for the 
“new  genres  of  risk-based,  genomics-based,  epidemiology-based,  and  other 
technoscience-based identities;”  (Clarke  et  al.,  2003:  182)  that  is,  identities  produced 
through the application of sciences and technologies to bodies directly and/or to a body's 
history, or bodily products and images of the body. These new identities are frequented 
inscribed  upon  people,  whether  they  like  them  or  not;  consider  the  aforementioned 
instance when the NIH adjusted US BMI standards downwards and suddenly classified 
millions of people as a 'high risk' population afflicted with a debilitating disease. These 
identities  are  not  necessarily  new (excessive  fatness  had been stigmatized  for  a  long 
time),  but  are  rather  new iterations  of  those  identities  in  the  (biomedicalized)  social 
relations of late capitalism.
We have already discussed at length the symbolic weight that fat identity carries, 
and  the  way  the  threat  of  'obesity'  mobilizes  the  behaviour  (self-regulation,  self-
surveillance,  and  other  practices  of  governmentality)  of  individuals  who  are  all 
(regardless of actual body size) at risk of becoming or remaining overweight or obese lest 
they relax their vigilance. The stigma of fatphobia and its detrimental effects on health – 
both physical and psychological – are widely acknowledged by obesity scientists and the 
mainstream press; incredibly, in many instances the overriding concern is that this stigma 
will  hinder  successful  weight-loss  (Puhl  and  Heuer,  2009),  ignoring  that  fatphobic 
attitudes are often the byproduct of centering health practices and medical interventions 
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almost exclusively on weight loss. There is, in fact, evidence to suggest that the practice 
of dieting itself (and, given its rate of failure, its accompanying weight-cycling) definitely 
does contribute to ill health; in spite of decades of well-documented failure, doctors are 
encouraged  to  keep  patients  pressured  to  lose  weight  and  diet  despite  hypertension, 
depression, weight gain over time (!) and a host of other risks associated with weight-
cycling (Stice et al., 1999). The behaviours demanded of fat people (and non-fat people 
who are actively worried about becoming fat), it turns out, fit very well into the power 
relations of late capitalism.
“Dieting  strategies  have  followed  the  stages  of  capitalism  so  closely,”  Hillel 
Schwartz notes at the end of his cultural history of dieting, “that one could be the model 
for the other47” (Schwartz, 1986: 327). At first this seems counter-intuitive; the professed 
goal  of  dieting  is  to  consume  less,  in  contradistinction  to  the  modus  operandi of 
contemporary capitalism. However, in effect, dieters on the whole consume more; the diet 
is the supreme form for the manipulation of desire precisely because it is so frustrating. 
Capital has as much a vested interest in the (almost assured) failures of dieters as it does 
47 He goes on to formulate the relationship between the development of dieting and the development of 
capitalism brilliantly: “The primitive accumulation of capital comes through marginal efficiencies and 
personal saving; call this fasting or abstinence. During the next stage there is an expansion of markets  
and  a  mastery  of  the  rhythms  of  distribution;  call  this  thyroid  treatment  and  the  tuning  of  the 
metabolism. The third stage leads from the efficiencies of mass production to the control of the flow of  
market data; call this calorie-counting. The fourth stage is preoccupied with the discovery that in order 
to further stimulate demand to accommodate unceasing production, capitalists must arrange desires; call 
this psychotherapy or group therapy, whatever must be done to adjust the appetite to society. The fifth 
stage finds competition so narrowed and industrial networks so large that the most effective way to 
perpetuate desire is to promote fear; call this the low-fat diet to lose weight and forestall hypertension,  
or  the  low-fat  low-cholesterol  high-complex-carbohydrate  high-fibre  diet  to  deal  with  just  about 
everything. In the sixth stage, capitalism runs aground on a shoal of crises pléthoriques, where neither 
the expansion of markets not the manufacture of desire can keep pace with the extent of production.  
This is the last stage, the time of Too Much. The surplus must literally be run off in a fury of exercises, 
fast dancing and marathons. Call this fitness, capitalism's last best hope.” 
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in the relentless promotion of dieting. It is through the constant solicitation and frustration 
of desire that drives consumption ever higher in late capitalism (ibid.: 328). The very 
ontology proposed by a culture of dieting is sinister; diet books and diet groups expect 
people to be weak, unsteady, and easily seduced – they anticipate lying and cheating all 
the while endorsing synthetic foods that masquerade as the real thing. The world of diet 
culture is not just delusive, but fundamentally dishonest; “while capitalism reduces what 
is real to what is apparent, dieting reduces what human beings are to their appearance” 
(ibid.).
Similarly, the perpetual circulation of capital also works as an apt metaphor for the 
endless repetition of diets mandated by fatphobic culture. That 95% of diets fail should 
not be read as proof of weakness; on the contrary, chronic dieters work very hard. To diet, 
to  actively  work  against  millions  of  years  of  human  metabolic  evolution,  requires 
tremendous effort;  it  is  quite literally a struggle between the Will-to-Thin and human 
biology. Recent research suggests that the body is incredibly resistant to sustained weight-
loss; so much so that the metabolic changes which occur among individuals who lose 
large amounts of weight means that their bodies actually process energy (qua  calories) 
differently  (Pope,  2011).  Those  who  lose  large  amounts  of  weight  must  restrict  and 
discipline themselves more severely than people of the same sex, age, and height who had 
never been fat (ibid.).
Successful  diets,  then,  require  incessant  vigilance.  Calories  must  be calculated 
with incredible precision; exercise is frequent, vigorous, and often performed as penance; 
hunger is an all-consuming obsession. The demarcation – both physical and psychical – 
Drew Brown – 126
between a dieting ascetic and someone suffering from an eating disorder can become very 
blurred.  In this very real sense, “losing weight, which is supposed to liberate, instead 
becomes  a  prison”  (Renzetti,  2012).  Remaining  virtuously  slender  is  a  never-ending 
process, a Sisyphean struggle that grows more difficult the more it succeeds. Anyone who 
has ever dieted knows that this is maddening, and as Naomi Wolf wryly observes, “a 
quietly mad population is a tractable one” (Wolf, 1991). But tractable to what?
To the operations of the oppressive power structures we have surveyed over the 
course of this work; to those ancient prejudices which have grown fat on the anxieties 
generated by the late capitalist mode of production.
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VI. Conclusion: Let Them Eat Cake
When Fat Power is a reality, (...) fat people will not simply turn the tables on thin people. 
Rather, weight and shape will no longer define the personality or confine its expression. 
People will face each other without calipers or weight charts; they will take each other's 
measure in more deeply human ways.
 Hillel Schwartz
On  April  10th 2012,  Michelle  Obama,  First  Lady  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
appeared on an episode of hit NBC reality television program The Biggest Loser. She was 
there promote her “Let's Move” campaign, an initiative aimed at encouraging children to 
eat better and exercise more in the hopes that this will reduce childhood obesity rates48. 
According to Mrs. Obama, she was motivated to appear on the program and pitch her 
public health initiative because the reality show is  an 'inspirational'  contributor to the 
health of the nation (Harnick, 2012). It is interesting that she would say this, because 
while The Biggest Loser is a lot of things, it is not a television show about health.
The Biggest Loser is a game show about weight loss. It is a program that relies on 
the dehumanization and abuse of fat people for entertainment value, and the messages it  
sends about what is necessary for “health” are deeply irresponsible. At the beginning of 
the eighth season in 2009, contestants (who had up until that point lived largely sedentary 
lifestyles) were dropped off at a beach and forced to run a mile in the sand; two of them 
collapsed from heat stroke, and one woman was hospitalized for over two weeks (Wyatt, 
48 While it is certainly laudable to encourage children (and indeed, people of all ages) to develop good 
health  habits,  it  is  doubtful  Mrs.  Obama's  endeavour  will  actually succeed in  making children  any 
thinner. There are at least two cases where the same strategy (i.e. government-led community health and 
weight-loss initiative) was employed on smaller scales; one targeted specifically at Native American  
children in three states,  and another  targeting ethnically diverse children from four different  states. 
Although in both cases most children did develop better health and nutrition practices, neither program 
produced weight loss among the children as a group (Caballero et al., 2003; Luepker et al., 1996).
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2009).  Contestants  were  regularly  encouraged  to  dehydrate  themselves  in  order  to 
accelerate their weight loss, some to the point of urinating blood (Poretsky, 2010a; Wyatt, 
2009).  They  are  commonly  abused  by  production  staff  and  trainers;  one  contestant 
recalled how they were often forced to work out for 2 to 5 hours a day, against medical 
advice,  and despite  sometimes being severely injured (Poretsky,  2010a).  Anyone who 
complained  was  publicly  berated  and  reminded  that  they  were  lucky  even  to  be 
participating in such a “life changing” opportunity (Poretsky, 2010b). At least one former 
finalist, Kai Hibbard, has openly admitted to coming away from the show with an eating 
disorder:
When I was on the actual [show] we were eating between 1000 and 1200 calories a day (...) 
it got worse when I got home (...) I would get emails constantly from the producers: 'what 
have you done today?' 'are you working out enough?' It was just always, always, always...  
they would tell you all the time, '200,000 fat girls were in line right behind you. How dare  
you waste this experience? How dare you let anybody down?' So I got to a point where I 
was only eating about 1000 calories a day and I was working out between 5 and 8 hours a  
day... and my hair started to fall out. I was covered in bruises. I had dark circles under my 
eyes. (...) My period stopped altogether and I was only sleeping 3 hours a night. I tried to  
tell the TV show about it and I was told [to] 'save it for the camera.' (Poretsky, 2010a)
Although she had been told that doctors and psychologists would follow up with her after 
the show, she never heard from any of them (ibid.).
But perhaps the most damning evidence that The Biggest Loser is less about health 
and more about the money to be made in humiliating fat people is that the program forces 
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contestants to sign a waiver on the opinions of its own medical professionals. According 
to a release obtained by the New York Times, contestants are required to declare that “no 
warranty,  representation,  or  guarantee  has  been  made  as  to  the  qualifications  or 
credentials of the medical professionals who examine me or perform any procedures on 
me in connection with my participation in the series, or their ability to diagnose medical 
conditions that may affect my fitness to participate in the series” (Wyatt, 2009).
Most of these criticisms have been dismissed by the program's producers and its 
public champions. They may concede that the show is extreme, but that it nonetheless still 
serves as an example and inspiration for ordinary viewers to live healthier lifestyles; one 
of the executive producers claimed The Biggest Loser actually constitutes a public service 
“in a nation struggling with obesity” (ibid.). This is doubtful, especially considering that 
the program plays a direct role in perpetuating the oppressions described in this work: 
recent research suggests that after even brief exposure to weight-loss reality television, 
anti-fat  attitudes  increase  among  all  people  (but  acutely  among  thinner  women  not 
actively attempting to lose weight) (Domoff et al.,  2012). Hibbard's assessment of the 
program is similarly bleak: “the lighter I got during that T.V. show, the more I hated my 
body (...)[;] at 144 [lbs] and at 262 and at 280, I had never hated my body before that 
show” (Poretsky, 2010a). It is doubtful that The Biggest Loser inspires much of anything, 
on the whole, except more fatphobia.
What  I  have outlined in  this  treatise is  a  brief snapshot of the complex social 
phenomenon called fat oppression.  The Biggest Loser is just one particularly prominent 
instance  of  the  exploitation,  marginalization,  powerlessness,  cultural  imperialism  and 
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violence to which individuals in contemporary Western societies are subjected because of 
the cultural and symbolic baggage tied to their weight. Although by no means the last 
word on the topic, the social ontology of Iris Marion Young provides a broad and accurate 
framework for making and evaluating claims of social justice such as this one. Analyzing 
material instances of injustice reveals that power relationships are structured at the level 
of social groups; individuals experience privilege and oppression as a function of their 
relationship to signifiers of group identity – man/woman, white/coloured,  straight/gay, 
thin/fat. These power relationships – whether at the economic, political, or cultural level – 
are  systematically  reproduced,  and  it  is  the  entrenchment  and  perpetuation  of  these 
processes that designates oppression as a phenomenon. Considered in light of the theory 
of oppression I outline in the first chapter, the structural dynamics and material effects of 
fat oppression are easy to see.
The second chapter provides a brief account of modern fatphobia, and as well as a 
psychoanalytic  account  of  how  this  prejudice  affects  a  subject's  relationship  to  their 
material  body.  Psychoanalysis  gives  a  compelling  account  of  how  subjectivity  and 
signification arise at  the juncture of biology and society,  the human body and human 
culture. Fatphobia sets very narrow parameters on what bodies (and what subjects) are 
acceptable and which ones are not; the more rigidly these ideals are defined, the more any 
deviation qua fatness becomes transgressive, and the more thoroughly that fat people are 
subordinated and Othered. A fatphobic culture represents fat bodies as absurd, grotesque, 
and repulsive, and produces subjects attuned to feel this way about their own bodies and 
the bodies of others. The production of subjects who are always-already predisposed to 
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view  themselves  as  abject,  moral  failures  is  the  most  elementary  operation  of  fat 
oppression.
Of course, because subjectivity is so tightly tied to its material body, the particular 
body (and according cultural significations) a subject occupies will greatly influence the 
way they experience (or do not experience) fat  oppression.  Women, as we have seen, 
experience fat oppression acutely; fear and hatred of the fat body in Western culture is  
intrinsically  linked  to  a  very  old  fear  and  hatred  of  the  feminine  body.  Fat  women 
represent  an  affront  to  patriarchal  culture;  they transgress  social  norms that  limit  the 
public  space  women  can  occupy,  as  well  as  sexist  culture's  demand  that  women are 
valuable only insofar as they make their bodies into objects for the aesthetic and sexual 
enjoyment  of  men.  That  the  overwhelming  majority  of  people  suffering  from eating 
disorders  are  women  is  a  testament  to  the  continued  need  for  feminist  activism and 
analysis  in  the  (post-)modern  West;  anorexia  nervosa is,  fundamentally,  a  political 
problem.  The corset  may have  been relegated  to  history's  dustbin,  but  many women 
remain just as tightly bound by the profoundly misogynistic insistence that their bodies 
are public property. As I demonstrated in the third chapter, this toxic mix of fatphobia and 
sexism is as subtle, and as deadly, as any hardening of the arteries.
I would suggest that, on the whole, the uptick of eating disorders presents as much 
a social health problem as does the modest uptick in people who have 'contracted' obesity. 
The insistence that that too many fat people will undermine Western civilization – despite 
some suggestion that 'obesity' may more closely resemble a symptom, rather than a cause, 
of many modern health problems – is a telling symptom of deeper insecurities stretching 
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back to the dawn of modernity. Many of the rhetorical battles in the 'war on fat' are the 
latest iteration of an old Victorian fear about the physical (and spiritual) degeneration that 
might accompany the Industrial Revolution, transfigured now into the social constellation 
of post-industrial capitalism. The process of biomedicalization has transformed the human 
body (and its component parts) into just another set of commodities within the larger 
“immense collection of commodities” (Marx, 1990 [1867]: 125) that characterizes the 
capitalist  mode  of  production;  there  is  a  tight  link  between  the  perpetuation  of  fat 
oppression and the circulation of Capital.
The outline of fat oppression I have presented herein is obviously not the complete 
picture;  there  are  many areas  where  this  analysis  could  be  extended.  While  Young's 
schematic of oppression and the politics of difference is invaluable, the question of “what 
is  to  be  done”  still  looms  large  overhead.  The  political  dimension  of  fat  oppression 
remains  contested;  many  libertarians  who  argue  that  State-sponsored  fatphobia  is  an 
affront to an individual's sovereign right to be as fat as they please would no doubt be 
incensed  by  my  arguments  herein  that  atomistic  individual  autonomy  is  largely  a 
structural  fiction,  to  say nothing of  the  pronouncement  that  the  operations  of  market 
capitalism drive oppression. Similarly, just as many on the Left may take issue with the 
suggestion that decadent consumer capitalism is less likely to make the proletariat greedy, 
fat, stupid and lazy than it is to lock them into a restless, frenetic cycle of anxiety and 
self-flagellation over the value of the 'commodity' they inhabit; in this analysis, the truly 
revolutionary position is to promote the unequivocal love and acceptance of the human 
form, regardless of the size it comes in. Moreover, although I have documented numerous 
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instances in which fat people experience oppression, I have scantly discussed the ways in 
which fat activists have resisted and challenged that oppression. Politically, the National 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Fat  Acceptance  (NAAFA)  is  perhaps  the  most 
prominent organization devoted to the promotion of civil rights for fat people; there are 
many examples of small, local burlesque troupes showcasing empowered displays of fat, 
feminine sexuality; and on the medical front, non-weight focused approaches to health 
and wellness (such as the “Health At Every Size” (HAES) movement) are increasingly 
gaining traction against the practice of reducing human health to the BMI. These are just 
a few of the readily apparent instances of fat resistance.
I have said much in this work about sexism, but I have only hinted at the ways in 
which  fat  oppression is  experienced in  contexts  of  racism and classism.  Amy Farrell 
(2011) provides a compelling account of the way fat bodies, in American culture, have 
historically been tied to the 'primitive' bodies of non-whites. There is a lot to say about the 
well-documented connection between obesity and poverty in the modern West, as well as 
the  way  globalization  has  exported  American  anxieties  about  fatness  to  developing 
nations (particularly in modern China; see Gilman, 2008). Moreover, the feminist analysis 
of fatphobia I do provide here is but a fraction of a burgeoning field of enquiry; Natalie 
Boero (2010), for instance, has suggested that for many women, their children's weight 
(along with their own) is increasingly symbolized as an index of good motherhood. 
As a  matter  of  fact,  I  would  suggest  that  an analysis  of  the  way children  are 
implicated  in  the  'obesity  epidemic'  would  do  much  to  sharpen  the  focus  on  the 
production and re-production of fatphobic subjects. The way fat children are routinely 
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portrayed  in  our  culture  as  harbingers  of  social  disaster,  as  victims  of  parental 
(particularly maternal) negligence, and as failed children in need of continual monitoring 
and disciplining (such as public weigh-ins during gym classes or attempts to put BMI on 
school report cards; see Oliver, 2006), I would argue, may be the most insidious element 
of  fatphobia.   This  is  particularly  ironic  given  that  cracking  down  on  bullying 
(particularly homophobic bullying) among youth is at the moment something of a cause 
célèbre; despite the (much needed) intervention on this front, the institutionalization of 
fatphobia in pedagogy remains a regrettable blindspot in the public's eye49. Obviously, a 
psychoanalytic account of subject formation could benefit greatly from an analysis of the 
way children are 'interpellated' into fatphobic discourse.
The medical debate about obesity I have addressed here is far from complete, and 
in the end I believe that this debate is itself ultimately secondary to the general argument 
about fat oppression as a social phenomenon. As a work of social science, the intention 
here is not to 'debunk' or cast aspersion on the entire edifice of bariatric medicine, but to 
emphasize that medical science does not take place in an ideological vacuum. While it 
obviously  makes  valuable  contributions  to  our  understanding  of  obesity,  human 
metabolism, and general health, it is also socially situated in a social field riven by fat 
oppression, which means we must be especially sensitive to ensuring that it does more to 
help fat people lead healthier lives than to harm them by contributing to their oppression. 
To reiterate, the pertinent discussion here is not to conclusively determine whether or not 
49 For instance, the rate of eating disorders among Canadian children between the ages of 5 and 12 is twice 
the rate of Type 2 Diabetes; girls, unsurprisingly, outnumbered boys six to one among children found to 
have an eating disorder (Pinhas et al., 2011).
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obesity is a medical problem, but to problematize the notion that science transcends social 
power relationships. Accordingly, there are broader questions to be asked about the social 
and political  implications of a biomedical society in light of fat  oppression.  Kathleen 
LeBesco  (2009),  for  instance,  notes  that  the  popular  tendency  to  use  biological 
determinism as a justification for the extension of rights based on socially 'problematic' 
identities  like  homosexuality  and  obesity  in  fact  obfuscates  (rather  than  resolves) 
processes of homophobic and fatphobic prejudice, as well as raises the spectre of a 'liberal 
eugenics.' Biological essentialism is deeply rooted into popular conceptions of identity, 
and given its ontological implications, I would suggest that a major task for any future 
investigation  into  difference  and oppression  would  be  to  expose and banish  its  toxic 
effects from analysis.
Finally, I will make no attempt to give fat oppression a place in a hierarchy of 
social  injustice;  I  consider  this  both  counter-productive  and  offensive.  Although  all 
processes of structural, social oppression (racism, sexism, homophobia, fatphobia, etc.) 
are  different  and  historically  distinct,  justice  is  not  served  by  prioritizing  and 
subordinating certain forms in relation to others;  many are interrelated,  and each one 
represents a grievous affront to a truly free society. These injustices will not be overcome 
through a transcendence or erasure of human difference; instead, they can only be effaced 
by the recognition of this difference, the affirmation of human diversity, and the infinite 
creative potential of solidarity and cooperation. Active and collaborative, collective effort 
is necessary to smash the bonds of oppression; the hammer of Theory is the instrument of 
liberation.
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We have chewed the fat here for long enough. Our table may have been cleared, 
but elsewhere fatphobia remains on the menu as one of the last socially acceptable preju-
dices; I anticipate that the food for thought I have offered herein has nourished your de-
sire for social justice. Fat oppression is a big bone that remains to be picked, but it is my 
hope that the treatise I present here is a step towards serving the oppressed with a more 
just dessert.
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